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FBIS-EEU-95-224 *21 November 1995*

CONTENTS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FRY, Croatia Sign Agreement on Missing Persons *[TANJUG]* 1
Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Greek Ministers Meet *[Sofia Radio]* 1

ALBANIA

Berisha Addresses Conference on Balkan Stability *[Tirana TV]* 2
Zhulali on Country's Role *[Tirana TV]* 3
Debate Over Legalizing Communist Party Under Way *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 16 Nov]* 4
'Flood' of Investors Buys Privatized Companies *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 16 Nov]* 4

BULGARIA

Pirinski Outlines Foreign Policy Principles *[DUMA 16 Nov]* 6
Pirinski, Ukraine's Udovenko Comment on Talks *[Sofia Radio]* 8
Zhelev, Greece's Stefanopoulos Stress Cooperation *[Sofia Radio]* 8
Stefanopoulos Views Relations *[Athens Radio]* 9
Videnov, Turkish Ambassador View Relations *[Sofia Radio]* 9
Videnov, German Ambassador Discuss Cooperation *[Sofia Radio]* 9

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus Wants Accounting of Army Budget *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 14 Nov]* 11

SLOVAKIA

Daily Anxious About U.S. Political Developments *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 16 Nov]* 12
Poll Reveals Level of Trust in NATO, EU *[NARODNA OBRODA 28 Oct]* 12
Meciar Comments on Recently Adopted Language Law *[Bratislava Radio]* 13
Report Details Approved Version of Language Law *[SME 17 Nov]* 13
SNS: Unions Intent on Toppling Government *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 13 Nov]* 14
Aspects of Army Demographics Noted *[PRAVDA 13 Nov]* 15

HUNGARY

Deputy Seeks Annexation of FRY Border Area *[Budapest Radio]* 16
Editorial Deplores Recent Slovak Language Law *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 17 Nov]* 16
Bokros Views Coalition, Stabilization Programs *[TALLOZO 14 Sep]* 17
Ministry on Army Restructuring Implementation *[MAGYAR HONVED 15 Sep]* 20

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Peace Talks Apparently End; Final Outcome Unclear 22
'Key Turning Point' 20 Nov *[Sarajevo Radio]* 22
Serbs Insist on Wider Corridor *[Zagreb TV]* 22
Bosnian Says Talks 'Have Broken Up' *[AFP]* 23
Both Sides Demanding Brcko *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
Spokesman on 'Failed' Talks *[AFP]* 23

New Demands From Serbs Claimed *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
Modrica Residents Issue Protest Over Posavina *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
Bosnian Posavina Citizens Adopt Memorandum *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
Herzeg-Bosnia Croats View Map Negotiations *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 15 Nov]* 25
MBO Supports Dayton Agreement on Federation *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Commentary Notes Status of Milosevic, Yugoslavia *[Belgrade Radio]* 25
Ganic Discusses Formation of Federal Government *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
FRY Army Exercises 'Threatening' Bosniak People *[Sarajevo Radio]* 27
Mujahedeen Commander Threatens To 'Fight On' *[TANJUG]* 27
Bosnian Croats Blame Muslims for Indictments *[TANJUG]* 27
Croats Warn Hague Court of 'Consequences' *[Mostar Radio]* 28
Tomic on Reconstruction, Federal Financial System *[VECERNJI LIST 12 Nov]* 28
Interior Minister Views Interethnic Relations *[OSLOBODJENJE 23 Nov]* 30
SGV Official Interviewed on 'Loyal Serbs' *[LJILJAN 15 Nov]* 32

CROATIA

Official on Suspension of Dayton Talks *[AFP]* 35
Deal Reached with FRY on Detained Persons *[Zagreb Radio]* 35
Parties Comment on Dayton Negotiations *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 20 Nov]* 35
Commentary on Dayton Negotiations, Tudjman Actions *[NOVI LIST 20 Nov]* 36
Krajina Serbs Said Tricked Into Surrendering *[TANJUG]* 37
Conduct of Russian UN Forces Criticized *[VJESNIK 10 Nov]* 38
Matesa Discusses Kordic, Privatization Issues *[GLOBUS 17 Nov]* 39
Commentary Views Reasons for Blaskic Promotion *[NOVI LIST 16 Nov]* 43
Publishing House Controversy Discussed *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 12 Nov]* 45

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Frckovski To Remain as Interior Minister *[MIC]* 46
Greece Abolishes Border Insurance for Vehicles *[MIC]* 46

POLAND

Kwasniewski Officially Declared Winner *[Warsaw Radio]* 47
Kwasniewski Statement on Elections *[Warsaw TV]* 47
News Conference Postponed *[PAP]* 48
Walesa Gives Postelection Statement *[Warsaw TV]* 48
Walesa Postelection News Conference *[Warsaw Radio]* 49
Walesa: No Cooperation With Kwasniewski Government *[PAP]* 53
Walesa Refuses To Hand Insignia to Kwasniewski *[Warsaw Radio]* 53
Foreign Minister Bartoszewski Resigns *[Warsaw Radio]* 53
Oleksy on Bartoszewski, Okonski Resignations *[Warsaw Radio]* 54
Army Chief Has No Intention of Resigning *[Warsaw Radio]* 54
KRRiTV Head Will Not Submit Resignation *[Warsaw Radio]* 54
SLD-PSL Coalition Continues To Function *[Warsaw Radio]* 55
Spokeswoman on Cooperation With New President *[PAP]* 55
Sejm Speaker Hopes Warsaw Continues Reforms *[Warsaw Radio]* 55
Investigation Into Kwasniewski's Affairs Suspended *[Warsaw Radio]* 55
Poles Cautious About New President *[London THE TIMES 21 Nov]* 56
NATO Reply on Troop Deployment to Bosnia Awaited *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 20 Nov]* 57
General Views 1996 Defense Budget *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 13 Nov]* 58
Chief of General Staff on Reforms in Army *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 17-19 Nov]* 59
Tribunal Rules Against Walesa Appeal on Pensions *[Warsaw TV]* 60
Episcopate Rejects Changes to Concordat Declaration *[Warsaw Radio]* 61

British Corruption Alleged in Printing of Money *[PAP]* 61

ROMANIA

Iliescu 'Concerned' by 'Monetary Developments' *[Bucharest Radio]* 62
CDR Also Expresses 'Concern' *[Bucharest Radio]* 62
UDMR Meeting Assesses Slovak Language Law *[Budapest Radio]* 62
Army Reports Compliance With Paris Arms Treaty *[Bucharest Radio]* 62
Composition of Arms Production Commission Defined *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 13 Nov]* 63

SLOVENIA

Foreign Ministry Urges Non-Recognition of FRY *[TANJUG]* 65

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Belgrade: 'Too Much' Invested for Talks To Fail *[Belgrade Radio]* 66
Foreign Minister, Canadian Diplomat Hold Talks *[TANJUG]* 66

Serbia

Information Minister, Romanian TV Director Meet *[TANJUG]* 66
Probe To Disprove Srebrenica Accusations Urged *[POLITIKA 19 Nov]* 67
New Democracy Wants Sanctions Lifted, Refugee Aid *[Belgrade Radio]* 68
Weekly Explains 'Disputes' in POLITIKA *[VREME 13 Nov]* 68
Jovic's Diary Fails To Appear in Stores *[NASA BORBA 13 Nov]* 70
Official Presents Industrial Production Statistics *[Belgrade Radio]* 71

Montenegro

Prime Minister to Meet With UK Foreign Secretary *[Belgrade Radio]* 71

Kosovo

Rugova Urges Political Parties to Cooperate *[Tirana TV]* 72
Newspapers Reportedly Publish 'Plan K' *[Ljubljana Radio]* 72
Serb Anti-Albanian Violence in October Reported *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 73
Former Policemen Criticize Serb 'Persecution' *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 73

FRY, Croatia Sign Agreement on Missing Persons

LD2011201395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2007 GMT 20 Nov 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dayton, Nov 20 (TANJUG)—In Dayton on Monday, Yugoslavia and Croatia signed an agreement on looking for the missing persons in their territories.

This matter would be assigned to a joint commission to be set up under the agreement signed by Yugoslav and Croatian Foreign Ministers Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic.

Also agreed was that the commission should comprise two vice premiers to underscore the significance of this matter.

By last May Croatia claimed that 2,800 its people were missing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which said around 1,000 of its people were missing in Croatia.

However, several thousand more Serbs have been missing following Croatia's aggressions in May and August against western, southern and northern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

At the relevant talks so far, the Serb side indicated that the figure set by the Croatian side was exaggerated because Croatia itself knew very well that some of its missing were killed on battlefronts.

Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Greek Ministers Meet

AU2111091895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 November Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, and Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias met at the Boyana residence at the invitation of Mr. Pirinski.

They discussed issues of regional infrastructure. The meeting was prompted by the fact that six of the nine trans-European highways proposed by the EU pass through the three countries, Mr. Pirinski said after the meeting.

Minister Udovenko and Minister Papoulias have fully endorsed the idea of adopting coordinated initiatives with a view to most rapidly and successfully developing regional infrastructure projects in all directions, Mr. Pirinski added.

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Berisha Addresses Conference on Balkan Stability

AU2011200995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 17 Nov 95

[Report by Amalia Dhamo, including address by President Sali Berisha—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] A conference entitled Factors of Stability in the Balkans, organized by the Albanian North Atlantic Association, opened at one of the Palace of Congresses halls in Tirana this evening.

After the opening speech by the association chairman, Mr. Moisiu, the president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, addressed the conference. After assessing the opening of the conference, Berisha stated:

[Begin recording] Albania is rapidly progressing on the road of political, economic, and social reform. It is developing democracy and consolidating the market economy. Albania has again resumed its place in the family of civilized nations and is being integrated into Europe and the West. Such a conference, attended by officials, NATO representatives, and NATO member states, is an indication of the great changes that have occurred. This would have been unimaginable five years ago. I would say that the country's major achievement over the last few years was the radical expansion of openness, freedom, and the consolidation of democracy. Since the historic victory of the anticommunist opposition in March 1992, the country has held two other polls on a national scale, which have been accepted worldwide as free and just. Today, the freedom of thought, expression, and belief, as well as freedom of initiative, lie at the foundation of the society we are building. To support them, there is extensive legislation, approved in the past four years and based on the West European model. In acknowledgment of this progress, there was Albania's unanimous admission into the Council of Europe.

In the economic field, the changes are also impressive. From a country of total autarchy in the past and of galloping inflation in 1991, Albania has managed to assure its macroeconomic stability and have an economic growth rate twice as high as the rate of inflation. Privatization and free initiative have made it possible to, at present, carry out 82 percent of the volume of the trade with the European Union. Three quarters of the country's gross production comes from the private sector, which currently creates four-fifths of job vacancies.

Albanians have had a long and difficult journey in their history. They suffered under occupations and dictatorships, but preserved untouched their dream for integration into Europe, to which they belong and to whose history and culture they have contributed. The past three years have testified to that. Albania's international reorientation under this government has created a line that was long desired. The integration into the euro-atlantic community constitutes the strategic goal of the country's foreign policy. I can assert with pleasure that, over the past four years, the relations with the European states and the United States have known a expeditious and striking development that is evident in the high-level visits and the reaching of interstate agreements. Thus, by becoming a member of the Council of Europe, Albania aims to raise the level of agreements with the European Union and cooperation with the Western European Union.

In this framework, the cooperation with NATO plays a significant role. The Atlantic alliance continues to be the foundation stone of European security. The alliance serves as the bastion of freedom and Western values. I am convinced that this alliance saved mankind from the terrible apocalypse that the communist cliques tried to provoke by applying their theory of the world revolution. It assured an incomparable peace and prosperity, but only for half of our continent. I think that there is now an historic chance to extend peace and prosperity in the East. Integration is the only way to dominate nationalism and strengthen democracy in eastern Europe.

Integration into NATO is a matter of vital interest for Albania. In it, we see not only an international guarantee of the country's security, but also a guarantee for the new Albanian democracy. As the leader of the opposition, I requested membership in NATO in 1991. A year later, I did the same thing as head of state. I have expressed the same stance to the North Atlantic Council during my three visits to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Although I am convinced that the admission of a former communist country into the Alliance cannot be done in the blink of an eye, I think that the Partnership for Peace program offers an excellent possibility to cooperate and learn. It is a journey toward the NATO criteria and standards. However, the end of the journey remains full membership in the alliance. At least, this is Albania's will.

Meanwhile, the concrete cooperation with NATO has known rapid and continuous increase. A good indication of this is the number and the quality of the maneuvers carried out with the United States and other allied countries here, as well as our troops' participation in exercises organized in the NATO countries. Albania has offered its air bases to the alliance for its missions that aim to establish peace in the former Yugoslavia. We remain loyal to this promise today and will do so in the future.

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NATO's role as the sole force for intervening with determination and imposing peace was best proven in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. There were the air strikes by the allied air forces and the assaults by the Rapid Reaction Force, made up of the allies, which, together with the successful Croat offensive in Krajina, restrained the Serbian aggression that was being developed in the middle of Europe with methods that the civilized world considered dead and buried long ago. The new situation that has was created left space for the energetic diplomacy of the United States to reach the Geneva accord, which, let us hope, will soon be followed by the Dayton peace agreement. The deployment of NATO troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a decisive condition for extinguishing the flames of conflict that threaten to engulf the Balkan peninsula in general and further afield.

However, we should not forget that peace should be just and permanent. No peace reached in the former Yugoslavia can be permanent if it does not offer a solution to the question of Kosova. Leaving this problem aside would only bring a permanent and explosive danger to the south of the Balkans and beyond. The inclusion of Kosova in the Contact Group agenda would have been a long-sighted action on the part of the great powers. Linking the ending of the punitive measures against Belgrade to the normalization of life in Kosova and the reaching and implementation of an agreement with the legitimate Kosova leadership on the status of Kosova would have been the most efficient lever in the hands of the international community.

Albania is against the changing of borders by force and respects the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] obligations. With its internal stability and its responsible policies in the region, it has turned into an important factor of stability for the Balkans. It will continue to remain so. However, the question of Kosova will remain as the focus of its diplomatic activity and efforts. A solution to this issue would enable the 2 million Albanians who live on the territories that have been theirs since ancient times to win back the human and national rights that are due to them. This solution is, however, of vital importance for the future of the entire region, as it would eliminate the most dangerous center of the destabilization that can develop from the Serbian violence.

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a clear example of how extreme nationalism can create a human tragedy on a national and regional scale. Such phenomenons, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, were released from the communist refrigerator and currently constitute the most serious challenge that the new democracies in Central and East Europe have to face. In our efforts to avoid and reduce it, to build a future different from the past, we should be liberated from the obsessions of history and particularly from its atavisms. The united Europe, which has strangled its traditional enmities through integration, is an excellent example for us. Integration should be our formula in the Balkans. The close cooperation of our democracies is the only certain road toward the European Union. The development of political dialogue, common economic and trade interests, and economic relations are the bases for building a better future for the entire region. This will also accelerate our integration into the European Union. We, ourselves, should have to face the burden of this task, however, we have had and will have the support of the Western world.

At the end of my speech, I would like to express once again my best wishes for a fruitful and successful conference. Thank you. [end recording]

[Dhamo] Government members, deputies, officials from the diplomatic missions accredited in Tirana, scholars from the counterpart associations in NATO, the United States, Germany, France, England, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Belgium, Romania, Slovenia, the George Marshall Center of Strategic Studies in Germany, journalists, and others are participating in the conference.

The conference continues its proceedings.

Zhulali on Country's Role

AU2011202095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 18 Nov 95

[Report by Amalia Dhamo]

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Safet Zhulali opened the second day of the conference entitled Factors of Stability in the Balkans. After analyzing the current situation in the Balkans, Zhulali stressed the fact that, although a small nation divided into several states with an ethnic and geographical continuity, the Albanians are playing an important role and are factors of stability in the Balkans. We feel a special pleasure when we think that the Albanian Army, which, four years ago, was the most isolated segment of the Albanian state in the communist period, has now become an excellent example of cooperation. No one would ever imagine, Zhulali continued, that, within such a short period of time, our armed forces would have signed military cooperation agreements with almost all NATO member countries and with all the Balkan countries that are members of the OSCE [Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe].

The themes discussed on the second day in three sessions were: NATO and other factors of stability in

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Southeast Europe, NATO's influence in the disintegrated Yugoslavia, the Atlantic Association in the region, and the role of the media and youth, and their importance in good understanding and cooperation in the region. Leaders and members of the Albanian North Atlantic Association and of the Atlantic associations of Bulgaria, Germany, France, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and people from the NATO Political Affairs Department, from the Marshall European Center on Security Studies, and from the International Institute on Strategic Studies in London lectured on these topics.

At the end of the sessions, leaders from the NATO International Military Staff and from the Institute of Strategic Studies in Tirana, as well as the secretary general of the Italian Atlantic Committee also took the floor. At the conference, opinions and viewpoints were also exchanged on turning the Balkans from a producer of war and insecurity, as it is today, into an area of peace and stability. Many ethnic communities live in the Balkans, with different languages, traditions, histories, and interests, but fate has placed them close to one another. That is why they should find a way to live in continuous peace and harmony.

Considering the latest developments, the conference stressed that NATO and the United States are playing a decisive and very important role in establishing peace in this turbulent region. The Atlantic alliance continues to remain the foundation stone of European security, the conference underlined. In it, Albania sees not only the international guarantee of the country's security, but also a guarantee o the new Albanian democracy.

The conference entitled, Factors of Stability in the Balkans, organized by the Albanian North Atlantic Association, concluded its proceedings at 1800 this evening.

Debate Over Legalizing Communist Party Under Way

AU2011161695 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 16 Nov 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Legalizing the Communists?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—A Communist Party in Albania? The debate has been rekindled recently, and controversy has immediately erupted; prompted more by a conception of pluralism than any concrete demand, it has now enveloped representatives of the opposition and senior Albanian officials. Members of the Socialist Party have justified the creation of such a party as something normal and acceptable to the rules of democracy in a multiparty system, while People's Assembly Chairman Arbnori has opposed it, referring to the reasons that led to the party being banned: "It called for an uprising and other behavior that conflicts with the constitution," he told the BBC yesterday.

For representatives of the Socialists, legalizing a communist party is a normal matter, like the legalizing of other parties. Mr. Brokaj explained that "The presence of different opinions and views of the world is permitted and is acceptable under pluralism, which presupposes that people sharing the same views will organize themselves into their own parties. On the basis of this conception of pluralism, there is no reason to obstruct the creation of a communist party."

People's Assembly Chairman Pjeter Arbnori retorts with the reasons why communists have been deprived of the opportunity to form their party. "It was banned because it called for the overthrow of the regime and issued many now-familiar appeals of this kind." Arbnori was, nevertheless, not categorical. While attacking the Socialists, he nevertheless said that "they can apply," and referred once again to the law. "No anticonstitutional party can exist, but parties that are within the constitution and respect the law, human rights, and pluralism have their place." However, there are still shortcomings in the realization in practice of party pluralism as the Socialists conceive it.

The issue of the Albanian Communist Party reemerged on the scene recently because of a new Internationale, at which the foreign press claims that representatives from Albania were also present. However, the former members of the Communist Party themselves have confirmed nothing and it is still not known whether or not they had representatives at the Internationale's founding meeting. Hysni Milloshi, the former Communist leader after the period of transition, has denied in the press having gone, although he said that his name had been put forward by the members of the presidium of the newly created organization.

'Flood' of Investors Buys Privatized Companies

AU2011161595 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 16 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by Arlanda Causholli: "Twenty Enterprises Privatized: 4,100 New Shareholders Since Yesterday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Now there are more that 4,100 shareholders of the first 20 companies that have emerged on the private market. Although people were "cool" for three weeks toward the list of companies for privatization that appeared every night on the television screen, they came in a flood in the final week, depositing 740 million leks worth of privatization leks and vouchers at the National Privatization Agency.

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"The first phase of the privatization of these companies can be considered successful," said Niko Gllozheni, chairman of the National Privatization Agency, at his news conference. This round ended on 25 October, and this has been a very fruitful period for the 4,100 new shareholders, not counting the increased numbers of landowners. One significant feature is that people have preferred not to invest outside their own districts. It has turned out that 95 percent of investors are regularly from the town where the company is based. Only 5 percent have travelled a few kilometers in order to realize their dream of becoming landowners. The largest number of shareholders is in Elbasan, with 471 people investing in the Metallurgical Works. Only 16 shareholders registered for Agrotregtarja in Mirdite. No less than 233 people have bought shares in a company based at Llogara, because it is a tourist resort and because of its very favorable natural position. These shareholders are from Vlore, Fier, Kurbin, Tirana, Lushnje, Korce, Tepelene, Durres, and Kukes. "The demand of the Independent Trade Unions that not only enterprise employees but also laid-off workers should be given full voucher rights has had its own effect," Gllozheni explained, "and there was therefore a great flood of people wishing to register. They continued signing up their names until 2300 on 25 October, which was the last deadline." The elderly will also have a share in ownership. The members of the War Veterans Associations collected bonds and were interested in becoming shareholders. A total of 350 companies will be placed in private hands during the three waves of privatization.

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Pirinski Outlines Foreign Policy Principles

AU2111092795 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Nov 95 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski by Vasil Popov; place and date not given: "Time for Pragmatic and Active Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popov] Why did you assess as very important the meeting that you had with Spanish Foreign Minister Solana during a session of the Western European Union [WEU]?

[Pirinski] First of all, it was a continuation of the dialogue that began in Sofia at the level of prime ministers during the visit of Filipe Gonzalez. Second, at present Spain is chairman both of the EU and the WEU, which is very important against the background of the forthcoming reforms in those organizations. Third, the scope of Spanish diplomacy extends beyond Europe and it plays an active role in Europe-United States and Europe-Latin America relations, as well as in the Mediterranean.

The fact that I could talk to Mr. Solana is very important, especially when one notes that 25 foreign ministers of WEU member-states were in Madrid. All of them requested meetings with Solana, but he agreed to only four or five meetings. We are not even a full member, but only an associate WEU member. This was an indication that Madrid really attributes importance to Bulgaria.

[Popov] What specifically happened at the meeting with Solana apart from briefing him on Bulgaria's positions?

[Pirinski] In the first 20 to 30 minutes, Mr. Solana listened to my presentation on the issues that interest the Bulgarians today. These include the negative EU list, the postconflict situation in former Yugoslavia, the common problems of the infrastructure in our region, the common problems related to EU membership, European security, and the comprehensive aspects of bilateral Spanish-Bulgarian relations. This is very important. I have participated in many meetings, but I have rarely had the opportunity of presenting my arguments in such a detailed and comprehensive manner and have been given to understand that they have been accepted. The meeting was attended by the three most important general directors of the Spanish Foreign Ministry, those in charge of bilateral relations, European integration, and visa and emigration issues.

[Popov] What was Solana's reaction to the issues that you presented?

[Pirinski] He confirmed Spain's commitment, which is not a formal matter or a political statement such as "yes, we support you." Solana expressed a readiness to establish working relations both in Brussels and Madrid on all the issues that I brought up.

[Popov] Did you discuss the negative list?

[Pirinski] The Spanish side stressed the possibilities related to the change that will be introduced in January, namely, making decisions by a qualified majority, rather than by consensus, as the situation now is.

Solana very positively supported the proposal to hold bilateral consultations in the first half of 1996 at the level of foreign ministry leaderships, on bilateral relations, European integration, and relations with third countries.

In addition, I had the opportunity to receive direct and real information on the development of the EU reforms and the situation with the dialogue with the United States and the preparations for the 3 December meeting in Madrid, which will be attended by President Clinton. The meeting will take place on the basis of a previous agreement on transatlantic cooperation, first of all in the trade and economic sphere. We also heard about the processes in the Mediterranean and the meeting in Barcelona at the end of the month, where Spain will have a leading role.

[Popov] Can we be sure that such an attitude toward our country will also remain after 1 January, when Italy replaces Spain as EU chairman?

[Pirinski] We have conducted very intensive contacts with Italy in recent months at the level of state secretaries on foreign affairs. Italy has an even more positive public position on incorporating Bulgaria into regional development plans. The Italian representatives openly declare that Bulgaria, together with Romania and Hungary, have every reason to be included in those plans. We can rely on Italy's active cooperation when it begins its term as EU chairman. Do not forget that Spain remains a member of the troika, which will facilitate further active cooperation.

However, there is something else that I would like to stress. We always turn to the other side to get reassurance whether we are being helped, insulted, or loved. We must understand that it first of all depends on us, our actions in Bulgaria, and the positions that we succeed in asserting on the basis of national unity of thought and consensus. This was the case with the European Parliament's resolution on the negative list. In that case, we succeeded in building up a strong position for the parliament, government, and president on the basis of national consensus. Two representatives of the two basic and opposing Bulgarian political coalitions were in Strasbourg when the resolution was passed and

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this had a strong influence. It is up to us to what degree we succeed in behaving as Europeans.

[Popov] How important are Bulgaria's foreign policy positions?

[Pirinski] We may have reason for our lower self-confidence, but we ourselves are responsible for this, mostly because we refuse objectively to see the real role that we could have. Since September, Bulgaria has been visited by the Russian foreign minister, U.S. Deputy Foreign Secretary Holbrooke, and EU Chairman Felipe Gonzalez. The official visits of the past are a rare event now. You see how in Europe and the world all important contacts on current issues, starting from the U.S. and Russian presidents, and including all European leaders, are taking place through direct telecommunications links and telephone conversations. This is a permanent, daily, and pragmatic diplomacy. The direct meetings are the visible manifestations of a permanent dialogue, which is taking place in multilateral international forums in Brussels, Luxembourg, Geneva, and New York.

As a state, we must strive toward a certain standard of behavior with sufficient consistency, depth, argumentation, and planned steps, which should be stable, rather than depending on what somebody decides to say on a certain issue or influence public opinion at a certain moment.

[Popov] Is there a scandal over changing the 11 ambassadors?

[Pirinski] The issue is important not from the point of view of those individuals or candidates, but from the necessity to have clear fundamental political principles and a clear understanding on how our foreign policy must be conducted. I do not accept the claim that one of the institutions—in this case the Presidency—can conduct an independent foreign policy without taking into consideration or even consulting the government and its specialized organization—the Foreign Ministry.

The things are very clear in the Bulgarian Constitution. The president really represents the state, but the relevant article points to something in the previous sentence, namely, that the president represents the unity of the nation. This is the prerequisite for representing the nation. He can represent it if he reflects its unity.

Obviously, the sphere of foreign policy is a subject of political confrontation. Each political force includes foreign policy priorities in its platform, which do not always coincide. The argument in an election campaign also encompasses foreign policy. The question is: Is the head of state entitled to conduct a foreign policy that differs from the foreign policy of the government, which is backed by a majority in parliament?

[Popov] However, there are national priorities that come before party interests.

[Pirinski] They must be defined on the basis of serious dialogue between the political forces in the president's Consultative Council on National Security. This is how the things should be in this realm. Then the president could represent the nation on the basis of a national position reached after a discussion. However, on issues of current foreign policy, a matter of infrastructure policy and various short- and medium-term political tasks, responsible behavior requires total coordination with the position of the majority and stressing that competence in foreign policy belongs to the government, the institution formed by the parliamentary majority. This is a solid position, which makes you more trustworthy, because it demonstrates a unity of the political institutions on the issue of how foreign policy must be formulated and conducted. For example, it is not serious to say "I ensured one of the corridors, so you ensure the other." This is not a serious position at all.

[Popov] How do you assess the refusal of the president to sign the decrees. What is it all about?

[Pirinski] This involves several things. First of all, this is an incorrect application of the specific articles of the Constitution, which point out that the president issues decrees. This does not imply that the president has the right to appoint and dismiss diplomats independently, but rather that he has the right to issue official state decrees on the basis of and in accordance with proposals of the government. When he is in doubt over the qualities of an appointee or has other considerations, the president—again on the basis of the Constitution—has the right and even the duty to approach the government and point out where he thinks there is a mistake and where opinions do not coincide. However, simply stating that he will not sign the decrees goes far beyond his constitutional prerogatives. This is turning things upside down. The Constitution points out that Bulgaria is a parliamentary system, not a presidential one.

The second factor involved is the deliberate search for a position that differs from the government's, even when candidates are proposed who should by no means disturb the president. These candidates include presidential advisers and Foreign Ministry diplomats. There could be no doubt regarding their professional qualities. Since a negative and totally confrontational position is assumed, it is obviously that confrontation is being sought, which should outline the president's position toward the ruling party. Obviously, he has certain specific political intentions.

Third—an insufficiently understood responsibility is involved here. In allowing himself to exceed the constitu-

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tional authority of his institution, the president is simply introducing a purely political element of confrontation, which in the final analysis—whether deliberately or not—hurts the authority of the Presidency itself and the constitutional foundations and postulates. This is totally unjustifiable behavior.

Pirinski, Ukraine's Udovenko Comment on Talks

AU2111083495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 20 Nov 95

[Announcer-read report on the visit of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, with recorded statements by Udovenko and Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski in Sofia on 20 November]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Sofia this morning, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko continued his meetings within the framework of his two-day visit. After talks at the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry with his Bulgarian counterpart Georgi Pirinski, he had meetings with National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov and members of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission.

At his meeting with Blagovest Sendov, Hennadiy Udovenko expressed thanks for Bulgaria's assistance in connection with Ukraine joining the Council of Europe. It was confirmed that, on 28 November, a Bulgarian parliamentary delegation led by Sendov will make a three-day visit to Ukraine. At the moment, Hennadiy Udovenko has a meeting scheduled with President Zhelyu Zhelev.

Here is how Ministers Pirinski and Udovenko summarized the results of their talks at the Foreign Ministry this morning:

[Pirinski] In fact our meeting this morning concentrated on the economic field of our bilateral relations. As you have already been informed, we had the opportunity yesterday to discuss issues relating to cooperation in the political, cultural, and humanitarian fields.

We will sign some extremely important agreements during Mr. Udovenko's visit: an agreement on avoidance of double taxation, a new agreement on trade and economic cooperation, and an agreement on the operation of the Varna-Ilichevsk ferry line. At our meeting, we established that the Bulgarian firms operating in Ukraine, Ukrainian firms operating in Bulgaria, and mixed Bulgarian-Ukrainian enterprises now number about 100. For them, the avoidance of double taxation is of extreme importance.

One of the fields in which we reached agreement on making a joint analysis is the structure and volume of our bilateral trade.

[Udovenko, in Ukrainian fading into Bulgarian translation] As a result, additional protocols will be signed, Hennadiy Udovenko said, relating to the consultations completed at the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry and the problems, which were not passed over in silence. We discussed certain issues relating to the Ukrainian debts to Bulgaria in connection with gas deliveries, he added. In all likelihood, he said, a joint meeting of experts will be held before the end of the year to discuss the completion of construction and future operation of the iron-ore plant.

Zhelev, Greece's Stefanopoulos Stress Cooperation

AU2111083595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Greek President Konstandinos Stefanopoulos is making an official visit to Bulgaria. Our reporter Silviya Velikova reports on his first day in Bulgaria;

[Velikova] The visit is taking place at the invitation of Bulgarian President Zhelev. It has repeatedly been pointed out that this is the first visit of a Greek head of state to Bulgaria since 1989.

Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski and his Greek counterpart Karolos Papoulias attended the talks of the official Bulgarian and Greek delegations. At the talks, as well as at the preceding private meeting of Presidents Zhelev and Stefanopoulos, issues related to bilateral and multilateral cooperation were discussed.

Bulgaria was supported by Greece in its quest to be admitted as a full-fledged member to the EU and NATO. The two presidents expressed the common position that Bulgarian-Greek trade cooperation must be strengthened.

The readiness to open new checkpoints along the Bulgarian-Greek border was discussed. Resolving the issue of the Mesta River water was also discussed.

The conflict in former Yugoslavia is an inevitable subject in the talks of two Balkan presidents. The issue was discussed within the context of the two countries' participation in the mini-Marshall Plan.

President Stefanopoulos said to journalists that the participation of Bulgaria and Greece in this plan offers a new opportunity of Balkan cooperation, as well as cooperation between the two countries. According to him all issues discussed with President Zhelev have arisen from the good cooperation between the two countries, rather than from any differences between the Bulgarian and Greek positions.

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In their brief statements for the press, Presidents Zhelev and Stefanopoulos said that a common willingness to resolve all issues was expressed. This common willingness was visibly expressed in the numerous handshakes between the two presidents.

Stefanopoulos Views Relations

NC2111074195 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 0500 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Konstandinos Stefanopoulos, accompanied by Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias, has been on a three-day official visit in Bulgaria since noon yesterday.

In his reply address at last night's official dinner, which was hosted in his honor by President Zhelyu Zhelev, Mr. Stefanopoulos stressed that the main characteristic of Greek-Bulgarian cordial understanding is that it is not directed nor could it be interpreted as being directed against third parties. Mr. Stefanopoulos noted that the basic positions of Greece and Bulgaria agree in their objection to the establishment of axes and inter-Balkan blocs. He also stressed Greece's unconditional and unselfish support for Bulgaria's accession to the euro-atlantic institutions.

Referring to imminent agreements between the two countries, President Stefanopoulos noted that they settle issues which have been pending for decades and open a new chapter in the two countries' bilateral relations. Our correspondent Kiki Pappa has the following report:

[Begin recording] The main characteristic of the Greek-Bulgarian cordial understanding is that it is not direct nor can it be interpreted as being directed against third parties. This was stressed by President Stefanopoulos in his reply address at the dinner hosted in his honor by President Zhelev. Mr. Stefanopoulos also emphasized that the basic positions of both Greece and Bulgaria agree in their objection to the establishment of axes and inter- Balkan blocs and, moreover, made the appraisal that when and where such axes existed they only brought about hardship and disaster.

The Greek president stressed the positive repercussions for both Athens and Sofia from closer cooperation and emphasized Greece's unconditional and unselfish support for Bulgaria's accession to the euro-atlantic institutions.

On the imminent agreements for the Nestos river waters, the opening of three new road arteries and border crossings, and the employment of Bulgarian workers in Greece, Mr. Stefanopoulos said that with these we settle issues which have been pending for decades and open a new chapter in bilateral relations. Mr. Stefanopoulos emphasized at this point that the construction of the Burgas- Alexandroupolis oil pipeline will prove in the best manner possible the benefits of cooperation. Mr. Stefanopoulos concluded by noting that our common interests call upon us to undertake initiatives for trade transport in the Balkan hinterland and central Europe.

Bulgarian President Zhelev referred in his address to the cultural bonds linking the two countries and stressed that Greece, which experienced a period of dictatorship, might understand better how important is for Bulgaria to be supported in its efforts for European orientation. Mr. Zhelev also said that he considers Greece's assistance in this direction as absolutely natural since Bulgaria has a duty to contribute toward the European future of the Balkans. [end recording]

Videnov, Turkish Ambassador View Relations

AU2011210995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 November Prime Minister Zhan Videnov received Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik for their first official meeting.

The prime minister stressed that intensifying the European integration processes and calming the Balkans will facilitate the intensification of bilateral relations. It was pointed out that the two countries have a great many areas of mutual interest, which require the intensification of the dialogue at various levels.

Turkey highly values the Democratic Left government, the Turkish ambassador said. It is in this spirit that the upcoming visits to Turkey of Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev and Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski will take place at the beginning of next year, as well as the visit of the future Turkish prime minister to Sofia in the summer of 1996.

Videnov, German Ambassador Discuss Cooperation

AU2011211495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 November Prime Minister Videnov received German Ambassador to Bulgaria Peter (Medier). He pointed out that stabilizing the socioeconomic indices in Bulgaria will contribute to intensifying bilateral relations and accelerating the integration processes with the EU. It is in this context that one should view the topical common projects in the fields of financing, banking, communications, and agriculture.

According to Ambassador (Medier) there is good prospects for cooperation in the privatization processes. He demonstrated interest in the specific steps Bulgaria is taking in its integration with the EU and expressed

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the readiness of the German Government to cooperate with our country in this area.

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Klaus Wants Accounting of Army Budget

AU1811175395 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 14 Nov 95 p 1

[Article by "(km, gag)": "Until the Army Transforms Itself, It Will Not Get Extra Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Following yesterday's meeting of the economic ministers, which dealt mainly with the Army's economic performance, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus asked Defense Minister Vilem Holan to draft a new concept for developing the Army.

Klaus has thus made it clear that he does not want to resolve the difficult financial situation in the Army by merely increasing its budget, which the majority of the department's representatives are calling for, but that he wants to know how and for what the money from the preceding budget—about 28 billion korunas—is being used.

"We want a new concept for the Army," declared Klaus yesterday. He said that the Defense Ministry has to prepare by mid-December an analysis of the current situation within the Army, an analysis that will form the basis for its new structure.

In essence, this means in practice that the Army will have to reassess the majority of its objectives and programs and determine which are more important and which are less important. So, it could be that the Army will have to abandon some of its military exercises and modernization plans for replacing its hardware, or curtail them radically.

"A further reduction in Army numbers is likely. At the moment, however, this does not concern me. Whether there will be more tanks in it and fewer troops or vice versa will be part of the aforementioned concept," stated the prime minister.

The ministers agreed at their meeting that a concept that was not based on the state's economic potential has been applied until now in the defense department. "It is simply impossible to have a grand concept and then to say that it is not financeable," declared the prime minister.

The economic ministers, who, apart from Holan, were joined by the two deputy defense ministers Petr Necas and Miroslav Kalousek and the Army chief Jiri Nekvasil, also pointed out that the new concept will have a fundamental influence on the plan for modernizing the weaponry.

"In the course of time, we will discuss the future system for public tenders—that is, which tenders will be under the deputy minister's jurisdiction, which will be under the minister's jurisdiction, and which will be under the jurisdiction of this kind of ministerial consultative meeting or, conceivably, the government," said Klaus.

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Daily Anxious About U.S. Political Developments

AU2011153395 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 16 Nov 95 p 1

[Editorial by Lubomir Hudo in the "Public Matter" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] If you happen to be in the United States, you will not have a chance to visit the Statue of Liberty in New York, Alcatraz prison in San Francisco, or the national parks, including the Grand Canyon, because they are closed due to the budgetary and political crisis in the United States. This sad news will surely not intrinsically affect 90 percent of Slovaks. What should intrinsically affect the majority of Slovaks, however, is when someone is turning their native country into a permanent target of expressions of concern, demarches, and doubts about its democratic development. Even our contemporary models do not have the cleanest of records, and, all too frequently, they use double standards.

The world's attention is currently focused on a country whose government has found itself "without money" and has stopped all except the most essential activities, and whose diplomats and consuls abroad, while present at their workplaces, provide only urgent services to their countrymen. The state as a whole is threatened with insolvency. Yet this is not all. Some 800,000 of 2 million federal employees must "enjoy" their compulsory unpaid vacation, several cultural and educational institutions have been closed, the President refuses to sign temporary laws that would secure the financing of the state, and an important visit by the head of state to one of the economic great powers of the world has to be cut by half. This country is the United States—the contemporary example of brighter democratic tomorrows! However, a little bit of quarreling between the Republican Congress and Democratic President Bill Clinton over budgetary issues (and not just over them) cannot be taken as a threat to the democratic system, can it?

It is high time to express concern over the domestic political developments in the United States because we in Slovakia, too, have the right to be anxious about the impact of these events on the lives of ordinary Americans.

Poll Reveals Level of Trust in NATO, EU

AU2111122895 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Juraj Alner: "Supporters of the Party of the Democratic Left Do Not Trust NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—NATO was trusted by 36 percent of respondents in a poll conducted by the FOCUS agency in October. This was 6-percent less than last year and 9 percent less than in 1993. The number of those who do not know whether to trust NATO has increased in Slovakia, on the other hand: from 17 percent two years ago to 31 percent at present, the same as the number of those who do not know whether to trust the EU (we published the results of the poll on the EU yesterday).

Especially women (41 percent against 20 percent of men), people with only elementary education (38 percent against 17 percent of university graduates), and residents of central Slovakia (39 percent against 13 percent of Bratislava residents) are unable to reply. NATO is trusted by 35 percent of ethnic Slovaks and 45 percent of ethnic Hungarians.

The poll revealed that the citizens' feeling of uncertainty regarding both Western alliances has grown in the past two years. This bears witness to at least two phenomena: Information campaigns about NATO and the EU are absolutely inadequate, and propaganda is heading in a direction that does not have a pro-European effect. Both of these phenomena are negative for Slovakia because now is the time when our future participation is being decided on the basis of a great many criteria.

The activities of political parties and movements and their representatives have considerable influence on citizens. The least degree of trust in the EU and NATO has clearly been shown by those who consider themselves nonvoters and those who are undecided as for whom to vote.

The table of those who "trust the EU" is topped, by a wide margin, by the supporters of the Democratic Union [DU], with 80 percent, followed by supporters of the Hungarian Coalition with 71 percent, and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] with 61 percent. The level of trust among the supporters of the other parliamentary parties (nonparliamentary parties are not listed in the poll results) is under 50 percent. The group of those who "do not trust" is led by supporters of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], the Slovak National Party [SNS], the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], with 27 to 28 percent each. Those who do not know tend to be ZRS (31 percent) and SNS (30 percent) voters, but not DU (only 7 percent) and Hungarian Coalition (15 percent) voters.

The level of trust in NATO shows a similar picture, even though eagerness to join NATO is much smaller in Slovakia than eagerness to become an EU member. A positive attitude toward NATO was expressed by 66 percent of DU supporters among the respondents, 55 percent of Hungarian Coalition supporters, and 51

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percent of KDH supporters. The "distrust" table is topped by supporters of the SDL (46 percent), followed by ZRS (38 percent) and HZDS (37 percent) supporters.

Summing up, it is possible to say that EU supporters are to be found mainly in DU and among ethnic Hungarians, and opponents in the ZRS and the SNS. Supporters of NATO are largely identical with the former, while opponents of NATO are to be found, in particular, among SDL and ZRS voters. The HZDS occupies roughly a middle position in all of the aforementioned tables.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 28 October on page 3 publishes the following table on the results of the FOCUS poll, which was conducted between 3 and 10 October 1995 and involved 1,013 respondents.]

Do you trust NATO?

	Oct 95	Dec 94	Oct 93
	Percent		
Definitely trust	8	10	15
Rather trust	28	32	30
Rather distrust	21	22	26
Definitely distrust	12	11	12
Do not know	31	25	17

Meciar Comments on Recently Adopted Language Law

LD2011171595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In the context of the recently adopted law on the state language, a question has emerged about its impact on the ratification of the Basic Treaty between Slovakia and Hungary by the Slovak parliament. We asked Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to comment on this issue.

[Begin Meciar recording] I do not know the original text of Prime Minister Horn's statements, and therefore I can hardly comment on them. However, I can refer to that part of our bilateral treaty in which we agreed to support each other, not to cast doubt on each other, as regards our integration into international structures.

Therefore, the questioning of this global trend is a substantially more serious shortcoming than the questioning of individual clauses of the language law.

The language law was approved by the National Council, and within 15 days either the government or the president can submit their comments, returning the law to the National Council. We will see how it is received. However, I would like to stress that the language law regulates the rules on the usage of Slovak as the state language of communication for all citizens. The language law does not deal with the right to use minorities' languages.

We will follow this trend to its logical consequences—that is, to the adoption of the charter on minorities' rights, and further to the discussion about the unifying codification if the currently achieved level is not sufficient. This is why there is no reason to doubt the government's intentions in this sphere. Discussing the formulation of individual paragraphs is in fact natural when such changes are taking place.

The rules on the use of Slovak as the official language of the state are aimed at protecting the language, guaranteeing the cultural standard of the language, and ensuring the functioning of all state institutions and the communication in this language throughout the entire state equally for every single citizen.

Naturally, if minority members can communicate in their own languages as well, this enriches them. They can use their language wherever it is in harmony with the law and nobody will hinder them from doing so. However, they cannot prevent those decent [statocny] Slovak citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, who wish to communicate [in Slovak], they cannot oppose the very existence of a language through which we can all understand each other. [end recording]

Report Details Approved Version of Language Law

AU2111101695 Bratislava SME in Slovak 17 Nov 95 p 5

[Report by "alg, rej": "What the Law on the State Language Brings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the approved law on the state language of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak language is the state language in the Slovak Republic. Compared with the original draft, the provision has been deleted that it must be the codified form of literary Slovak. This means that it is possible to use dialects or the colloquial form of the language. The state language has priority over other languages used in the Slovak Republic. The law does not regulate the use of liturgical languages; the use of liturgical languages is regulated by the churches' and religious communities' regulations. At the same time, however, the law stipulates that the churches' agenda intended for the public should be

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conducted in the state language. Similarly, the law does not regulate the use of the ethnic minorities' languages, the usage of which is regulated by special laws. In this context, the language law names, for example, the law on the designation of communities in the language of the ethnic minorities (the so-called law on signposts), but it does not mention the law on first names and surnames (the so-called law on registers). The 1990 law on the official language, valid thus far, is being abolished. The law stipulates that the use of the state language in official communication is mandatory; the law does not address the use of the languages of the ethnic minorities in official communications. Proposals to solve the legislative vacuum that has arisen in this way by passing a special law or by incorporating into the new law the relevant provisions of the law on the official language have been rejected.

Unlike the original draft, a command of the state language will not be a condition for acquiring Slovak citizenship, which will allow even foreign nationals who have not mastered Slovak to acquire citizenship (through marriage, for example). The teaching of the state language is mandatory at all primary and secondary schools. A language other than the state language can be used as the language of instruction and examination to the extent set out in special laws. Textbooks are to be issued in the state language, with the exception of textbooks used in schools with a different language of instruction, in the teaching of foreign languages, and at institutions of higher learning. Radio and television broadcasts are to be in the state language. The periodical and nonperiodical press is to be issued in the state language, with the exception of the ethnic minorities' press, whose publication is subject to a special law. In television broadcasts, foreign language programs with subtitles in the state language or programs otherwise meeting the condition of basic comprehensibility in terms of the state language represent an exception. (This will probably make possible the showing of Czech films on television without dubbing or subtitles, as well as the showing of foreign-language films dubbed into Czech.) Audiovisual programs intended for children up to age 12 must be dubbed into the state language. Further exceptions are foreign-language broadcasts on Slovak Radio, television and radio language courses, musical programs with the original texts, and broadcasts in the languages of the ethnic minorities. Cultural and educational events are to be in the state language or must meet in some other way the requirement of basic comprehensibility in terms of the state language. The cultural events of the ethnic minorities, guest performances by foreign artists, and musical programs with original texts are exceptions. The use of the state language is mandatory in designating the contents of domestically manufactured or imported goods, in manuals, terms of warranty, and other information for consumers. Communication between medical staff and patients is to be conducted, as a rule, in the state language. If the patient is a foreign national or a citizen without a command of the state language, it may also be conducted in a language the patient understands.

The Ministry of Culture is to monitor the observance of obligations ensuing from this law and is entitled to demand the elimination of instances of unlawfulness. In case of noncompliance, it can impose on juridical persons a fine of up to 500,000 korunas [Sk] and upon natural persons a fine of up to Sk50,000 (the upper limit of fines is 50 percent of the level proposed in the original draft). This authority of the Ministry of Culture is at variance with the opinion of Council of Europe experts, according to whom fines should not be subject to administrative proceedings but ought to be decided by the courts.

SNS: Unions Intent on Toppling Government

AU1611124295 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 13 Nov 95 p 3

[Report by TASR: "Slovak National Party Condemns Course of Action by the Confederation of Trade Unions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vrutky—The Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Council vigorously condemns the current course of action by the Confederation of Trade Unions [KOZ] of the Slovak Republic, the organizing of protest and pressure actions. This is stated in a statement adopted at the Saturday, 11 November, meeting of the SNS Central Council in Vrutky, which was made available to TASR. According to the SNS Central Council, KOZ is intent not on asserting the justified demands of its members and a constructive solution to their problems, but on toppling the democratically constituted government and parliament and subverting the foundations of the law-governed state, which will ruin the economy and bring about the cheap sellout of national property abroad. The SNS Central Council calls on representatives of KOZ of the Slovak Republic to abandon the path of confrontation and to cooperate in seeking ways of solving social problems of our society. It also follows with alarm the escalation of chauvinistic moods in the Hungarian Republic and vigorously condemns terrorist attacks on the Slovak High School in Budapest, the SNS Central Council statement says.

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Aspects of Army Demographics Noted

AU1711120795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 Nov 95 p 2

[TASR report: "Demography in the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—At present, the planned strength of the Slovak Army units is filled by soldiers in active service to 83.4 percent, of which NCO's and conscripts form 93 percent. From the vantage point of ethnic composition, 90 percent of the conscripts are of Slovak, 9.3 percent of Hungarian, and 0.36 percent of Czech ethnic origin. More than 2 percent of the soldiers have a criminal record. Regarding health classification, 68 percent of the total exercise their patriotic duty without any handicap, and the rest have reduced health category by various degrees.

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Deputy Seeks Annexation of FRY Border Area

LD2111102395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As usual, parliament today started with pre-agenda contributions. Andras Kerekes reports:

[Kerekes] According to the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], Hungary should be at the Dayton peace conference discussing the Yugoslav settlement, for Hungarians also live on the territory of the former Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY]. According to Zsolt Lanyi [FKGP deputy], the best solution would see the territories populated by Hungarians near the border being reannexed to Hungary. He said that this is the only way to protect our Hungarians, but if it does not work, at least autonomy guaranteed by the great powers should be demanded.

According to Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, political state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is difficult to imagine a less responsible policy than coming up with territorial demands in a time of crisis, which has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands over the past few years. Such recommendations should not even be voiced in the Hungarian National Assembly. The Hungarian Government is following the developments with close attention, and has made efforts to prepare a comprehensive minority protection agreement, the state secretary said. [passage omitted]

Editorial Deplores Recent Slovak Language Law

AU1811153095 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 17 Nov 95 p 7

[Editorial by Otto Neumann: "A Game of Patience"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nothing unexpected took place in the Bratislava parliament in the early morning hours of 16 November: They adopted the law on the Slovak state language. Nor is it surprising that Ivan Hudec, the leading man of the Slovak Ministry of Culture, traced the need for the new law mostly to historical grievances. We have already gotten used to the fact that the law defending the state language almost leads to the logic of a blood feud: "Your ancestor deprived my ancestor of his mother tongue, so I am now depriving you of your mother tongue."

Of course, this is an exaggeration in this form, but let us admit that, in our world full of impossible things, raising the language absolutism to the rank of law reached the peaks of absurdity that exceeds even the imagination of Ionescu or Becket.

As I said, there is no surprise.

It is obvious that the Slovak parliament will not let itself be intimidated by the protests of the Hungarian neighbors or those of the Council of Europe. Just like most deputies of the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest who did not consider the unfavorable reactions either when they adopted their own educational law. A political elite living in the trance of a national state can even make itself advantages from the tough attitude they display against those who express their displeasure.

Speaking about the similarities of the two laws, it is worth mentioning two things. One is the shrewd formulation: at first glance, one can hardly notice the attack against the language of the minority. For example, Article 6, Paragraph 5, of the Slovak law stipulates that, although cultural events must be held in the state language, the events of national minorities are an exception to this. However, if we take the effort to read the lines thoroughly, we can learn that the presentation of national minority programs first happens in Slovak. One can here ponder on the effects of such an event on the audience.

The Romanian educational law also allows education in the national minority language, and only a thorough examination of the list shows the areas where the Hungarian language is banned from the training of ethnic Hungarian professionals.

The two laws derive from the same thing also because they try to assert the state language against someone rather than for someone. The Slovak law deliberately allows every citizen to adjust their last and first name "according to the Slovak spelling rules." However, if an ethnic Hungarian woman does not want to have her name end with the Slovak "ova" in her personal documents, the law does not give her any assistance in this.

The Romanian education law declares that no other language can be taught to the detriment of education in the state language. At the same time, permission to national minority education is conditional, so the training of people who do not have Romanian as a mother tongue is not guaranteed.

The Slovak regulations most seriously violate the national minority rights in that they hinder the contacts between the state and the individual by means of language obstacles. It is useless to refer to collective rights for anyone to admit that a national minority citizen who cannot turn to the authorities in his mother tongue is in a disadvantageous situation. Not to mention the abuses the regulations can lead to, like the one according to which knowledge of the state language is an essential condition for getting a job.

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How will they decide on whether a person knows Slovak well enough if he wants to start his career in public service?

Of course, it is the easiest thing to continually list our grievances regarding the serious injustice the parliaments of the neighboring countries are committing against their national minorities. However, the big question now is what Hungary can do in this situation.

The government in Budapest already signed a basic treaty with Slovakia, and the Hungarian National Assembly already ratified this document. Therefore, Gyula Horn's letter to his colleague in Bratislava was quite justified, a letter in which Horn points out that this is not what we agreed upon! It is doubtful, however, that such a letter will change the mind of the Slovak parliament, a body that proudly and continuously declares its independence. If the European Union stopped financing the Slovak programs, that would be a tougher argument. However, it is not sure that sanctions will eventually be implemented; on the other hand, I almost hear the Slovak answer: We prefer to stay poor, but we will not sacrifice our nation's independence!

No matter how strange it might sound, Hungary has to continue the game of patience in its approach to its neighbors. Even if, at the moment, there is a lot more of everything but patience in Hungary. We must hope that the neighbors will once understand that neither the Hungarians in Hungary nor the ethnic Hungarian minority are preparing to attack Slovakia or Romania.

Once they understand this, it is but a short step to understand the impossibility of these laws and reject them.

Bokros Views Coalition, Stabilization Programs

95CH0368B Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian 14 Sep 95 pp 1740-41

[Interview with Finance Minister Lajos Bokros by Tamas Forro in Budapest on 7 September: "The Market Economy Is Integrated by Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Forro] The danger of a breakup of the coalition has momentarily passed. Would you, as finance minister, have resigned if the socialists were running the government alone?

[Bokros] Probably this is what I would have had to do because—as I repeatedly mentioned earlier—a 54-percent majority would not have been sufficient for the implementation of this hard but consistent economic stabilization program. But I think that what is important now is that the coalition remains intact, therefore, we have a good chance to continue with our economic policy.

[Forro] Had the administration's planned restructuring taken place, i.e., had the portfolios of economic prime minister, economic chief minister, or state minister been set up, how would all that have undermined your position?

[Bokros] It is not certain that they would have undermined it. Had that been the case, then I think I would have fiercely opposed this measure, but anyone can remember that I basically did not oppose the administration's restructuring. And Sandor Nagy was not even considered from this aspect. In the sense that I allegedly was against him. Incidentally, I think that our main task is not so much reorganization but rather a clarification of our concept and the clarification of who supports this concept and who can support the administration on this rough road.

[Forro] At any rate, the present situation is that everything remained the same. Does this also mean a strengthening of your position and a better chance and a guarantee for implementing your economic program?

[Bokros] I think that in this budding market economy of ours, the Ministry of Finance has a very special role which is completely independent from personalities. The market economy is integrated by money. No real economic coordination or economic growth is conceivable without macroeconomic stability and financial balance. Therefore, every model for growth must start with the premise that financial balance must be maintained at any cost, for an economic growth that upsets the financial balance will sooner or later end in recession, and in the end it will become apparent that it was nothing but an artificial boom.

[Forro] For 24 hours it seemed that there was a conflict between you and the privatization minister without portfolio. Then Tamas Suchman swiftly corrected the statements that were released by the press, namely, that it was not you whom he criticized but the financial establishment. But you are the head of the financial establishment.

[Bokros] I think it does not lead anywhere to analyze these statements now. I think that Suchman closed the issue by retracting that statement of his. It is much better to analyze, from the aspect of economics, the ramifications of using a significant part of the privatization revenues for payments on our government debt. I think that this is, to a certain extent, the right thing to do, for our deficit would be even greater without it and, consequently, the government would have to shoulder even greater burdens and, consequently, the interest rates would be higher and economic growth would be even slower. I think, therefore, that it is right to use privatization revenues for payments on our

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government debt. Incidentally, it was parliament that decided on this and thus the figures in the supplementary budget were not changed in this regard, they are the same in the supplementary budget as in the original budget.

[Forro] The supplementary budget included a planned 156-billion deficit [currency not specified], but this can only be implemented if this 150-billion privatization revenue exists. Tamas Suchman, in correcting himself or the press, also stated that it was not the 150-billion revenue for the budget that he guaranteed but that the 150 billion will be a revenue that originates from privatization. The two are not the same.

[Bokros] Well, I think that we must start from the laws that are in effect. Long before Suchman or I became ministers, parliament had decided that the 150 billion must be raised as a budget revenue item and, yes, it must be used for payments on government debt. However, with regard to the issue of what privatization revenues must be used for in general, I think—on the basis of economic considerations—that anyone reading through the 25 items (which were the basis of my acceptance of this position) can clearly see that I was the one who said the first time that increasing privatization revenues is not the main purpose of privatization. Privatization is a means for economic revival through company restructuring, and helping companies in becoming successful through privatization is more important than budget revenues.

[Forro] But this is not true right at this moment. What is true right at this moment is that it must be used for reducing the budget deficit.

[Bokros] It is true even at this moment because I think that this is not a problem that must be resolved at the macro level; it is a problem that must be weighed at every decision concerning privatization. Obviously, there are many saleable companies and, consequently, the revenues coming from their sales can indeed be used both for financing the budget deficit and for payments on government debt. But every privatization may raise the question, why we do not privatize through more capital, which would enable the companies to keep most the payments which they could use in turn for modernization, restructuring, and business growth. Every privatization combines these two. If we think about it, the privatization of the electric power industry, the gas industry, and the oil industry will be the same, i.e., it will consist of selling existing stocks, on the one hand, which will generate budget revenues, and increased capital, on the other hand, which can finance company revival.

[Forro] At any rate, there is little guarantee that this planned 150 billion will come in this year. But, then, what will happen to the budget? Obviously, the deficit will be much greater and, obviously, everyone is concerned about stricter measures in that case.

[Bokros] Why, there should be no concern about that because the whole thing is calculated in a way that makes certain that the budget can be maintained even if only a small portion of this 150 billion comes in. And next year's budget is calculated so that the deficit under discussion constitutes 3.5 to 4 percent of GDP and does not include the planned 100-billion privatization revenue. The reason is that we think that, in accordance with correct bookkeeping, current expenditures—and current deficits—must be financed with current revenues. Privatization revenues are one-time, unrepeatable revenues, like capital, because privatization means that the value of a state property decreases. For this reason, these revenues must be used either for payments on government debt or for restoring the state property to its earlier value, i.e., for new investments, and not for financing the current deficit.

[Forro] The program or stabilization package bearing your name is almost half a year old. Certain interest groups and the Constitution Court did soften this package that was originally called shock therapy. After half a year, what do you think this program achieved or failed to achieve?

[Bokros] I think that the overall results are positive, for I would remind you that the Constitution Court's rulings were mostly dealing with postponements, thus the point was not saying the final word on the planned changes in family assistance, child support, or sick leave financing but a simple postponement of the date of effect by six months or a year in some cases. Incidentally, 90 percent of the original package has been implemented. Had it not been implemented, those modest but obvious results which indicate a sharp improvement in restoring the balance of our economy would not be apparent.

[Forro] But one of your predecessors, Finance Minister Ferenc Rabar, said yesterday in Gyula that the growth actually began in 1993 and that so little of the stabilization package has been implemented and so little time has passed that its effects are not even perceivable.

[Bokros] None of these statements negates what I said, for I think that it is a fair and factual statement that our economic growth began around the turn of 1993 and 1994. The great achievement is that this economic growth has not halted, thanks to the strengthening of our balancing economic policy. So the point is not that we promised that economic growth would speed up in a short six-month period, rather that the measures taken

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in the interest of restoring balance do not necessarily have to push the country into a recession. On the other hand, I think that the success of these balance-maintaining measures is obvious and it will later prove that growth can only be achieved through balance. For let us consider that, although there was growth in the past two years, our total government debt increased by about 7 billion at the same time. I do not think that we can continue with such a pace of debt increase in the future.

[Forro] But Rabar also added that the only "achievement" of these measures is that they completely turned our economic structure upside down and that our economy is slowly becoming completely independent from the numerous measures of little value.

[Bokros] I do not think that this is true. The way I see it is that our economy is producing almost exactly those macroeconomic indices that were expected in our program of economic policy which was the basis for the supplementary budget. The deficit of the current balance of payments has been reduced significantly, inflation has slowed down, and we were able to dramatically reduce budget overspending. At the same time, growth has not halted. Even the rate of unemployment has been lowered, although I would not make too much of that because it has seasonal effects. Actually, if we look at the data, then our economy as a whole has proven that it can adapt to this so-called shock therapy.

[Forro] But now the Constitution Court is going to rule next week on the second part of the stabilization package, which includes many things, among them the use of company cars, severance pay, and the child support system. It is possible that the Constitution Court's ruling will be similar to its first one, and that may affect the key figures of next year's budget.

[Bokros] The ruling may only affect the budget's internal structure, not its key figures. If the Constitution Court will make decisions that set higher limits for certain expenditures, then we will obviously introduce savings in other expenditures. Consequently, the announced key figure of next year's budget—that the budget deficit may not exceed 4 percent of GDP—will not be affected.

[Forro] You mentioned savings, not restrictions. But one of your advisers, Laszlo Antal, said the other day that the really bitter pills are due in 1996 and that the irritation of society will come to an end only after that.

[Bokros] I think, Laszlo Antal was referring to the budget reform, which will begin next year; therefore, next year will see not only budget-related restrictive measures but also a reform of these huge, so-called humane infrastructural care systems (e.g., the retirement system or the health care system). That may indeed involve a significant regrouping of burdens, but under no circumstances will that mean that the needy, the low-income people will be squeezed out of any type of care. If you followed the recent events which developed in connection with the budget structure, culminating in the Ministry of Finance's proposal, then you could see that we do want indeed to assign a high priority to the improvement of public education. After eliminating the biggest superfluities in health care, we will implement a major internal restructuring. The basic issues of the retirement system's reform are being clarified and, of course, the point is not that everyone will immediately be disadvantaged; we want to offer options where the citizen can decide for himself which retirement system is most beneficial for him now or at the age of 60 when he can retire with higher pension. Thus, I think that, in this sense, there will be no restrictive measures that are tantamount to a shock therapy. Next year's growth rate has been determined, and we have actually announced the maximum rate of inflation through the indices of our devaluating exchange-rate policy. Thus, we now have a calculable and stable economic environment.

[Forro] But please list the bitter pills as well.

[Bokros] The beginning of the line of bitter pills will happen next year when we will suffer through a decrease in real wages, for following this year's 8-to-9-percent decrease in real wages, another 4-percent decrease may become necessary next year. As it is known, we want to achieve this primarily by a 2-percent increase of the social security contributions paid by employees. But we must note that the employers' social security contributions will be reduced by two times 2 percent on 1 January and on 1 July. Thus the burdens will be eased at that end. At the other end, we will introduce those regulations concerning sick leave, whose introduction on 1 July was not allowed by the Constitution Court. Obviously, this will be an extra burden for both employees and employers. Moreover, in all probability, we must obviously expect a certain rate of unemployment in all spheres of public employment that are affected by the budget reform (educators, physicians, hospital staff).

[Forro] So, there will indeed be some bitter pills!

[Bokros] There will be, of course, but selectively. That means that not everyone will be affected to the same extent. The real issue will be whether social solidarity will work to the extent that it will be possible to make an agreement with the Trade Union Council regarding the distribution of burdens. In the present economic situation, it is indeed the most needy people who should

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be spared from the disadvantageous and paralyzing consequences.

[Forro] You are consistently at the bottom of the politicians' popularity list, but his does not seem to bother you much.

[Bokros] I think that my job is not to top the popularity list. Incidentally, my colleagues abroad say that this is no problem at all. The important thing is to do everything that is dictated by our professional commitment and social responsibility to restore the balance of our economy, to avoid bankruptcy, and to create the conditions for growth. And afterward, I think, all this will be put in time in its appropriate place in history.

Ministry on Army Restructuring Implementation

95CH0368C Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 15 Sep 95 p 7

[Article by Attila Kovacs: "We Heard It at the HB Meeting—It Will Be Abolished, Restructured"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the last meeting of the National Assembly's Defense Committee [HB], Laszlo Borsits, deputy state secretary of the Ministry of Defense [HM], briefed the representatives on the measures taken by the ministry following the 88/95 parliamentary resolution. We heard that following the National Assembly's voting, the minister issued a directive on 15 July in connection with the long- and middle-term program of restructuring the Hungarian Defense Forces [MH].

As Borsits said, the resolution calls for beginning the implementation this year, and, thus, the planning is under way at the MH Command. The ministry must prepare the middle- and long-term plans for the MH, to be discussed in early October by the HM council. The proposal will be presented to the administration in late October, and the reorganization is expected to begin in early November.

Borsits stressed that the Command of Land Forces and the Regional Military Commands will be abolished this year. A Mechanized Army Corps Command will be set up instead, which will oversee the Mechanized Division Command; moreover, an Air Force and Air Defense Corps Command will be set up at the Air Defense Command's air base. In addition, the Budapest Regional Military Command will be replaced by the Central Organizations Command.

Laszlo Borsits also emphasized that two all-branch brigades, one single-branch brigade, two regiments, and one battalion will be abolished. Moreover, one brigade, six regiments, and ten battalions will be restructured. The abolition will continue into next year when two all-branch brigades, three regiments, two battalions, and two air defense units will be abolished. Moreover, 13 brigades, 15 regiments, five battalion-level units, and other air force and air defense units will be restructured.

After the briefing, representatives of the opposition strongly criticized the ministry for undermining the country's security by suddenly and drastically downsizing our defense forces. They thought that the ministry is acting in a haphazard manner, confusing the military personnel.

Ferenc Juhasz (MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]) rejected the opposition's statements because, in his opinion, all that has happened was that the ministry began the implementation in accordance with the National Assembly's resolution. In connection with confusing the military personnel, Juhasz said that, not only our military personnel, but our entire society is confused.

As the second item in its agenda, the committee discussed—and found it ready for debate—the National Assembly's resolution proposal regarding the detailed breakdown of the MH personnel at the end of 1995 and 1996. As planned, the peacetime number of the MH personnel shall be 81,266 on 31 December 1995. It was said that this figure, which is about 8,000 less than the figure that was determined on 1 July 1995, does not mean that officers will also be let go.

However, by the end of next year, the size of military personnel must be reduced to 69,812. This means the dismissal of about 5,000 civilian employees; the number of enlisted personnel will also be cut back by 4,000. By the end of 1996, 3,000 officers will not be serving their country anymore, but HM officials emphasized in this connection that this problem will be manageable because of people leaving the military for natural reasons (retirement, job changes). But, conceivably, a few hundred regular officers will have to continue serving in lower-rank positions—for the same salaries.

[Box, p 7]

The National Assembly's Defense Committee visited last week some border guard companies stationed at our borders. HB Chairman Imre Mecs briefed our correspondent on what he saw there.

"The HB had discussed the southern Slav situation earlier. At that time we were briefed by the minister of the interior and the commandant of the border guards. This time we thought that it was important for us to go out in the field to see it for ourselves, so we visited Siklos and Beremend. We talked with people at the command posts, then we visited the border region where a border guard battalion gave us a demonstration. First

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we saw close-combat and then a company alert. We had very favorable impressions about the combat-readiness, training, and physical condition of the troops.

"But members of the HB discovered some problems as well, including the fact that the troops do not have bulletproof vests and night-vision equipment. At the same time, our visit corroborated our earlier opinion in the wake of the aforementioned ministerial briefing, namely, that the administration's measures were appropriate to the existing danger. They were extremely careful not to elicit any crisis or appear provocative through those measures. So, no measure was taken by the MH, although the border guard units took up their positions alongside the 60-kilometer-long threatened border section. Through this measure, they provided assurance for the local population, and also sent a clear message to the southern Slavs that any adventurism would be senseless.

"It is another indisputable fact that this task requires great efforts: the companies and their officers had to be brought in from afar. I think it is very reassuring that our units carried out their tasks without any problems and in an orderly fashion. We are confident that a more decisive stand by NATO and the negotiations of the American deputy secretary of state will bring about the desired results and that the leaders of the two feuding nations, Serbia and Croatia, will realize that any progress can only be made through negotiations and agreements. We hope that eventually there will be no need to strengthen our borders."

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Peace Talks Apparently End; Final Outcome Unclear

'Key Turning Point' 20 Nov

AU2011154395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been a key turning point at the Ohio negotiations, as the negotiators brought their stands closer on some important issues, an unnamed source close to these negotiations told REUTER. They reached a key turning point (?at the end of) the day, the source has said. This pertains to territorial issues that were at the center of attention during the negotiations that lasted the whole day yesterday. The negotiators have now set off toward finalizing the agreement on questions pertaining to constitutional issues and elections for the new state setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this source said.

The White House is expected to issue a formal statement on this agreement, and U.S. officials say that President Bill Clinton may come to Dayton to attend the signing of the agreement as witness. U.S. officials expect the ceremony previously planned for 1500 [1400 GMT] to be moved back to 1800.

Sources describe the negotiations held all through the evening yesterday as very emotional at times. An agreement on prisoner exchange was signed between Croatia and the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia. The signatories were Mate Granic for the Croatian side and Milan Milutinovic for the Serbian side. The main territorial issues were discussed over the whole of last night and pertained to administrative solutions concerning Sarajevo and the two disputed ground corridors.

Serbs Insist on Wider Corridor

LD2011221195 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 20 Nov 95

[From the "Slikom na Sliku" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified announcer] Right now we are going over to Kasim Trnka, the ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, who is talking to us by direct phone link from Dayton. He is also a negotiator in the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation in Dayton. Mr. Trnka, good evening, welcome.

[Trnka] A very good evening to all your viewers.

[Announcer] Are the negotiations in Dayton still continuing? If so, are they closer to success or to failure?

[Trnka] There is still half an hour to go, the last efforts are being made to save the negotiations, because a news conference is scheduled for 1700 local time, 2300 your time, at which the hosts are expected to announce what has in fact been achieved. I have to say, however, that there is a slim chance of reaching an agreement in this half an hour. Despite a number of agreements reached on various separate supplements to the peace plan, an agreement has yet to be reached on the maps of demarcation between the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding several vital points. This is what has placed the whole agreement in Dayton at stake.

[Announcer] Mr. Trnka, what are those key issues on which an agreement is impossible to reach at present?

[Trnka] I would first of all like to say with pleasure that the delegations of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia acted jointly in these issues, and that from the beginning they insisted on the Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan or its variation.

Unfortunately, we have to say that the Serb side either accepted the 49:51 proportion, insisting on a quantity that can never belong to it, or in some way asked that the most important things should not be included in the territory of the Federation. The problems focused on the of Brcko zone and part of Posavina, but we also spoke about Sarajevo and Gorazde.

[Announcer] What in concrete terms do the Serbs want to have in Bosnian Posavina, how much territory?

[Trnka] They insisted all the time on a wide enlargement of the corridor. Milosevic is not ready to cede the town of Brcko to the Federation, as envisaged by the Contact Group plan. There has also been much difficulty in obtaining approaches to Brcko.

[Announcer] What is the basic principle advocated by the delegation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croats and Bosniaks, with regard to a compromise on Bosnian Posavina?

[Trnka] It is difficult to present all the details on the phone. That should be seen on the maps. What is the essence is that the Serbian side is quoting a previous agreement on [territorial] swaps, which the Croatian side has denied. This means that our side still insists on the implementation of the Contact Group plan in some modified form in the light of the changed circumstance in the field. The Serb side insisted on solutions that, in my mind, might lead to the exacerbation of relations between the Croats and Muslims in the Federation, which normally neither the delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the Croatian delegation were ready to accept.

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Bosnian Says Talks 'Have Broken Up'

AU2111074595 Paris AFP in English 2206 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 20 (AFP) — Peace talks in Dayton have broken up without an overall agreement, a Bosnian government official in Sarajevo said Monday.

"We are coming home and we have not been able at this stage to reach an agreement," the government official who requested anonymity told AFP shortly after speaking with the Bosnian delegation in Dayton, Ohio.

The leaders of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have been meeting at the U.S. airbase just outside Dayton since November 1 at so-called proximity talks in an attempt to reach an overall peace accord for the three and a half year war in Bosnia.

The official added that the sides had agreed to "reconvene in Paris at some other time." The conference, the representative said, "had been useful after the shuttle diplomacy. It was time for us to sit down together and work things through."

Both Sides Demanding Brcko

AU2111093095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has stated this morning that the negotiations in Dayton are in crisis but that they have not failed. The negotiations have reached the critical point, but I would not describe them as failed, as many things have been agreed in Dayton. This was stated by a source of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina citing President Izetbegovic, B-H PRESS reports.

He said that the deadline set by the U.S. negotiators to find an agreement is 1500 Central European Time [1400 GMT]. We cannot give up our demand for Brcko. We want Brcko, and so does Milosevic, President Izetbegovic said.

According to the source of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Izetbegovic has said that the negotiations would continue today, but that it was difficult to expect an overall solution to be found. According to the official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an agreement on constitutional arrangements and the status of Sarajevo has been reached.

According to this official, Sarajevo will remain an open city. The city airport, the railroad track, and the main roads that lead toward the west and east will be under the control of the city authorities.

According to the latest news from Dayton, the Serb aggressor has allegedly given up the demand to control Iijas, Hadzici, Ilidza, and Vogosca. The areas south of Sarajevo — Lukavica, Kasindol, and Vojkovici — would remain under Serb occupation.

According to the sources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Izetbegovic has said that an agreement has been reached on linking Gorazde with Sarajevo.

Spokesman on 'Failed' Talks

AU2111094495 Paris AFP in English 0930 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Nov 21 (AFP) — The latest bid to reach a peace accord on Bosnia has failed and the talks ended early Tuesday, Bosnian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mirza Hajric said here, confirming earlier reports.

"There was no accord in Dayton," Hajric said, adding that "the talks in Dayton ended at 0820 GMT."

Shortly beforehand, Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic was quoted by CNN early Tuesday as saying the peace talks had apparently failed. [passage omitted]

New Demands From Serbs Claimed

AU2011200195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Nov 95

[Report by Envera Selimovic from Dayton]

[FBIS Translated Text] The outcome of the Dayton negotiations following two nights of marathon fine tuning is still uncertain. The negotiations were interrupted for a short time this morning at 0530 local time and resumed at 0830. Maps are the central part of the negotiations and obviously the most difficult one.

The problem obviously lies in the fact that as time has passed, the Serb side has come up with new demands.

However, the main characteristic of the information that is arriving at the press center to about 100 journalists gathered here is contradictory.

It is certain that, as regards territories, the Serbs have only partly accepted the Contact Group plan. They accept the 49 percent, but demand a qualitatively new territorial division. Apart from their Posavina demands, they are allegedly also demanding Drvar.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian delegations agree that negotiations should be held within the framework of the Contact Group plan or, in the event of changes, that the percentage should be adjusted to the Federation's

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advantage. The Sarajevo government's stand from the very beginning of the talks has been that in the event of disagreement, the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation should stick with the Contact Group plan. It is hard to say how a solution will be found.

Sarajevo has not been negotiated on today. It is unclear whether that means that the city's status has been solved or that the issue has been sidelined for a period. As for the Gorazde corridor, to judge from everything, this has been agreed upon, but nobody thinks that it is as wide as the one in Posavina, on which the Serbs insist.

Also to be discussed today is the balance of military forces, that is to say, armament or disarmament. Few people believe that solutions will be sought in demilitarization. As for lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, this will be discussed only if the peace agreement is signed.

The UN Security Council today again started a debate on the sanctions regime against Belgrade. This problem should in fact also be solved after the peace agreement has been signed. In the first round, the sanctions would be suspended and only after the agreement is implemented would they be lifted.

There is in fact no news from Dayton. The negotiations will probably last until late afternoon. There is still a narrow line between failure and reaching the agreement.

Modrica Residents Issue Protest Over Posavina

AU2011133795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the war presidency of Modrica Municipality, the Social Democratic Party [word indistinct], and the soldiers and residents of Modrica Municipality have issued a protest telegram in which they state, among other things:

The talks that are currently being held in Dayton should serve to resolve the injustice and behind-the-scenes political game of the exchange of territories, and to end the war and further bloodshed so that Bosnia-Herzegovina can be sovereign, integral, and indivisible. The concessions to the Serbian aggressor, which [word indistinct] of the talks, are a reward for the crimes that he committed upon the Bosniaks — the Muslims and the Croats of the Bosnian Posavina as well as the Serbs who carry Bosnia-Herzegovina in their hearts as their only motherland.

Hereby, we publicly voice our protest and announce that Bosnian Posavina, and Modrica as a part of it, cannot be separated from the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is stated in a protest telegram of the SDA, the war presidency of Modrica Municipality, the Social Democratic Party, and the soldiers and citizens of Modrica Municipality.

Bosnian Posavina Citizens Adopt Memorandum

LD1911154895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the association of northeastern Bosnia, the association of the citizens of Derventa and Bosanski Brod, and the council of the Bosanska Posavina assembly adopted a memorandum at their rally in Sarajevo today on the defense of Bosnian Posavina. The memorandum will be sent to Dayton. The memorandum says:

We lend our full support to the implementation of the agreement on the revitalization of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded on 9 November this year. We demand that Bosnian Posavina be organized as a single and undivided canton, a grand county within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with equal rights and obligations for all Posavina citizens — Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs and all others who lived in this area. We would particularly wish to stress that we cannot allow the history, culture, and spiritual unity of Bosnian Posavina be ruined, and coexistence and tolerance of all the nations who lived in this area wiped out.

We would like to let the participants of the peace talks in Dayton know that the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not allow it to be partitioned by some corridor that would amount to the direct negation of sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, legalization of genocide and aggression on the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nobody has the right, particularly those outside Bosnia, to sell us off or trade with our lives, nor does our delegation at the Dayton talks have the constitutional right to partition the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not even if it is in line with proposals by the Party of Democratic Action, the Contact Group, and even less so in line with the aggressor's demands. We demand that Sarajevo remain a single city, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also request of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation to persist in these demands. Otherwise, we propose that it withdraw from the peace talks, not individuals to resign.

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Herzeg-Bosnia Croats View Map Negotiations

AU1711210895 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 p 3

[HABENA report on announcement by "Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia": "Exchange of Territories for Posavina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to preserve the existence of the Bosnian Posavina region and to preserve the whole context of the negotiations, the negotiators for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are ready to make certain territorial concessions in some of the recently liberated areas — it is said in the announcement of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia that was published on the occasion of the negotiations over the maps that are taking place in Dayton.

The delegation will insist on those stands even at the cost of withdrawing from further negotiations, unless an agreement acceptable to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is achieved. The Croat part of the delegation at the peace negotiations in Dayton decisively advocates the existence of the Bosnian Posavina region within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, taking into account the fact that the Croats have lived there from time immemorial and constitute the majority of the population.

"In Dayton, as well as among the domestic public," it is pointed out in the announcement, "there are various and numerous maps, presented by all the negotiating sides, including, of course, the proposals of the Contact Group, which stick persistently to their first proposal on the division of the territories, 51:49 percent. It is said unofficially in Dayton that the negotiators have been introduced to the prefered maps, and that the international mediators, primarily the military experts of the U.S. Administration, have been visiting the buildings of the individual negotiating teams around the clock in order to achieve a solution that is acceptable to everybody."

From the position of an equal participant in the negotiations, the Croat part of the negotiating team of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been trying to involve the maps that provide full protection for the national interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in this decisive game with maps. The Croat negotiators have four or five meetings with the international negotiators each day, and they hold special talks within the delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the maps, the announcement says.

MBO Supports Dayton Agreement on Federation

AU1711172495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 95

[Report by Vehida Kulenovic on a news conference by the main committee of the Muslim Bosniak Organization in Zenica on 17 November — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] supports the negotiations in Dayton and insists that our delegation perseveres in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity, without the division of territory or [word indistinct] of its parts. The party is determined that the safeguarding of the external borders of the country must remain the responsibility of the government.

They also support the agreement on setting up the federation, signed in Dayton, although the solution for Mostar is considered to be confused and imposed. We are particularly worried, today's statement emphasized, because of the silent resistance to the implementation of this agreement, and we wonder at the same time how is it possible that the federation is being organized by the people who were most directly involved in the undermining of Bosnia- Herzegovina, why the return of Bosniaks to Stolac and Jajce is being dragged on and obstructed, and why the return of Bosniaks to Busovaca and Kiseljak is not being mentioned.

The party also hailed the decision of The Hague Court to indict Blaskic, Kordic, and all others who committed crimes, however, they are surprised by and they protest the decision of the Croatian Government to promote Tihomir Blaskic.

The international community did not safeguard the instruments that would secure the creation of the federation, Mujo Kafedzic, vice president of the MBO, emphasized.

Fuad Sabat, president of the MBO Zenica municipal committee, emphasized that this party had not yet gained its place in Zenica, even though they had issued requests to the incumbent municipal authorities on several occasions, and also that it was impermissible that the heating season in Zenica was running late, which, among other things, also caused a break in education.

Commentary Notes Status of Milosevic, Yugoslavia

AU1911191695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Nov 95

[Commentary by Milika Sundic]

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and vice president of the Federation in the forthcoming creation of the new federal government.

FRY Army Exercises 'Threatening' Bosniak People

AU2011163595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The so-called Yugoslav Army still continues its military exercises on the territory of Sandzak with a view to demonstrating (?power) and threatening the Bosniak people, the Information Center of the Sandzak Muslim National Council reports.

The Yugoslav Army has recently carried out several military exercises on the territory of the villages of Grahovo and (Vili) under the name of Golija 95. What is involved is an exercise of the Podgorica Corps which belongs to the 2d Army of the so-called Yugoslav Army. According to Montenegrin Television, the corps' infantry brigade with air support has demonstrated its firepower.

By the way, in its report on the said exercise, Montenegrin Television failed to mention the name of Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin, recently proclaimed war criminal and candidate for The Hague tribunal for the destruction of Vukovar, who is commander of an infantry brigade within the Podgorica Corps which is taking part in the said exercise.

Mujahedeen Commander Threatens To 'Fight On'

LD1811003095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0012 GMT 18 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 17 (TANJUG) — Mujahedeen commander in Bosnia Abu El Ma'ali of Algeria is quoted on Friday as threatening to fight on against Bosnia's Serbs and Croats if the Dayton peace talks collapse.

Speaking for the Croatian weekly NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, published on Friday, Ma'ali said that, if the peace talks fail, the Mujahedeen, who are fighting on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, will very soon attack Doboj in northern Bosnia, according to Associated Press.

'Bosnia is the country conquered by Islam,' said the commander of the 800-strong Mujahedeen who form part of the Zenica-based third corps of the Bosnian Muslim Army.

'For us, there is no difference between the Serbs and the Croats. Croatia has territorial pretentions toward Bosnia and Serbia wants to create a greater Serbia. The Muslims in Bosnia will never accept such an outcome,' Ma'ali said.

He also said he expected tensions between his units and U.N. British peacekeepers to continue to grow.

A British patrol killed a Mujahedeen fighter in self-defense in Central Bosnia a month ago.

The United Nations has recently threatened to call in the rapid reaction force to protect the peacekeepers from frequent Mujahedeen provocations.

Mijahedeen fighters, who consider the Bosnian war as part of the Holy War (jihad), came to that former Yugoslav Republic as far back as 1992 to train Bosnian Muslim troops and fight alongside them.

Bosnian Croats Blame Muslims for Indictments

LD1711144295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1413 GMT 17 Nov 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 17 (TANJUG) — Authorities of the Bosnian Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia blame Muslims, their federation partner, for the indictment of six Herzeg-Bosnia officials, because Muslims have forwarded the evidence against them to The Hague tribunal.

A statement issued by Croatian Democratic Union leaders in five Herzeg-Bosnia towns said that, 'instead of Bosnian Muslims looking within their own ranks for those responsible for the deaths of their young men... we witness the indictment of Bosnian Croats for the alleged war crimes, which deeply hurts the Bosnian Croats' pride and national feeling.

'Such rash moves on the part of Bosnian Muslims did nothing for the (Muslim-Croat) federation, to which Croats are unreservedly committed,' the statement said.

The international criminal tribunal in The Hague on Monday filed charges against six Herzeg-Bosnia officals for war crimes committed against Muslim civilians in central Bosnia between May 1992 and May 1993.

Dario Kordic, president of the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Tihomir Blaskic, Bosnian Croat army chief of staff, are among the indicted persons.

The statement also said Herzeg-Bosnia officials had received a large number of reports on atrocities committed by Bosnian Muslim troops and officials.

The Croat people in the Lasva valley area are determined to resist these filthy political moves, as they have been determined to resist the Muslim aggression earlier, the statement said.

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Herzeg-Bosnia Croats View Map Negotiations

AU1711210895 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 p 3

[HABENA report on announcement by "Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia": "Exchange of Territories for Posavina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to preserve the existence of the Bosnian Posavina region and to preserve the whole context of the negotiations, the negotiators for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are ready to make certain territorial concessions in some of the recently liberated areas — it is said in the announcement of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia that was published on the occasion of the negotiations over the maps that are taking place in Dayton.

The delegation will insist on those stands even at the cost of withdrawing from further negotiations, unless an agreement acceptable to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is achieved. The Croat part of the delegation at the peace negotiations in Dayton decisively advocates the existence of the Bosnian Posavina region within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, taking into account the fact that the Croats have lived there from time immemorial and constitute the majority of the population.

"In Dayton, as well as among the domestic public," it is pointed out in the announcement, "there are various and numerous maps, presented by all the negotiating sides, including, of course, the proposals of the Contact Group, which stick persistently to their first proposal on the division of the territories, 51:49 percent. It is said unofficially in Dayton that the negotiators have been introduced to the prefered maps, and that the international mediators, primarily the military experts of the U.S. Administration, have been visiting the buildings of the individual negotiating teams around the clock in order to achieve a solution that is acceptable to everybody."

From the position of an equal participant in the negotiations, the Croat part of the negotiating team of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been trying to involve the maps that provide full protection for the national interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in this decisive game with maps. The Croat negotiators have four or five meetings with the international negotiators each day, and they hold special talks within the delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the maps, the announcement says.

MBO Supports Dayton Agreement on Federation

AU1711172495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 95

[Report by Vehida Kulenovic on a news conference by the main committee of the Muslim Bosniak Organization in Zenica on 17 November — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] supports the negotiations in Dayton and insists that our delegation perseveres in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity, without the division of territory or [word indistinct] of its parts. The party is determined that the safeguarding of the external borders of the country must remain the responsibility of the government.

They also support the agreement on setting up the federation, signed in Dayton, although the solution for Mostar is considered to be confused and imposed. We are particularly worried, today's statement emphasized, because of the silent resistance to the implementation of this agreement, and we wonder at the same time how is it possible that the federation is being organized by the people who were most directly involved in the undermining of Bosnia- Herzegovina, why the return of Bosniaks to Stolac and Jajce is being dragged on and obstructed, and why the return of Bosniaks to Busovaca and Kiseljak is not being mentioned.

The party also hailed the decision of The Hague Court to indict Blaskic, Kordic, and all others who committed crimes, however, they are surprised by and they protest the decision of the Croatian Government to promote Tihomir Blaskic.

The international community did not safeguard the instruments that would secure the creation of the federation, Mujo Kafedzic, vice president of the MBO, emphasized.

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Commentary Notes Status of Milosevic, Yugoslavia

AU1911191695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Nov 95

[Commentary by Milika Sundic]

[FBIS Translated Text] One should in any case expect positive news from Dayton, if not today, then most

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likely tomorrow. The negotiations have obviously been very hard and complicated, but one fact was confirmed even before Dayton: President Milosevic is the central figure at the talks, and was the central party during the preparations for Dayton. This has been confirmed by the U.S. press, even by leading papers such as THE NEW YORK TIMES and THE WASHINGTON POST. This has been confirmed by the U.S. Administration through the contacts with President Milosevic. As my colleague Lalic [TANJUG correspondent in New York] said a few days ago, almost half of President Clinton's cabinet spent several days there.

The negotiations had to be both long and hard, but it is completely certain that the United States, while preparing for Dayton, was determined that no one would leave Dayton without a peace agreement for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. This peace agreement will bring peace to the entire region of southern Europe, to all of Europe, and the world, and everyone will be in a position to devote themselves to much better things than the question of war and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is certain that it is not easy to divide Bosnia, and it is not easy to satisfy all the appetites, particularly of the side that caused the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the side that kept asking the world powers to support it until the end of the war, until the so-called victory of the Muslim-Croat federation. It is now obviously clear that Bosnia must be divided into two state entities, and that the Serb Republic gets its statehood and everything that goes together with a state.

It is also clear that after the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina is signed, that is, after the Paris peace conference, the sanctions against the FRY will be lifted, and that Yugoslavia will find itself in the position that has always belonged to it in Europe and the world. Yugoslavia has done very much during all this time, both in the relations between the warring sides — and it has not been a warring side — and has done everything it has had to do so that a just and honorable agreement could be reached. This has of course implied many compromises, some of them painful, but every decent compromise and every honorable peace is better than the continuation of the war.

Also, conditions have been created for the normalization of relations in our region, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and one of the conditions has been the agreement on the Srem-Baranja region. This is an important point for the Yugoslav diplomacy and for President Milosevic, since it is obvious that this agreement would not have been reached if President Milosevic had not put in a tremendous effort to bring about this agreement. It would have of course been much better if the Knin leadership had at the time listened to President Milosevic. This agreement would have been far more favorable for the entire Republic of Serbian Krajina than it is now.

Yugoslavia has plenty of reasons to be satisfied and proud of everything that it has done so far, and it is certain that this recognition — when they say that President Milosevic is not only the central figure in this region, but also in the entire complex situation connected to the solution of the disputed issues on the territory of the former Yugoslavia — means that President Milosevic will return from Dayton as a man who went for peace and is bringing it back.

Of course, all those who have supported him in this should be commended, including also the U.S. hosts, who have obviously put in a huge effort to bring peace about while satisfying to a degree all the sides in the conflict. So, in my view, peace is at hand, and we can expect it some time tomorrow.

Ganic Discusses Formation of Federal Government

AU2011202995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During intensive activities in implementing the agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Dayton, Ohio, Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation and member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today held a meeting with all political parties that have representatives in the Assemblies of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and exchanged views with them about the formation of a new government of the Federation. The meeting was also attended by the representatives of the Council of the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals, the Croatian National Council, and the Serb Civic Council.

The center of attention was the building of the Federation, strengthening it, and the necessary reorganization of all of its executive bodies, particularly the formation of the government, which should function in a professional, strong, and unified manner over the entire territory.

In this respect, very useful ideas were also discussed on the principles and modalities of a more active inclusion of all the available potential in building strong institutions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Ganic particularly stressed expertise as the basis criterion in selecting key persons for ministries, and urged the cooperation of all political parties on this joint task.

The participants presented many suggestions and proposals that will be of significant use to the president

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and vice president of the Federation in the forthcoming creation of the new federal government.

FRY Army Exercises 'Threatening' Bosniak People

AU2011163595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The so-called Yugoslav Army still continues its military exercises on the territory of Sandzak with a view to demonstrating (?power) and threatening the Bosniak people, the Information Center of the Sandzak Muslim National Council reports.

The Yugoslav Army has recently carried out several military exercises on the territory of the villages of Grahovo and (Vili) under the name of Golija 95. What is involved is an exercise of the Podgorica Corps which belongs to the 2d Army of the so-called Yugoslav Army. According to Montenegrin Television, the corps' infantry brigade with air support has demonstrated its firepower.

By the way, in its report on the said exercise, Montenegrin Television failed to mention the name of Colonel Veselin Sljivancanin, recently proclaimed war criminal and candidate for The Hague tribunal for the destruction of Vukovar, who is commander of an infantry brigade within the Podgorica Corps which is taking part in the said exercise.

Mujahedeen Commander Threatens To 'Fight On'

LD1811003095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0012 GMT 18 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 17 (TANJUG) — Mujahedeen commander in Bosnia Abu El Ma'ali of Algeria is quoted on Friday as threatening to fight on against Bosnia's Serbs and Croats if the Dayton peace talks collapse.

Speaking for the Croatian weekly NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA, published on Friday, Ma'ali said that, if the peace talks fail, the Mujahedeen, who are fighting on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, will very soon attack Doboj in northern Bosnia, according to Associated Press.

'Bosnia is the country conquered by Islam,' said the commander of the 800-strong Mujahedeen who form part of the Zenica-based third corps of the Bosnian Muslim Army.

'For us, there is no difference between the Serbs and the Croats. Croatia has territorial pretentions toward Bosnia and Serbia wants to create a greater Serbia. The Muslims in Bosnia will never accept such an outcome,' Ma'ali said.

He also said he expected tensions between his units and U.N. British peacekeepers to continue to grow.

A British patrol killed a Mujahedeen fighter in self-defense in Central Bosnia a month ago.

The United Nations has recently threatened to call in the rapid reaction force to protect the peacekeepers from frequent Mujahedeen provocations.

Mijahedeen fighters, who consider the Bosnian war as part of the Holy War (jihad), came to that former Yugoslav Republic as far back as 1992 to train Bosnian Muslim troops and fight alongside them.

Bosnian Croats Blame Muslims for Indictments

LD1711144295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1413 GMT 17 Nov 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 17 (TANJUG) — Authorities of the Bosnian Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia blame Muslims, their federation partner, for the indictment of six Herzeg-Bosnia officials, because Muslims have forwarded the evidence against them to The Hague tribunal.

A statement issued by Croatian Democratic Union leaders in five Herzeg-Bosnia towns said that, 'instead of Bosnian Muslims looking within their own ranks for those responsible for the deaths of their young men... we witness the indictment of Bosnian Croats for the alleged war crimes, which deeply hurts the Bosnian Croats' pride and national feeling.

'Such rash moves on the part of Bosnian Muslims did nothing for the (Muslim-Croat) federation, to which Croats are unreservedly committed,' the statement said.

The international criminal tribunal in The Hague on Monday filed charges against six Herzeg-Bosnia officals for war crimes committed against Muslim civilians in central Bosnia between May 1992 and May 1993.

Dario Kordic, president of the Croatian Democratic Union for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Tihomir Blaskic, Bosnian Croat army chief of staff, are among the indicted persons.

The statement also said Herzeg-Bosnia officials had received a large number of reports on atrocities committed by Bosnian Muslim troops and officials.

The Croat people in the Lasva valley area are determined to resist these filthy political moves, as they have been determined to resist the Muslim aggression earlier, the statement said.

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Herzeg-Bosnia government official in charge of war crimes investigations, Marinko Skobic, told the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA that he had come into possession of 5,000 documents on war crimes against Croats committed by Muslims in a systematic and organised manner.

In an interview published Thursday by the daily, Skobic said the documents had been forwarded to The Hague tribunal.

Sarajevo press reported, however, that the indictment of the six Bosnian Croat officials had been a slap in Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's face, because he himself had appointed these people who were under his direct control.

Zagreb reports say The Hague tribunal will soon indict five Bosnian Muslim army officers as well as leader of Croatian paramilitary troops Tomislav Mercep, who is responsible for the massacres of Serb civilians at Pakracka Poljana in 1992 and 1993.

The fact that Mercep was the commander of the unit that committed the massacres has been revealed by the Zagreb weekly GLOBUS.

Zagreb press quoted foreign sources as saying The Hague tribunal could file charges against Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Susak and other Croatian officials as soon as early next year.

By indicting the Herzeg-Bosnia officials, the tribunal's chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone has made a confusion in relations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, initially adversaries in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and then allies in a war against Bosnian Serbs.

Goldstone appears to have taken advantage of Bosnian Muslims and Croats going back on their informal agreement that they will not accuse each other of war crimes.

Moreover, he has done so at the point when everything is done at the Bosnia peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, to salvage the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was set up under U.S. pressure in March 1994.

Croats Warn Hague Court of 'Consequences'

LD1711194195 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 17 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the indictment against Dario Kordic [president of the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, of Bosnia-Herzegovina], Tihomir Blaskic [Bosnian Croat army commander], and other Croat officials, members of the HDZ district committee in the Lepenica-Lasva-Vrbas grand county have sent a petition to the international court in The Hague. Predrag Milinovic reads the petition:

[Milinovic] Petition in connection with the indictment of the leaders of the Croat people of central Bosnia:

We, the Croat people of central Bosnia, declare that our — now indicted — leaders stood up for the just interests of all peoples living in this area and in this framework also defended the rights of the Croat people. Together with our leaders we defended these areas. As a result our fate is a common and indivisible fate.

On the recommendation of these same indicted leaders of ours, we accepted the project of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation and have already realized the first, but significant steps. We were happy that the time of a definitive peace, renewal, and development was approaching. This indictment has now put us back to square one. Dark omens and concerns for our future are returning to us. Distrust of our partner in the Federation has returned.

Dear Sirs in the Hague court: We ask you to refrain, as a matter of urgency, from the unfounded allegations. The consequences could be catastrophic. This is not a matter of six unjustly indicted people. This is a matter of playing with the fate of a people, because in both a just and an unjust war it is always the innocent who suffer most. Please adopt a new, more rational approach and eliminate any opportunity for a return to wartime chaos.

Finally, we remind you that, after having suffered enormous human and material sacrifices in an absolutely unequal struggle — one against five — we defended ourselves from the indoctrinated fundamentalist fanatics. If this, sirs, was a sin or a crime, then we are all ready to go before the court because we have all participated in the defense of our survival in this area with the same fervor and motives.

Tomic on Reconstruction, Federal Financial System

AU2011200495 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 95 p 7

[Interview with Neven Tomic, minister of finance in the Government of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Milan Sutalo; place and date not given: "Help for Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Sum of $3.7 Billion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina is concluded in Dayton, one part will refer to the help of the international community in the post-war reconstruction of the country and the

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normalization of financial relations with the world. The task of preparing that economic part of the peace package has been given to a mixed mission which, under the patronage of the World Bank, included the representatives of the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S. organization for international aid, and other world financial institutions. Before the Ohio negotiations that group spent several days in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and met with officials of the government in Sarajevo and the government of the [self-proclaimed] Croat Republic [HR] of Herzeg-Bosnia. The minister of finance in the government of the HR of Herzeg-Bosnia and in the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Neven Tomic, was one of the hosts of that international mission.

Economic Help to the Whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Sutalo] What was the content of the investigative work and the talks of the group of world economic experts, and what will the economic part of the peace agreement consist of?

[Tomic] One of the mission's teams worked on regulating Bosnia-Herzegovina's relations with the world, the establishment of the financial system and membership in the financial institutions of the world, while another team worked on projects for the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Together with representatives of the Croat and Bosniak authorities they compiled the data for the whole territory of the federation. The result of that work is the package of the most urgent needs in the reconstruction of the country in the first three post-war years. On the basis of that document, for the first phase of the post-war reconstruction Bosnia-Herzegovina would get $3.7 billion, from which the exact amounts for particular regions have been determined. With that amount and with the package for the financial normalization of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in mid-December they will go to a conference of donors, a conference of all countries that are supposed to support the Ohio peace agreement. One part of the sum will be used for the restoration and reconstruction on the territory of the so-called Serbian Republic, because the aid is intended for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sutalo] Is it true that the representatives of the Bosniak authorities tried to impose the needs of the territory under their control as the needs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, excluding the territory under Croat rule?

[Tomic] In fact they tried to impose their view of needs and priorities in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the first provisions, which were made in Warsaw in June, there was no data on the territory and the needs of Herzeg-Bosnia. That has now been corrected through our intervention. Besides Sarajevo and Mostar, the international mission went to Medjugorje, which the Bosniak representatives disapproved of. Thirty of our experts worked together with that international mission, so that the two aforementioned documents include all the relevant data for the territory of the entire federation.

What About the Foreign Debt?

[Sutalo] What does the second document on the financial normalization of relations with the world contain?

[Tomic] In the first place, it regulates the membership of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the international financial organizations, the IMF and the World Bank, which implies the clearing of debts. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a foreign debt of over $2.5 billion, and half of it is already due. Out of that $450 million are owed to the World Bank, and around $80 million to the IMF. According to the rigid regulations of international financial organizations, those debts cannot be written off.

The World Bank is prepared — and this is the first time something like that has been allowed to one country — to give a $400 million package of "IDA [International Development Association] credit." This is credit under the most favorable conditions — due in 20 years and with a minimum interest rate. That would make the repayment of the debt possible. The problem of the debt to the IMF will be solved with a loan, which will be provided by Holland, and according to the first arrangement with the IMF that loan would be paid back, which would regulate the membership of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the IMF and its debts in the first period. As for other activities on the normalization of the financial situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that document foresees support to the country's balance of payments to the amount of $2 billion in the first year of postwar reconstruction, in which the balance is expected to be negative. The prerequisite is the clearing of the debts with the Paris and London Clubs, with the countries from which Bosnia-Herzegovina borrowed money. There is the possibility that 70 percent of the debt to the Paris Club could be written off, in accordance with the conditions of Naples, and there are also possibilities for the debt to the London Club to be paid off.

[Sutalo] Is the creation of federal institutions and the financial system a precondition for getting the resources for the postwar reconstruction of the territories of the federation?

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[Tomic] The document on international financial aid clearly says that the help goes through federal institutions, and the precondition for receiving it is the construction of the federal financial system: the central bank, the federation money, the tax and customs system, and also the construction of a federal agency for the reconstruction and the restoration of the country, which will be the partner of the international financial institutions for the use of the aforementioned $3.7 billion in aid. Therefore we have to start with the gradual building of the federal budget immediately, from which the army would be financed according to a special program. On the income side, the federal budget would be formed from customs and taxes, as well as donations, whereas on the expenses side there would be the expenses of the federal administration, expenses of the financing of the republic institutions, and, in the transitional period, also the expenses of the financing of the current debt and the participation in the reconstruction with 15 percent of the budget resources.

[Box, p 7]

In the Transitional Period — The German Mark

[Sutalo] How will the issue of the federal money, and customs and tax system be solved?

[Tomic] In the transitional period the official currency on the territory of the federation will be the German mark. The kuna and the Bosnia-Herzegovina dinar would remain on the territories where they are presently used, but all the reserves of the Bosnia-Herzegovina dinar and all the blocks for the minting of that money would be destroyed. The competition for the name and the design of the new federal money would be completed by the end of the transitional period. Then, the German mark would be changed into the federal money according to the established exchange rate. That would make the federal money convertible.

The tax system will have many decentralized elements, and as for the customs system, the federal customs administration would be formed, starting from scratch. At the moment there are many people in the customs offices who do not have an adequate level of education. Therefore we asked for technical help from Switzerland, where customs affairs are performed by a private agency, and the professionals would partly be formed from the existing customs personnel. At the moment, the Croat side does not require customs to be paid on the goods that go to the territory under Bosniak control or vice versa, whereas the Bosniak side treats the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia as another country, and, accordingly, requires that customs be paid on all the goods imported to Herzeg-Bosnia from Bosniak territory, or exported. Of course, that cannot go on.

The documents of economic aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina also contain a number of other elements, such as the economy's being based on market principles, private property, support to the economic reform, technical help in the construction of federal institutions. The program of help to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the postwar period, which is being prepared in the IMF and the World Bank, is a complete package. That program, under the auspices of the World Bank, should lead Bosnia-Herzegovina out of this situation, with the support of the IMF, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the Islamic countries.

Interior Minister Views Interethnic Relations

AU2011213995 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 16-23 Nov 95 pp 8-9

[Interview with Bakir Alispahic, interior minister of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Rasim Cerimagic and Djuro Kozar; place and date not given: "Crime Without the National Sign"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

There is No Pressure on the Ministry of Internal Affairs

[OSLOBODJENJE] Is it true that the Ministry of Internal Affairs consists of one nation and one party only? What do the personnel statistics show?

[Alispahic] According to the latest statistics, there are 249 Serbs and 564 Croats in the ministry's active and reserve forces. Compared with the overall number of personnel, these are negligible figures, but it still cannot be claimed that the Ministry consists of members of only one national group. Neither does it consist of members of only one party, since there are a certain number of people in leading and other positions who are members or followers of all parties that participate in the work of the parliament of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is true that some personnel of Serb and Croat nationality have left, but we did not in any way initiate this. It happens that an officer comes to me, a Croat or a Serb, it does not matter, and quits. They usually find excuses such as separation from family, or irritation with the war; they tell you thousands of reasons for leaving. They are told that the ministry needs them, that they are counted on, but this usually does not work. They are simply prepared to leave, and it is difficult to make them change their mind. Their real motives can be varied. It is certain that the aggressor exerts pressure on them and

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their families, there is blackmail, and all other things characteristic of the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. As far as we are concerned, I can claim in all seriousness that nobody from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has left under any kind of pressure exerted by us. [passage omitted]

[OSLOBODJENJE] Now, when the road in and out of Sarajevo is open for civilians, it can be seen that the inhabitants of Sarajevo are in a worse position than the inhabitants of Zenica, Tuzla, or any other town in the free territory. This "internal encirclement" is still firm and it consists of a series of bureaucratic hurdles and papers that in most cases kill every wish of a Sarajevo resident to decide to leave the city after four years.

[Alispahic] Your statements are not true. Sarajevo is still under siege, regardless of the illusion called "blue roads." We have made it possible for all citizens to leave Sarajevo and go to the free territory without any special documents. There is no "internal encirclement." There is only a "bottleneck" near the airport, so that the Sarajevo Security Service is entitled to make lists for the passage of cars, in order to enable free passage for trucks that bring food, fuel, and other essentials into the city.

We have kept records of the cars and inhabitants that left Sarajevo from 7 September 1995 to 5 October 1995 — 5,384 cars, and 11,907 citizens left during that period. We have also kept records of the entries into Sarajevo from 7 September 1995 to 1 October 1995 — 3,150 cars and 9,742 passengers entered the city in that period. These figures tell us enough about how free the flow of people and goods is regarding procedures for both exit and entry. We are no longer keeping records about this, since everyone has two possibilities to enter and leave the town, either in the morning or in the afternoon.

In other words it has been made easier to leave Sarajevo on the "blue road," and no documents are necessary, apart from the travel order for those going on business trips. This has placed Sarajevo inhabitants in the same position — as far as freedom of movement is concerned — as the inhabitants of other towns in the free territory. It was not up to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that this was not the case before. It rather depended on other authorities, the bodies in charge of defense first of all, since they had to issue permits, taking into consideration the interests of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is logical.

You have to know that during a certain period soldiers fled from their units, which affected the safety and combat readiness of the units. This had to be prevented, so that those who were necessary for the defense were not allowed to leave the city. This was the core of the problem.

Conditions have improved, but it is still necessary to be careful with permits for leaving Sarajevo. The Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs jointly try to prevent conscripts from leaving, so that it is necessary to make controls on certain points in order to see what someone's real motives are for leaving Sarajevo.

Reporters and Police

[passage omitted]

[OSLOBODJENJE] Doe the police have any idea about the identity of the pyromaniac who set the Studio 99 transmitter on fire?

[Alispahic] I received the latest reports a few days ago. It can be seen from them that a large number of persons could have done that. The cause is known: An unknown person pulled out the cables, which caused a short circuit and made the electric insulation burn, and the fire spread to the transmitter equipment. Polygraph testings have been made, but it was impossible to reduce the number of suspects to one person.

The problem lies in the fact that from time to time a large number of persons were illegally attached to the transmitter power cable, and anybody could have had a motive for pulling it out and causing the fire. I think that Studio 99 made skillful use of all this to make a political issue out of it. It did not have any arguments for making the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina responsible for the crime. This is a case of monopolization of the media, Studio 99 abused its permit to inform the public, it is not pursuing the struggle for independent and professional journalism. I think it is not prohibited for the minister of internal affairs to have his own opinion about everything, including the events in connection with the Studio 99 transmitter. Regardless of our opposite opinions, I am pleased that Studio 99 soon resumed the work soon after the event.

I support competition among the media, since this is the only remedy against a monopoly in the information system. We are, after all, a public service and have to get used to be accused of certain things, but both media and citizens must have arguments against us. [passage omitted]

[OSLOBODJENJE] When will the federal police start functioning throughout the whole territory of the Federation? Is any kind of pressure exerted on the police?

[Alispahic] As soon as there is a real and honest political will of our federal partner. Since the Washington agreement was signed, things have been only postponed since our federal partner is obviously waiting for the

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political and military outcome in order to start solving matters in the field.

I do not know what kind of pressure there should be against the police, since its obligations and tasks are strictly defined by law. If you mean positive pressure of public opinion, I support the principle that the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should be public, since we are all here for the sake of the citizens, in order to protect their rights and freedoms. Constructive criticism and ideas are welcome.

SGV Official Interviewed on 'Loyal Serbs'

AU2111094895 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 pp 18, 19

[Interview with SGV Vice-President Sretko Radisic by Esad Hecimovic in Zenica; date not given: "President Izetbegovic Personally Asked for the Rights of Loyal Serbs To Be Protected!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The Serb Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "which represents Serbs loyal to the multinational government in Sarajevo," "the forgotten voice of all those who, under extremely difficult conditions, have managed to maintain their support for a humane, multiethnic, democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina and reject the war of genocidal apartheid that is being conducted by the Pale regime," is the winner of the international "Real Life" prize, or the alternative Nobel Prize.*

[Hecimovic] Does this explanation for your prize mean that the basic intention of the SGV is to look for the solution of the Serb national issue within a democratic atmosphere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or does the SGV have some special Serb national goals?

[Radisic] The prevailing intention is to look for a solution in a democratic atmosphere and, in that atmosphere, to look for the realization of the basic goal: the integral and democratic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We believe that such conditions can only be achieved in peace, but a kind of peace that will permit a reasonable dialogue and bring about the preconditions for reasonable and acceptable solution for all the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Hecimovic] How does the SGV see democracy in relations on the territory controlled by the Presidency and Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Radisic] Bosnia-Herzegovina is an internationally recognized state and, as such, it is obliged to respect democratic principles. I have always opposed people comparing us to the separatist forces that have formed parastates in this region and wish to keep that right for themselves. Here we believe, and this is as it should be, that the grosser the violation of human rights, the stricter the punishment should be. Recently in Tuzla, at the HCA [Helsinki Citizens Assembly] session, I said that at the moment in Bosnia-Herzegovina the cities that offered real hope for the development of democratic relations were Zenica, Sarajevo, and Tuzla. I said that because of the extent to which fascism had entered Banja Luka, how strong it still was, and how much it excluded and ruled out the interests of other nations who disagree with the opinion of the regime. The example of western Mostar is also infamous. So I do see a possibility for the development of democracy, but I do not see, because of a number of circumstances, that it is still a true and realistic democracy. I do not accept the notion of limited democracy. Democracy either exists or it does not exist. It seems to me that in Zenica, in Tuzla perhaps most, but also in Sarajevo, there are the institutional preconditions for democracy. We are through the worst: Human rights and civil freedoms are increasingly being respected in practice, we have preserved the multiethnic core of society, we have a multiparty political system, and we have interconfessional relations. Those are all solid preconditions from which one can expect the improvement of democratic relations in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the future. That model should be spread throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Did Kordic Move the Serbs Out?

[Hecimovic] There are different assessments of the number of citizens of Serb nationality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both on this territory and the territory of the self-proclaimed Serb Republic. What information does the SGV have about this?

[Radisic] We have rather scattered data. We mostly use approximate data. The migrations are still dynamic, not as much as in 1992 and 1993, but they still go on. We assess that around 150,000 people of Serb nationality live on the territory under the control of the Government and Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that on the territory controlled by Karadzic's forces there are around 500,000 people. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to the 1991 census, there were 33.3 percent of citizens of Serb nationality or 1.3 million. This shows that a large number of Serbs have left Bosnia-Herzegovina and a large number of Serbs have also been killed in this war.

[Hecimovic] According to what the SGV knows, how many Serbs have left the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army during the war?

[Radisic] Around 30,000 Serbs have remained in Sarajevo, in the part controlled by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is the largest Serb population

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on this territory. Around 10,000 Serbs have remained in Tuzla, and, in comparison to the pre-war figure, the number has perhaps been halved. In Zenica, according to our estimates, around 5,000 have remained, which means that over 15,000 people have left this area.

[Hecimovic] Why have 15,000 Serbs left this area?

[Radisic] The first reaction to the mass exodus of tens or hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks was fear among the Serbs. That fear was unrealistically encouraged by the propaganda of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], but it is also a fact that this was realistically encouraged by some individuals who tried to provoke and maltreat people and who attacked people's property. Thus, two massive waves of departures of the Serb population occurred in 1992, in summer and in the autumn. That was a time when there was an extremely complex and difficult military-political situation in this region. The armed forces had still to be formed. At that time there were several military formations and it was hard to coordinate them. There were some people who used the time to avoid the authorities and endanger the citizens' security. After that, the situation stabilized somewhat, but the tense phase of political relations between the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] resulted in a fierce conflict between the army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in central Bosnia. Zenica was under a total blockade and the people were in an unbelievable and uncertain situation. The humanitarian situation was catastrophic, with people threatened by mass starvation. In such a situation people were looking for a way out and I would say that this caused the second wave of emigration. It has to be said that the 5,000 Serbs who have remained in Zenica are critical. Regardless of the reasons, any further departure of citizens of Serb nationality from Zenica would threaten the multinational structure. Therefore, I have to say this for the first time: From now on I will dedicate myself even more to the human rights of Serbs on this territory, because, objectively speaking, they are now a minority. I hope that the citizens of Zenica and of Bosnia-Herzegovina can understand this. I will dedicate myself to this, because I believe that the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot exist without one of its constituent nations. I do not want Zenica to be a city without Serbs in the future, any more than I do not want it to be without Croats or Bosniaks.

[Hecimovic] How did the Serbs leave Zenica?

[Radisic] In phases.

[Hecimovic] Was it an organized emigration, a kind of trade in people...?

[Radisic] It is interesting that in the period of the biggest euphoria, in the climate in which these departures occurred, the authorities issued a statement in which they expressed their opposition to the departure of the Serbs. No competent organization organized the departure. I would say that on this territory it was a sort of self-organization, and that the HVO organized convoys from Busovaca to Kiseljak. And another thing: There were also some illegal departures, organized by individuals for large sums of money.

So those were the two kinds of organization. One was with the help of the HVO and the other was with the help of corruption and crime.

[Hecimovic] In 1992, the Zenica SDA was already claiming that Dario Kordic, one of the leading HVO men in central Bosnia, was organizing the emigration of Serbs from central Bosnia with far-reaching political goals. Can you confirm or deny this conjecture?

[Radisic] I am absolutely opposed to ethnic cleansing. I cannot support an idea that strips an area of some people just because of their ethnicity or religion. Today I have to talk about that situation tentatively because of the federal Constitution. I hope that the Federation succeeds, and I hope that the federal Constitution will nevertheless eventually manage to bring about the return of those expelled and that it will be the first phase in the reintegration — not disintegration! — of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina; I hope that it will trigger positive processes, concerning the hatred that has been imposed through violence. In that context, I would not like to talk about the role of particular politicians. I do not have sufficient information to be able to support or confirm it, but I have already said that the process occurred in phases, that in those departures there was none of the cruelty that characterized the fate of Bosniaks expelled from Prijedor or from eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the people were able to sell some of their property — and I really do not know who they gave that money to. I know that the HVO secured the transport from Busovaca and, as for whether there was a political goal or interest behind it, let us allow the process of the implementation of the federation to continue. [passage omitted]

Life Together Is Possible

[Hecimovic] How do you personally feel after three years of cooperation and participation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities? Do you feel cheated, or do you see a meaning and a purpose in your engagement?

[Radisic] If I saw no meaning, I would not be engaged here any longer. After all these changes in the authorities made on the basis of the federal Constitution, I have remained the only representative of the Serb nation

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in the municipal authorities. After all, I represent an institution through which all the problems of the citizens of Serb nationality are solved. I did not gain legitimacy as the representative of the Serb nation in any elections, but the times have imposed that responsibility upon me. I can cooperate with all the competent authorities. I am a member of the closest political team of the Zenica Mayor Besim Spahic. Our relationship has been completely correct all the time. I do not feel and I do not want to feel like a follower of the Greater Serbia idea and, if anybody suggests that there is anything of that sort in me, it will be a crime against me, but now I am in the situation to commit myself more to the protection of the rights of the citizens of Serb nationality. Serbs are objectively a minority here, and only through the survival of Serbs in this area we will be able to preserve the multiethnic character of society. [passage omitted]

[Hecimovic] In the opinion of the SGV, does the U.S. initiative lead to the ethnic separation of the Serb nation from the other two nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or does it lead to the restoration of Bosnia as a multiethnic country?

[Radisic] The SGV disagrees with any internal division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into different entities, because the exclusive right of one nation to live on one territory without other nations is not acceptable, and it will be a permanent source of instability. Regardless that our permanent orientation is the preservation of a integral and multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the moment it is a matter of opinion as to which solution is militarily or politically more suitable at this time. The condemnation and punishment of war criminals and the return of all people who wish to return to their homes — those things have to be secured through a strong international monitoring mechanism. The solution must give the state the minimum of functions to make it a viable state.

[Hecimovic] In your view, what would be the consequence of a possible legalization of the Serb Republic within a union of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Radisic] I do not believe that that will happen. There is no mention of a state, but of an entity. I believe that it is only possible to talk about a high degree of autonomy, but that there can be no talk about the establishment of a state within a state. The consequences of a state within a state would be very serious. I do not believe that such a peace solution would be successful and that the war would go on.

[Hecimovic] Would such a solution motivate the departure of the Serbs who have spent the entire war here?

[Radisic] Probably. The federal Constitution did not recognize the Serbs as a constituent nation and the U.S. initiative, if it freezes the situation as it is at this moment and accepts self-organization within the Serb Republic, would probably put these people in an even harder and more uncertain situation. If the state character of the Serb Republic were recognized, that would put these people here in an unfavorable position, because they would not be recognized in the political or any other sense. They would be squeezed between some sort of republic on an ethnically cleansed territory and the status of minority here. That would inevitably have an even more serious consequence: emigration on an ethnic basis. I am hoping that the peace solution will bring about integration processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Official on Suspension of Dayton Talks

AU2111122495 Paris AFP in English 1130 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Nov 21 (AFP)—Balkan peace talks near Dayton, Ohio, have been suspended but have not failed, a Croatian official said here Tuesday anonymously.

"The last time we spoke to our delegation last night, they told us that they were going to go to bed, but we know that they are not coming back today (Tuesday) to Zagreb," the official said.

The earlier announcement by Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbe that there had been no accord was "not an official statement," the source said.

"From our point of view, only the (U.S.) State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, is qualified to make an official statement," he said.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman went to Dayton on Sunday to join his Bosnian and Serbian counterparts Alija Izetbegovic and Slobodan Milosevic around the negotiating table, stressing that he would not have been summoned if there were nothing to sign there. [passage omitted]

Deal Reached with FRY on Detained Persons

LD2011093095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our Dayton correspondent reports that Croatia and so-called Yugoslavia have reached an agreement on the exchange of missing and detained persons.

All detained persons must be released immediately. The details of the agreement will be tackled by a commission which will meet alternately in Zagreb and Belgrade.

Parties Comment on Dayton Negotiations

AU2111100995 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Nov 95 pp 4-5

[Report by Zorislav Petrovic and Ivica Djikic on statements by Stjepo Martinovic (HNS), Anto Djapic (HSP), and Jozo Rados (HSLS); place and date not given: "Unacceptable Trade With Territories"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

HNS [Croatian National Party]: Triumphalism Out of Place

Stjepo Martinovic, secretary general of the Croatian National Party: We welcome the fact that the Dayton negotiations are approaching a solution, which means the end of the war, but in no way can we agree with the president's triumphal assessment that the United States and the Contact Group members are treating Croatia differently than the other sides. If the main result of the negotiations is the partly veiled division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the normalization of relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is in the interest of connecting traffic to southeastern and Central Europe, we cannot see what the big profit for Croatia would be. Namely, on three crucial points—eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem—the basic agreement is not an act on the return of Croatian sovereignty in the period of 12 months, but an act on a temporary solution under UN patronage. We think that any idea regarding the exchange of territories is scandalous and we reject the surrender of Prevlaka as a precedent, particularly the arguments that the point in question is the defense of Dubrovnik, because Dubrovnik is defended on the Drina River, not on Popovo field. We do not agree with the insincere relationship toward the International Tribunal in the Hague, because in that way we lose the right to condemn the other side. The HNS thinks that the territorial shaping of the states that were in the former Yugoslavia cannot be solved without the conclusions of the Badinter Commission, particularly if the interests of only one part of Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be satisfied by the internal organization of that country.

HSP [Croatian Party of Rights]: Dictation Against Croatia

Anto Djapic, spokesperson of the Croatian Party of Rights: We have experienced President Tudjman's epistle as a report on the situation in Croatian foreign policy, which is very bad for Croatia. In our opinion, the only positive thing in the negotiations in Dayton is the strengthening of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, everything else is harmful. We consider equal treatment of all the sides in the conflict unacceptable, and we point out that the normalization of relations with Serbia is unacceptable before it is clearly said who is the aggressor, before the truth about the missing Croatian defenders is made public, before the future status of the Bosanska Posavina region and the Croats in Backa, Srijem, and Boka is defined, and we think that the announcements of the return of the fugitive Serbs to Croatia are particularly scandalous.

We are aware that it is a dictation of the international powers, but there is and there can be no haggling about Croatian sovereignty. Prevlaka is only an indication that Croatian sovereignty is being brought into question. We have already given a negative mark to the agreement on

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peaceful reintegration, which does not guarantee Croatian sovereignty in the momentarily occupied territories.

HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party]: Policy of Failure

Jozo Rados, vice president of the HSLS: President Tudjman's epistle to the citizens is an attempt to disguise obvious failure of Croatian policy in the negotiations in Dayton, and the president has avoided directly confronting the public—that is, with the journalists. The president speaks affirmatively about the agreement on peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, and expresses expectations that are utterly unrealistic according to the contents of the very agreement. When he mentions Prevlaka, the president for the first time talks about the possibility of the exchange of territories, but without any concrete data. He openly mentions the conquered areas in the hinterland of Dubrovnik, and hitherto those have been territories conquered by HVO [Croatian Defense Council] for operational reasons. Not even a word is uttered in the epistle about the Bosanska Posavina region, which means that the solutions regarding the Bosanska Posavina region are very unfavorable for the Croats.

Shortly, the epistle is the result of the failure of Croatian policy, and the one who is responsible for that policy is the one who has independently created it, and that is Franjo Tudjman, president of the republic.

Commentary on Dayton Negotiations, Tudjman Actions

AU2111105495 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Some Unknown Susak Has Spoken Up Like Old Budisa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As this very uncertain diplomatic match draws to an inevitable end, it is becoming more and more obvious that even some of the most famous players will not remain on the playing field until the referee's final whistle. Just like in soccer, in this closed Dayton political fair, some exceptionally important chosen persons of the national and state diplomatic teams cannot or do not want to listen to the instructions of the irreplaceable selectors, from whom very rigorous referees expect in the last third of the game to stop the ball, regardless of all the booing from the audience. Some of them only played well when the ball was in the opponent's half, the others only in the goal area, while at the moment the most wanted are those center tacticians who will maintain more or less an unchanged balance with as less incidents as possible for additional yellow and red cards. One can keep running to and fro, but it nevertheless seems that the whole game has been limited to the center circle.

And, therefore, the first to drop out of the game are those who have too naively and romantically charged over the wings in search of truth and justice (Zubak, Sacirbegovic, Tadic), while those who have felled their opponents on every square inch of turf (accused of war crimes) are still being forgiven of their yellow cautions, since they have indebted their own selectors by their reliability and their mercilessness so much that they will still sooner come to blows with the referees than admit that any dirty game deserves some kind of red card in the end. Milosevic still supports Karadzic and Mladic militarily, while Tudjman has already in Dayton too quickly and in too panicky a way made public those generally controversial appointments (Blaskic), which certainly will not help Croatia in defense of its European image. In the newly formed league, there will be no place for many from Grude and Pale, but it seems almost impossible to move some of the most important players into retirement, or at least into a lower league. Thus, the writing off of Mate Boban has already become an omnipresent legend, regardless of the fact that they had wanted to put him at least seemingly away from the contemporaneity.

Thus, the first to jump from the reconstructed ships are those who nevertheless wanted to keep the ships on some kind of honest and correct course: Both Zubak and Sacirbegovic obviously do not belong to the majority of politicians and statesmen who will painlessly agree to "the borders drawn by blood" and agreements that will play with people and territories like ordinary consumption goods, while the irreplaceable heads will use all the state power—from the media to the uniforms—in order to prove that the best thing today is precisely that what was inadmissible yesterday. Therefore Tudjman's latest epistle was, in the official public, primarily interpreted as "instructions," and not as an object of discussion, although everybody understood that the point in question is the first crucial feeler by which the president, too, has been—probably also too quickly—testing the real quantity of power that his limited election victory brought to him. And not only in Croatia, but also in heated "Herzeg-Bosnia," where even some unknown Gojko Susak has suddenly spoken up about the state establishment like some old and forgotten Drazen Budisa.

In that overall changing of clothes, the opposition has still been vainly trying to at least point out the inadmissible change of fashion and general moral bankruptcy so that the two latest bitter statements of eight joint oppositional parties (one on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and betrayal of the Posavina region and

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Cape Prevlaka, and the other one on the doubtful integration of eastern Slavonia) were published on the whole, while the others watered them down by sordid retelling, or even passed in total silence over them. However, even those incurable malcontents know that this omnipotent, inevitable, and untouchable Franjo Tudjman is suitable to the "mighty world," primarily as a statesman who will very stubbornly and irreconcilably keep order in his own house, even when some walls are collapsing, and other partitions are being constructed, and then also in the wider courtyard, that he will deliver what he has promised, regardless of the final measure of elegant sensibility.

This is the war in which the "forceful resettlement of significant parts of whole nations was the basic aim, and not an unwanted consequence," so Dayton obviously expresses the bitter turning point where it is extremely overtly recognized that the only important thing is the "strategic" quality of nevertheless dismembered territories which simultaneously enables the survival of the "rounded off" economic and military wholes and the long-term balance of power between the confronted aspirations of the local warriors and imported tutors. That is the inevitable syllable in which both Washington and Moscow will understand Tudjman's wish to "thicken" the hinterland of Dubrovnik, and the quadruple trade by which the Bosnian Serbs will "get their access to the sea," and simultaneously not support anyone until the final and just victory. In all this, even a much livelier and more resolute opposition can only impotently be late at home, while in the world it is threatened to stay ununderstood in a role of a bit ridiculous and old-fashioned lady that inopportunely invokes some kind of absolutely just peace.

Krajina Serbs Said Tricked Into Surrendering

LD2111120195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1022 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 21 (TANJUG)—At a two-day trial, if it can be called that at all, 23 Serbs were sentenced in Gospic by a Croatian military court to between six months and two and a half years in prison. Serbs are being sentenced summarily at blitz trials by Croatian judicial authorities.

All 23 sentenced Serbs were found guilty of participating in 'the armed rebellion against the Republic of Croatia.' The differences in the prison terms are probably supposed to demonstrate that regular trials are in question, although court-appointed counselors 'defend' a score or more defendants at once. Even if they wanted, they could hardly provide adequate legal service to such a large number of defendants.

Sufficient 'evidence' for Krajina Serbs to be sentenced is if they were members of military units of the Republic of Serb Krajina, without any heed whatsoever being paid to their statements that they surrendered believing Croatian President Franjo Tudjman that only perpetrators of crimes would be tried.

To make things simple, the deadline set under a law on abrogation has expired and no new one has been fixed so that everything is done based on 'laws' of the new independent state of Croatia. Tudjman guaranteed abrogation to Serbs in the western, southern and northern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina in May and again August this year on condition they surrendered to Croatian authorities. He has, however, failed to meet the promise.

More than 250,000 Serbs were forced to flee due to Croatia's aggressions on the western, southern and northern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina in May and August. Several thousand Serbs, mostly civilians, were killed and Serb homes were plundered and burned.

It is estimated that 1,300 or so Serbs are awaiting trial in Croatian prisons. If the 'blitz' trials continue, the imprisoned Serbs will no doubt very soon receive 'deserved' sentences. A smaller number of prisoners of war or arrested Serbs have not been tried. They have been released but without any money, without knowing where to go, without identification and other papers, except for the decision that the inquiry proceedings against them were discontinued.

No matter how paradoxical it may sound, Serbs in prisons have been better off because, thanks to international control, they could not have 'disappeared' never to return again as have many Serbs across Krajina, mostly elder people, who have been killed. Reports about the executions of Serbs continue arriving although it has been three months since Croatia's latest military aggression.

Ten Serbs against whom proceedings were discontinued were recently released from Zagreb's Remetinec prison. Three went to stay with their relatives, while the other seven, without having anybody in Zagreb or Croatia, had to ask the prison warden to let them spend another night in the cells so that they would have a whole day before them to find some kind of accommodations. They found provisional accommodations at the Serbian orthodox church monastery in Zagreb.

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Conduct of Russian UN Forces Criticized

AU2011211095 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Nov 95 p 5

[Commentary by Mirko Sajler: "Yeltsin's Delusions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Frowning and gesticulating before the television cameras, Boris Yeltsin expressed the firm position that Russia must, on an equal basis with other world forces, take part in resolving the crisis in former Yugoslavia, forgetting or consciously neglecting that members of the Russian Army within the UN forces, particularly the officers, neither behaved correctly nor did their jobs properly.

Russian Colonel Viktor Loginov was replaced as commander of the Russian battalion in the former Sector East following a series of abuses of office. However, after that he did not return to Russia. He stayed within the former Sector East, where he joined Arkan's paramilitary formations. It was precisely in Erdut, in the immediate vicinity of the medieval castle in which Stoltenberg and Galbraith are now negotiating with the self-styled leadership of the local Serbs, that the Russian colonel instructed Arkan's "Tigers." Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan gave Loginov a white Mercedes in return for his services, which he is now using to drive back and forth between Belgrade and Erdut. By the way, this former Russian officer was also involved in "white slave trading" when he was in command of the Russian UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] battalion. He and Arkan have turned inns in Erdut, Dalj, and Aljmas into brothels, which he is now supplying with Polish and Russian prostitutes, who charge the UNPROFOR soldiers a great deal of money for their services. There are also girls who were tricked into coming, and, after forceful prostitution in eastern Slavonia, turned over to Arkan's men, who took them to brothels in Bosnia. This is known within the UN, but is being carefully played down.

The Concealed Truth

General Aleksandr Perelyakin, a Russian officer, was the commander of 1,600 Russian and Belgian blue helmets in former Sector East. His name is connected with many abuses of office, which, at one time, forced a special UN committee to come to eastern Slavonia and establish the truth. An extensive record was put together with a "UN Confidential" seal on it. However, the former head of UNPROFOR, Bertrand de Lapresle, managed to conceal the truth. On orders from UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, the envoy for the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi was tasked with sparing the UN and Moscow public disgrace and keeping the impression that the Russian Army is reliable, while Lapresle swept the issue under the carpet. However, everything was found out later, since the contents of the secret documents were leaked from the upper floors of the UN building on East River in New York.

What did Russian general Perelyakin do? According to the secret UN documents, he was involved in organized crime. Together with Loginov and Arkan, he covered up whatever was happening in Sector East and did not report it to UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. With his inclination towards the Serbs, itself the fruit of corruption, this Russian Army officer jeopardized all the international efforts to establish some kind of peace through UNPROFOR. In fact, his activities created tension in former Sector East. The list of Perelyakin's sins is quite a long one, as the UN Committee established. After he took up his duties in April 1994, the Russian general allowed 13 armored vehicles into Baranja, which were a gift from the Yugoslav Army to the local Serb paramilitaries. The subordinate officer from the Belgian battalion opposed this on Batina Bridge across the Danube River, but Perelyakin ordered that the armored vehicles pass anyway. The case involving reporters, which occurred on 24 August 1994, is also well known. Russian guards in the "buffer zone" arrested two Croatian reporters, Antonija Rajkovic, who worked for Croatian Radio Vukovar, and Steve Gaunt, photographer for GLAS SLAVONIJE.

The Brothels

Instead of handing the reporters over to Croatian officers, they transferred them to the Serb side. They were handed over to the Serbs, which Perelyakin had personally insisted on. The two Croatian reporters spent five weeks in prison before being released. From the positions where Russian troops were deployed, the Serbs shot at the Belgian "blue helmets," as well at the Croatian Army positions. General Perelyakin tolerated all of the above and did not inform his superiors in Zagreb about any of it.

As required by the UN Headquarters, Perelyakin rented quite a large building in Dalj, but he turned it into a brothel. Therefore, the UN was paying the rent on the brothel of a Russian general. After all, this is all in the UN Committee's secret report that some Western reporters have managed to get their hands on.

Other Russian officers in UNPROFOR in Bosnia behaved in a similar way. Still, Boris Yeltsin, even though he knows about all of this, insists that Russian forces be part of the international peace implementation forces in the former Yugoslavia, but not in any way under the command of U.S. or NATO officers. The Russian president has several reasons for such behavior. First, he still

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considers NATO an enemy and opposes it spreading east. Second, he wants to save at least part of the international reputation that the former Soviet Union used to have as the leading world force and the founder of the Warsaw Pact. Thirdly, he wants to gather at least some points for the coming presidential election in Russia, if his illness and many other things allow him to run for president.

However, because of its negative experience Croatia must consider whether it should agree to Russian officers appearing as part of the international peace implementation forces in the former Yugoslavia and under whose command they will be if they come. The local Serbs are insisting that the Russian forces come precisely to eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. Noone should mind that, but these forces must be under NATO command. In fact, the experience with Russian officers should determine it.

Matesa Discusses Kordic, Privatization Issues

AU2111075395 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 95 pp 2-4

[Interview with Zlatko Matesa, new Croatian prime minister, by Djurdjica Klancir and Davor Butkovic; place and date not given: "Croatia Will For the Time Being Not Extradite Dario Kordic, HDZ Chairman for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Who Has Been Charged With Crimes Against Humanity!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [GLOBUS] What will Croatian Government do in connection with charges and arrest warrants that have been issued by the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague to Zagreb, Mostar, and Sarajevo, against six high-ranking officials in the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities?

[Matesa] First, not a single Croat from Croatia has been charged with war crimes yet. Second, you know what has happened with the charges issued in the Hague against Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic.

I believe that a whole series of actions has yet to follow that should prove to both domestic and foreign audiences that the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina charged with war crimes really committed the crimes they are charged with.

The initial procedure for the establishment of guilt is under way. We have to see what will be established.

[GLOBUS] The court in the Hague issued arrest warrants that were handed over to the Croatian authorities on 15 November 1995. Will the Croatian police arrest Dario Kordic, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] chairman for Bosnia-Herzegovina if he comes to Croatia?

[Matesa] The Croatian police will for the time being not arrest Dario Kordic so long as the responsible Croatian authorities, such as the Ministry of Justice, have not passed the decisions relevant for us.

[GLOBUS] Does Croatia not have an obligation toward the International Court in the Hague to arrest Kordic, since the Croatian authorities have already been handed over the arrest warrants?

[Matesa] I cannot answer this question. You will have to ask Mr. Miroslav Separovic, the minister of justice.

[GLOBUS] Will the Croatian Government cooperate with the court in the Hague regarding the six officials from Bosnia-Herzegovina charged with war crimes?

[Matesa] Croatia will cooperate with the court in the Hague, but within the interests of its official policy.

[GLOBUS] You want to say that there is the possibility that nothing will happen to these people, that they will be protected by the Croatian authorities?

[Matesa] All options are open. We are prepared to cooperate with the court in the Hague, but if court procedures show that the Croatian state has to intervene, we shall take the appropriate measures.

Dario Kordic

[GLOBUS] Four months ago, on the occasion of the Day of the Establishment of the Croatian State, Dario Kordic was, among other things, decorated for his contribution to the improvement of the international esteem of the Republic of Croatia. How is it possible that a man who is charged with war crimes has had a positive influence on the international esteem of the Republic of Croatia?

[Matesa] It is not up to me to assess why Dario Kordic was given that award. He was probably awarded by President Tudjman personally. It is impossible for me to interpret the reasons for Kordic's decoration. I think, however, that it is very dangerous to judge on political relations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in general from the point of view of the present charges. Court decisions must have no influence on these relations. Apart from that, let me repeat once again, we have to wait for the Croatian judiciary to take the necessary measures.

[GLOBUS] How would you interpret the fact that the charges against the leading Croatian politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been brought right now?

[Matesa] The timing and the persons charged with war crimes permit numerous speculations. I have personally

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not been presented the materials that were the basis for the above mentioned charges.

[GLOBUS] What is the attitude of the HDZ toward the fact that the HDZ chairman for Bosnia-Herzegovina has been charged with war crimes?

[Matesa] The HDZ has never discussed this.

[GLOBUS] Is it not extremely discreditable for the HDZ that his leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been charged with such a heavy crime?

[Matesa] I would like to repeat that the HDZ has not discussed this issue so far. If the HDZ discusses this issue, which will probably happen, we shall assume concrete attitudes.

[GLOBUS] How is it that you have not discussed this, although there were important signs that Kordic would be charged? It is well known that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina sent the documents incriminating Dario Kordic to the Hague several months ago?

[Matesa] I have not been informed about a single part of the indictment, I did not expect that charges would be brought against him, so that I find it extremely difficult to comment on the HDZ attitude toward Kordic and other persons charged with war crimes. I repeat that I have never been present in a single HDZ meeting in which this issue has been discussed.

[GLOBUS] Have the charges against the leader of Herzeg-Bosnia been brought because of the Dayton negotiating process, as is considered by some Croatian politicians?

[Matesa] That would be too primitive. In the tradition of the judiciaries of the countries that make up the International War Crimes Tribunal politics has no influence on judicial decisions. I do not believe that the charges are a result of pressure exerted on Croatia in order to make it more flexible in Dayton.

Sanctions

[GLOBUS] What will happen if Croatia is threatened with sanctions if it does not extradite the six persons charged with war crimes?

[Matesa] I am aware of the fact that this could happen. Without a decision of the Croatian Ministry of Justice, or if the Croatian laws or the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina on extradition are violated, we shall not be able to arrest anyone, however. We have to respect the procedure.

[GLOBUS] Why has Croatia accepted the agreement on eastern Slavonia, which has caused bitter disappointment both among refugees and in the free part of Slavonia?

[Matesa] When you mentioned Dario Kordic you also mentioned sanctions and isolation. I think that if we had not been ready to try to find a peaceful solution to eastern Slavonia, this would have much more affected the international position of Croatia than our attitude toward the charges from the Hague.

We have always underlined that Croatia supports a peaceful solution, but there has been no response so far from the other side. Now, having finally obtained a positive answer from the Serbs, we could not have given up our peaceful policy. The positive Serbian answer is practically a guarantee for Croatia that its most important interest—territorial integrity—will be realized. Why reject signing the peace agreement then?

Satisfaction or dissatisfaction in a part of our population because of the agreement on eastern Slavonia will depend on its materialization.

I do not have any illusion that its realization will be easy. But, after all, we have always claimed—and we have not given it up—that we shall make use of other means too if the final solution cannot be reached in a peaceful way.

[GLOBUS] Do you think that the refugees from eastern Slavonia and Baranja will be able to and want to return to areas that will, objectively, be supervised by local Serb authorities? Nobody has returned yet to the liberated areas.

[Matesa] This is a good question. Why is no one returning to liberated areas? This is a very important and difficult question from both the sociological and political point of view. As far as the government is concerned, we shall take a series of encouraging measures in order to make refugees return home. We do not know, however, whether the refugees have in these four years created the conditions for their existence in other parts of Croatia and how many of them really intend to return.

Croatia does not have any means to force someone to return back home, either in the liberated areas [Krajina] or eastern Slavonia.

[GLOBUS] Some 120,000 Serbs live in eastern Slavonia now. It is ethnically clean, and the basic conditions for the return of refugees have neither been fulfilled now, nor will they be fulfilled in the coming year. Which refugees would dare return to territory under Serb supervision, where the Serbs have a majority?

[Matesa] The agreement is very clear and it should enable the refugees to return. Realistically speaking,

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the situation is very difficult for both sides. In order to implement the agreement and make refugees really return, it will be necessary to show good will and abandon many things. All this is clear to us, but the final option is always possible.

[GLOBUS] Why has the Croatian leadership not decided to take the final option now, since all military conditions have been fulfilled?

[Matesa] Yes, military conditions have been fulfilled, but this is only the technical aspect of the problem. We have to bear in mind that the situation in the whole of the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, has to be solved. We want the territorial integrity of Croatia, the international recognition of all the countries in the area, and the unique Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Washington agreement.

The main steps we have taken within our foreign policy correspond to these aims. In that context, a military action must remain the ultimate solution, it must not be the first one.

[GLOBUS] Has Croatia been exposed to international threats in case it does not accept the agreement on eastern Slavonia?

[Matesa] I do not know anything about such a thing.

The Carrot and Stick Principle

[GLOBUS] We would like to remind you that two weeks ago President Clinton mentioned the possibility that sanctions could be introduced against Croatia it it started a military action.

[Matesa] Croatia has been threatened with sanctions at least ten times recently. On various occasions, these threats have come from various institutions, including the European Union. There were threats both after the "Bljesak" and after the "Oluja" actions.

I think that it should be seriously analyzed what sanctions would mean for Croatia in practice and whether, because of these threats, the Croats should really behave like dwarfs who can be manipulated.

I do not believe that any effect can be achieved any longer with the application of the carrot-and-stick principle in this area.

[GLOBUS] Who, after the agreement on eastern Slavonia has been signed, will supervise the extracting of oil in Djelekovci?

[Matesa] Croatia, that is for sure.

[GLOBUS] Whose money will be used?

[Matesa] Croatian. This is Croatian territory and only Croatian currency can be used as the means of payment there.

[GLOBUS] By signing the agreement on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dayton on Friday, 10 November 1995, Herzeg-Bosnia was abolished. What are political implications of this decision on relations between the Croatian HDZ leadership and its counterpart in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Matesa] I cannot really tell you anything about the Dayton negotiations. The Croatian Government concentrates on internal Croatian problems, so that I have the same amount of information about Dayton as you. This is only natural, since according to the Constitution the president is in charge of foreign policy. I shall get the information about the negotiations only after he returns from Dayton.

[GLOBUS] I do not mean the information in connection with the negotiations but about the political aspect of the abolition of Herzeg-Bosnia as a state organization. Will this significantly change the relations between the HDZ leadership in Zagreb and that in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Matesa] I can answer by asking you another question. If we had signed the Washington agreements a long time ago, the core of which is the unique Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the latest agreement not only the expected act of implementation of these agreements? It is only important that the basic rights of the Croatian population, as a constituent nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are not put at stake.

[GLOBUS] Is the abolition of Herzeg-Bosnia one of the main political problems for the HDZ?

[Matesa] Not for the time being, but I cannot say that it might not become a political problem.

Inflation Rate

[GLOBUS] It was said in the first meeting of the government that a 10-percent production rise and an inflation rate of 3 percent could be expected. Does this mean that you will follow Valentic's anti-inflation model?

[Matesa] President Tudjman's assessment about economic growth and the inflation rate was made on the basis of the four-year work of the government.

Second, the government will take the current level of macroeconomic stability as the precondition for the realization of other activities. We shall take a whole series of new measures in order to encourage economic activities. It must be clear to everyone that there can be no real economic growth if there is inflation.

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We shall not do anything that could affect the current macroeconomic stability. We shall not print money or take similar actions.

[GLOBUS] This means that Valentic's model will remain effective.

[Matesa] No, there is no Valentic model. Only macroeconomic stability will remain as the precondition for our activities. I would like to repeat that money without coverage will not be printed, that the exchange rate will not be artificially improved, that there will be no devaluation, and that there will be no mechanism for an artificial stimulation of economic growth.

I think that there is a whole series of economic policy instruments more effective than devaluation that can be used to make the economy grow.

[GLOBUS] What are they?

[Matesa] The change of custom duties. The duties on imports of raw-materials and production materials will be either reduced or abolished, but there will be duties on final products.

Thereafter we shall also reduce taxes since we shall reduce the payment of certain benefits from salaries and wages. We shall also grant loans for exports.

[GLOBUS] Are you aware of the fact that many people are afraid that inflation might sharply rise, as this was the case after the 1992 election?

[Matesa] There are really no signs that inflation might reappear. On the contrary, I am sure that this will not happen. This would not help anybody.

Denationalization

[GLOBUS] All previous prime ministers have promised to carry out privatization. Which attitude will your government take regarding that issue?

[Matesa] I can claim with responsibility, and you are the first reporter I am telling this to, that the privatization law will quite certainly come to parliament in January. It is still being worked on. I have just had a meeting with the people from the Ministry of Justice about the text of the law.

I think that our bill for the privatization law will be the continuation of what has been achieved in that respect in postcommunist Europe, but, it will, naturally, be adapted to Croatian needs.

It will be a mixture of payment in kind and financial compensation.

[GLOBUS] Is the text of the law being prepared by your government similar to the bill presented to parliament by Franjo Greguric?

[Matesa] It is completely different from Greguric's proposal. I even think that Mr. Greguric should withdraw his proposal. I do not at all know why he offered it. You must ask him.

[GLOBUS] In the opinion of the government will the adoption of the law on denationalization cause big social and political shocks?

[Matesa] I do not think so.

[GLOBUS] Why has the adoption of that law been postponed for so long?

[Matesa] I do not know. There could be some shocks, but generally speaking only denationalization can conclude this part of the Croatian history, the process of the establishment of the Croatian state.

Privatization must be honest compensation for previous injustice. It should satisfy a large part of the Croatian population because it is entitled to that.

[GLOBUS] Should denationalization not have preceded the reprivatization of companies?

[Matesa] I do not think so because the reprivatization of companies enabled the accumulation of a considerable part of the capital that will now be used for the compensation of earlier proprietors.

[GLOBUS] But earlier proprietors are extremely unhappy with reprivatization! They think they have been robbed.

[Matesa] In some countries compensation limits have been set. In Hungary, the highest amount that can be paid in compensation is 1 million German marks. We shall not set limits for compensation, but we are aware of the fact that privatization is an extremely complicated process. The claimant first has to prove that he is entitled to receive compensation. In certain cases it will be necessary to reconstruct the structure of certain stock companies, in order to establish who is their real owner.

I want to repeat that the basis of the privatization law will be a just compensation for those who were deprived of their property. We cannot speak about a complete restitution, because certain things simply cannot be returned.

[GLOBUS] How will apartments be privatized?

[Matesa] I do not want to anticipate anything, but I think that the law will try to make the position of all tenants equal.

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[GLOBUS] Does this mean that in case of apartments there will be no restitution in kind? Does this mean that apartments will not be returned to their previous owners?

[Matesa] You can translate [word as published] this yourself.

Political Ambitions

[GLOBUS] Two and a half years ago, on the day when Nikica Valentic was appointed prime minister, he told us that the real aim of the government was to return as little as possible in order to avoid political, economic, and social problems.

[Matesa] It is difficult for me to comment on what Valentic wanted to say and what he practically wanted to achieve with privatization. But let us be realistic. You simply cannot return agricultural land, building sites without buildings on them, or business premises.

The whole thing becomes a little bit more complicated when we speak about companies, and the most risky and difficult thing from the social point of view is the part of privatization concerning apartments.

[GLOBUS] Nikica Valentic was not only prime minister but also chairman of the government's Commission for Apartments. Will you take on this function too?

[Matesa] I do not know, the new chairman of the above mentioned commission has not been appointed yet. I do not oppose the idea that politicians are given apartments, that they solve this problem owing to their political functions. I have this problem too.

[GLOBUS] You allegedly do not have any political ambitions. Why have you taken over this task?

[Matesa] I really have no political ambitions and I do not want to use the position of prime minister in order to continue a political career. I think that I am competent enough to lead the government, in order to make at least a small contribution to a better life for everyone. This is why I have taken over this offfice.

[GLOBUS] How long have you been an HDZ member?

[Matesa] I do not want to tell you that, but long enough to be chairman of the government.

Commentary Views Reasons for Blaskic Promotion

AU2111120195 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 16 Nov 95 p 3

[Commentary by Sanja Modric: "Salvation or Removal of Tihomir Blaskic?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Tudjman discreetly on 15 November sent a fax from Dayton to Zagreb and Mostar with which he shocked part of the domestic public, placed a dilemma before another part, and gave reason to a third part to go on unconditionally adoring him as before. Namely, the president's fax orders the promotion of Major General Tihomir Blaskic, currently head of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] General Staff in Mostar, to inspector in the Croatian Army's Main Inspectorate in Zagreb. Moreover, Major General Zivko Budimir was relieved of his current duties and "placed at the disposal of the Presidency of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia as commander of the HVO General Staff." Tudjman, therefore, is bringing Blaskic from Herzegovina to Croatia, and is at the same time sending Budimir to fill Blaskic's vacated post in Herzegovina.

The key reason for the aforementioned different reactions to Tudjman's legally rather curious international personnel reshuffle—which TV moderator Bunjevac-Filipovic, with a defiant expression and voice, read out on the evening of 15 November in the Croatian Television evening newscast—was the spectacular news from The Hague, disclosed only a day earlier, on 14 November. That day, all international agencies, including our HINA, informed the general public that the The Hague International War Crimes Tribunal for crimes carried out in former Yugoslavia, had indicted six Bosnian Croats: the already mentioned Tihomir Blaskic, Dario Kordic, currently Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] president in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mario Cerkez, Ivan Santic, Pero Skopljak, and Zlatko Aleksovski.

The Indictment Was "In the Air"

After pressing charges against Karadzic and Mladic, and recently against Sljivancanin and two others accused of committing crimes in Vukovar, and after demanding that they be extradited to the Court, main prosecutor Richard Golstone indicted six Croats for war crimes against the Muslim population committed between May 1992 and May 1993 in the Lasva River valley. The indictments are based on the period in the Croatian-Muslim war during which Kordic was vice president of the Herzeg-Bosnia parastate, Blaskic was HVO commander in central Bosnia, Cerkez commanded the HVO brigade in Vitez, Santic was mayor of Vitez, Skopljak was head of the Vitez police, while Aleksovski was the chief warden in the prison in Kaonik from January 1993, and from May he was the chief warden of the HVO prison at the heliport near Mostar.

The indictment of Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, most responsible for crimes against Muslims in central Bosnia, has been in the air for quite some time, and some sources have explicitly mentioned Kordic in the context. It was

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easy to assume that the indictment, signed by Goldstone, would elicit bitterness and disbelief in a greater part of the Croatian, and particularly Herzegovina public. The very pinnacle of Croatian politics, as well as the media, have during all these years trained both publics that "we" did not commit war crimes, that "we" could not have carried them out, and that in the vortex of Greater Serbian penetration into Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina tissue, "our national cause" was so pure that the means used in fighting for it could not be other than justified. That is why the establishment of the The Hague Tribunal was greeted by the Croats as a Croatian victory—that is, as evidence that the aggressor and our enemy would finally be tried. And that is why the Croatian side was quick to broadcast speedy and loyal promises that "we" would unreservedly cooperate with Goldstone's international court.

The White Blanket of Our Autistic World

However, the white blanket of our ideal, autistic world, with which the HDZ leadership in both countries has been carefully covering the Croatian national body, was sporadically pierced by the blades of accusations for crimes which "we", after all, did commit here and over there. Each time, they were rejected for domestic ears from relevant state and party positions, denounced as ploys against Croatia, pressure, blackmail, part of a plot, or, as a plain, detestable, malicious lie. However, a somewhat different approach to such topics was always reserved for the foreign public. After we could no longer negate "our" disgusting deeds before the world, and when sets of imaginative explanations became completely counterproductive, it was time to send letters to international forums in which "we" disassociated ourselves from "extremists" and condemned them; moreover, we also send promises to the same addresses claiming that "we" would process and punish perpetrators who were being hunted down. However, it would somehow always transpire that it was impossible to trace the "extremists". Whenever anyone asked, the procedure was "in progress" and then things would slowly be forgotten.

Just as distinguished Judge Golstone promised, indictments against Kordic, Blaskic, and the remaining four show that all criminals "will get their turn" and that they will be neither forgotten, nor forgiven. At the same time, all well-informed individuals claim that it is absolutely excluded that the International Tribunal in The Hague and its distinguished chief Goldstone will allow any of the indictments to "drop" because of a lack of evidence; they have, moreover, expressed a joint conviction that the people Goldstone indicts will certainly be convicted. We should suppose that President Tudjman is aware of this. Why then did he transfer Blaskic to Zagreb and why did he appoint him to a new, high-ranking function in Croatia; this is the issue everyone is questioning, and to which the grapevine has come up with several answers.

The Theory of Saving the Accused Is "Watertight"

One "school of thought" believes that Tudjman has brought the accused Blaskic, who almost certainly has Croatian citizenship, into Croatia and the Croatian Army's Inspectorate in an attempt to save him from extradition. This is substantiated by a current statement made by the HDZ Youth (which was certainly not drafted without certain consultations with the older members of the HDZ), which goes so far as to compare Blaskic's "innocence"—and international charges of war crimes have been pressed against him—with the innocent victims of Vukovar hospital. The next among first reactions which can be taken as "evidence" that Tudjman is saving Blaskic from facing the law is yesterday's statement to Zagreb Radio 101 by Ivo Lozanicic, Herzeg-Bosnian deputy defense minister, and future deputy in the Croatian Sabor. Lozancic, namely, claims that the accused are "honorable and moral people" and that according to him, President Tudjman is aware of this. That is why Tudjman "has decided to support this young man" (Blaskic) and thus "show that he does not recognize the The Hague Tribunal indictment." If to this we add the fact that all high-ranking officials in Herzeg-Bosnia have been appointed on the orders or with crucial agreement of the Croatian president, and that Tudjman decorated the recently indicted Kordic with three high state decorations on the occasion of Statehood Day (among other things for his contribution to Croatia's international reputation), then the theory that Tudjman will protect the accused is watertight.

Whose Orders Were They Carrying Out?

However, there are other theories. The second one is that Blaskic has been transferred to Zagreb so that he can be "on hand" for extradition to The Hague; however, this is not very likely as Blaskic himself could have figured this out. Namely, it is highly unlikely that Blaskic would come to take his post in the Croatian Army if there was even a little doubt that he could be taken from his new post to Goldstone. That is why some claim that Blaskic is coming to Zagreb in order to more easily "flee" to one of the rare countries with which the international community is not on friendly terms. Finally, there are those who believe that Tudjman's unusual personnel move is calculated to serve Tudjman as a means of justifying himself before the Herzegovina public once Blaskic goes to where he has been summoned.

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However, we shall certainly not wait too long for the correct answer. While we continue to guess which one is the right answer, it is interesting to note that certain Herzeg-Bosnia officials have lately been stressing that the accused did not do anything on their own, but were "exclusively carrying out orders." That is why the correct question is: whose? And will not those who issued the orders do everything in their power to see that the embarrassing witnesses do not end up before Goldstone?

Publishing House Controversy Discussed

AU1811141595 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by "SD": "Whose Way Is SLOBODNA DALMACIJA Standing In?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last few days, some magazines simultaneously published several reports about SLOBODNA DALMACIJA with a clear intention of bringing a certain anxiety and bad mood into this publishing house. Of course, when it is impossible to find true arguments that could discredit us professionally, the "analysts" of the situation in this publishing house and in this newspaper resorted to speculations and doubtful information. So that, allegedly, editors and directors are being removed, and, eventually, the paper should be overtaken by new owners.

Since SLOBODNA DALMACIJA is a stable enterprise in the financial and any other aspect, which is not very frequent under the present economic conditions, and since this paper has a great confidence of its readers, which can be seen in our large edition, and since it has managed to become affirmed as a Croatian independent paper, the opponents of such a situation and such an orientation of ours are getting somewhat nervous. Their own plans concerning SLOBODNA DALMACIJA have less and less objective chances, so with their side blows they are trying open cracks through which they could come in.

Many have been surprised and disappointed that we have not turned into a newspaper of one party. Of course, the most disappointed are those who thus lost their argument about the omnipresent control of the media, but also those who would really like to control us, neglecting the interests of the Croatian nation and of democracy, and ignoring our professional and moral obligations towards the public, towards the constitution and the laws of this country.

The state is the party, and the party is me! That is more or less the motto of a group of semiskilled, incapable, but ambitious, unscrupulous politicians of the young generation, for whom nothing is holy, who are morally and politically thoroughly empty, deprived of any higher values and deeper orientations. No, they serve neither the state nor the party, although they represent themselves as big, irreplaceable protectors of both. They will explain all their shortcomings and failures by saying that they are not loved by the media, thinking that through the control of the media they can get compensation for all those shortcomings.

There is nothing new in the fact that SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, the way it is, stands in the way of the enemies of Croatia, in the way of Yugo-nostalgics who do not even try to hide that. However, it is interesting that both of these groups end up with the same hypotheses. They even start to speak in the same words. For both of them, for example, the Croats from Herzegovina have suddenly become the greatest danger, and that as a political not a territorial category.

The elections have shown what this people appreciates and what it does not. The elementary values of the HDZ are appreciated, chaste people are appreciated, the national left wing is appreciated, but by no means the Yugo-left, the extreme and false left, or people burdened with affairs, regardless of the party they belong to (and poor the party to which such people belong!), just like the pushing, one-sided, aggressive, stupid and partisan propaganda is not appreciated. Those who intend to deal with politics, those who want to bring a grain of wisdom and morals in that work too, and not only their big will and wishes, must learn something out of these elections—instead of prying in newspapers.

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Frckovski To Remain as Interior Minister

AU2011185095 Skopje MIC in English 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski reviewed on Friday [17 November] the resignation submitted by Interior Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, the President's cabinet announced.

Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski assessed the resignation, primarily, as a democratic and highly moral act, as an expression of the feeling of responsibility of the Interior Minister, who is in charge of the overall security of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], as well as the personal security of the President of the Republic, as the highest institution in the state.

Considering the complex circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack on the Macedonian President, as well as the importance and priorities of the tasks that are to follow precisely on this plan, the Prime Minister decided not to accept the resignation and asked Ljubomir Frchkovski to continue to carry out his duties as Interior Minister in the Macedonian Government, to his maximum efforts.

Greece Abolishes Border Insurance for Vehicles

AU2011210795 Skopje MIC in English 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Starting from this Friday, the green "security" insurance cards for vehicles entering either Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] or Greece, are recognized on the border between the two countries.

From midnight, the Greek border officials abolished the border insurance for Macedonian vehicles, in line with the recognition of the Macedonian insurance card by all EU member-states, and the protocol on car insurace, signed between the two countries.

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Kwasniewski Officially Declared Winner

LD2011191695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 20 Nov 95

[News conference given by Wojciech Laczkowski, chairman of the Polish State Electoral Commission, in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The individual candidates have received the following number of valid votes:

Aleksander Kwasniewski came in first, with 9,704,439 votes—that is, 51.72 percent of the valid votes.

Lech Walesa came in second, with 9,058,176 votes—that is, 48.28 percent of the valid votes.

The commission has established that the greater number of valid votes was received by Aleksander Kwasniewski, and, in accordance with Article 8B, Paragraph 3 of the law of 27 September 1990 on the election of president of the Polish Republic, he has been elected the president of the Polish Republic. [passage omitted]

Kwasniewski Statement on Elections

LD2011201295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1905 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We are at Aleksander Kwasniewski's election headquarters. The president-elect, together wth his election staff and members of government, has just heard the announcement of the State Electoral Commission.

But this is not going to be a news conference by the president-elect. We have learned unofficially that this will take place only when the president's officials are appointed.

Now President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski will make a statement before Polish Television cameras.

[Kwasniewski] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. The results of the 1995 presidential election are now known. I am happy, I am moved, and I have a sense of the great responsibilities that have befallen me as a result of the will of the majority of the Polish voters. I would like to express my thanks to all those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who gave me their trust, who supported my program, and who have hopes connected with my presidency. Every vote, every one of those nearly 10 million votes for me, is a great obligation and, at the same time, a great honor.

I would like to address all of you, ladies and gentlemen—those who voted for me, those who voted for Lech Walesa, and those who remained at home.

In every democratic country an election campaign has its logic and its time. It arouses feelings, it is a programmatic dispute, a dispute between individuals, it is an offer to you, ladies and gentlemen, dear voters. But this election campaign in Poland ended on 19 November. Some people are happy, others are worried. But Poland is our common Poland. That is why I would ask that today the feelings should give way to our common concern for what lies ahead of us, what we should do together.

The time for work has began. The campaign is over. That is why I would like to assure everyone, equally those who voted for me and those who today have great doubts: Poland will not leave the road of reform. The choice we made in 1989 is the right choice; it is the choice of the majority of the Poles. That is a great Polish opportunity. The president whom you have elected has to do his utmost to ensure that we make even better use of this opportunity, that we give Poland even more democracy by adopting a modern constitution, that we give Poland economic development, which has been a fact over the past few years but must not be wasted through any irresponsible experiment.

We must make use of this development to resolve the great problems of many social groups, so that reforms mean something good also to the millions of unemployed, the poor, the people from the countryside, the pensioners, and the young. I regard this as my great task that can only be fulfilled if the president is a man of cooperation and dialogue, if, in accordance with the Constitution, he takes advantage of all of the opportunities and possibilities, so we can come up with solutions to acute problems shared by millions of Poles.

I will not in any way use this position to strengthen only one part of the Polish electorate. I feel obliged to look after the interests of all of us.

Ladies and gentlemen, Poland has been and is located in Europe. Today the task we are facing is to inscribe Poland into the structures of European security and the North Atlantic Treaty. I have received with satisfaction the letters and telegrams sent by many excellent world politicians who wish—not me personally of course, but all of us, Poland—success.

I reply to our neighbors and our partners, all those who have been closely watching the Polish elections: We will cooperate in accordance with the principles of democracy, in accordance with the common will, for the benefit of our joint interest, to achieve better security and more harmony and cooperation in the world, so we can understand one another better.

Poland will be part of the common Europe. I am convinced that all of us together will take appropriate steps in this direction.

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These elections, as any other elections, were a choice between two candidates. Such elections divide, but they cannot become a division that cannot be overcome.

That is why I want to tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that I am convinced that, after 19 November, we can build accord and agreement in Poland. I am open to opinions by people from different groupings, I am open in setting up the presidential chancellery, which will reflect various views and experiences of the Poles. But I address the millions of you who yesterday followed the election evening with very strong feelings. Look at you, ladies and gentlemen, look around. We are together, those who voted for Lech Walesa and those who voted for Kwasniewski. After all, you are neighbors, we work together, we meet on different occasions. Believe me, if you look yourself straight in the eye you will see that much more unites us and very little divides. Politics cannot be an obstacle impossible to overcome. The presidential election must not be a moment when we go along different routes. We can follow the same route, we can be together because this is our common interest, the interest of Poland and the Polish nation. That is why I ask you, after this election, to search for what can become the common value for the Poles, for all of us in big cities and small towns, in the Polish countryside, and everywhere where we want to serve our common homeland with full responsibility.

I would like my great opponent, President Lech Walesa, to participate in the task of searching for what is common for the Poles. His place in Polish history is indisputable. I used to argue with him on many occasions on the matters concerning his presidency, on what should have been done in recent years. But I know that this is a personality that left a great mark on our modern history. I would like Lech Walesa to be a man who will not take offense at either Poland or all of us, and who will be a man inscribing himself in all of these great tasks and great challenges that are ahead of us. Together we will be able to do more; separated we would waste time. I present this idea for his calm consideration.

Ladies and gentlemen, the election is behind us. The time has come for work, for accord, and for a smile. The time has come for us to know that there is a great chance before Poland, and I will strive to fulfill the hopes placed in my presidency. I am convinced that I can count on your support, on your friendly attitude, and that I can count on all of you, ladies and gentlemen. During these five years I am going to be at your disposal, listening to both positive and critical opinion. Poland can be common, Poland will be common. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

News Conference Postponed

LD2011144095 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1355 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Nov—According to Danuta Waniek, Aleksander Kwasniewski's chief of staff, the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] leader has not yet started to discuss with his colleagues the staffing of the President's Office. "We are waiting for the official results from the PKW [State Electoral Commission], while the current president still has a month's work ahead of him," she said to a PAP journalist today.

Waniek admitted she had never talked to the SLD leader about personnel appointments at the office and felt uncomfortable when her name was mentioned in that context. "We had other motives for taking part in the campaign," she emphasized.

Waniek believes Lech Walesa deserves a dignified and peaceful departure. "Because of the respect for him, irrespective of the fact that he is our political opponent, he ought to have an opportunity for a peaceful, dignified, and decent departure worthy of the president of the Polish Republic," she said. She also expressed the hope that the final month of Walesa's presidency and his relations with Kwasniewski would have a "decent climate."

Aleksander Kwasniewski's news conference preliminarily announced for this evening will not take place. We thought he deserved a few hours' rest, Waniek said.

Walesa Gives Postelection Statement

LD2011172595 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1652 GMT 20 Nov 95

[Postelection statement by outgoing Polish President Lech Walesa, location not given; broadcast in progress—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of the elections are already known. A democratic majority has made its decision. This should be respected.

With all my heart I want to thank all those who put their trust in me, those who cast their votes for me, and all those who did not spare their efforts and time working for our joint cause. Thank you for the words of support I have received from various circles and political groupings. I thank the people from the election staff who put so much effort and energy into my campaign.

The number of votes cast in my favor proves that the Poland of August hopes is still alive in the hearts of millions of Poles. I consider it a great obligation and

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an order to stay with you. We are not parting ways, we are not abandoning our wishes. Let us not weaken our strength. We are needed by Poland, and we will be needed by Poland.

To be defeated but not to yield means victory. To be victorious and to rest on one's laurels is defeat. Let us believe in the victory of our cause. Let us believe in an independent, a just, and a strong Poland.

This is an official statement I wanted to read out to you, ladies and gentlemen. Now, as always, I am at your disposal.

Walesa Postelection News Conference

LD2011203295 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1752 GMT 20 Nov 95

[News conference given by outgoing Polish President Lech Walesa for domestic and foreign correspondents in Warsaw on 20 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Walesa] We will answer all of the questions. Stay calm.

[Correspondent] [name indistinct], BBC. Mr. President, in an interview for us you said that, should you lose, you are going to organize the public. Does that mean you are going to set up your own bloc? How do you intend to organize the public?

[Walesa] Not my own but our bloc. Remember, ladies and gentlemen, that after five years of very hard reforms we have suffered very minimal losses. I had in those elections I think 10 million and in these nine and a bit [as heard]. So after five years of such hard reforms that's not a lot. And at the same time the things that were promised by my opponent—that is, those homes, those jobs—it will very soon transpire how realistic that program was. So very soon we will do some serious talking about Poland.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, are your ministers, if I may say so, doing the right thing by offering their resignations? According to the public, they should stay behind to keep an eye on those who are taking over the helm from you.

[Walesa] I think you can work with some people, but with others you cannot. It is even not a nice thing to do. And that is why I did not force their decisions, I gave them a free hand, but it looks as though these people do not want to work in this arrangement. And I think it will not be just they alone who will not want to work.

[Correspondent] Will you be trying to gather around yourself the forces that are not at present represented in parliament?

[Walesa] Ladies and gentlemen, I already have and I am going to do this. There will be one election ticket, and we will soon make up all that we have lost. So there are no fears on this score. I will have enough energy. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] Go ahead, please.

[Kolenda] Katarzyna Kolenda, Television News. Mr. President, your presidential campaign had a very strong theme of settling accounts with the past. What is this going to look like now?

[Walesa] Even more so. Now I am going to go around Poland and help to set up white papers and we will try to show all these webs to the whole of Poland and help [as heard]. I am going to have more time. Now I did not have much time so I did not organize. Now I am going to help organize this.

[Moderator] Yes, you, go ahead.

[Pruszynski] Jan Pruszynski, emigre press. Why did you, Mr. President, not ensure in advance that the Poles resident abroad also had the right to take part in the second round of the elections?

[Walesa] Even if they had such a right, this 100,000 would not have been much use. Of course it was a great mistake. It has to be corrected and we will try to correct it in the next elections.

[Pruszynski] Mr. President, is a meeting between you and Aleksander Kwasniewski at all possible?

[Walesa] No, we have nothing to talk about, and we will not talk at all.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, what is going to be the future of the taxation act?

[Walesa] Of course, it is not on my desk yet, but I am not changing my view. I think we ought to go back to a clearer way of calculating taxes, so the other version is more legible because there are fewer combinations.

[Moderator] The last two questions, please.

[Walesa] No, no, no. Let us go all the way.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct], Radio Information Agency. Mr. President, what do you intend to do during the remaining month of your presidency?

[Walesa] Well, now I want to take a week's rest because this was a fairly exhausting campaign. I want to spend a week in Gdansk. And during that time we will have a look at what is going on, and then we will get down to hard work. Everything that was, everywhere where our shortcomings were shown, we will show where they

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really are and what Poland looks like and all these lies we are simply going to reveal and...

[Correspondent, interrupting] [Words indistinct] (?referendum)?

[Walesa] All this is now being examined technically, and, depending on how the technology is going to determine it, I will announce it too. [words indistinct]

But, ladies and gentlemen, just so that everything is clear. Because I am speaking here so decisively, do not let anyone think we are going to organize some sort of rallies, some sort of brawls. No, Poland is too dear and we have to select methods effectively. Of course, great political pressure, that is obvious, but not so much as to ruin the country, to cause feelings and stresses, some sort of street brawls. That does not even come into consideration. This is the middle of Europe, so we are going to conduct a truly effective political struggle and not one that would cause stress or do something unpleasant.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, how do you think the television debates influenced your defeat?

[Walesa] Well, it was—I mean, it is not a defeat. Those voters simply got cemented together and played on base instincts on empty promises of housing, of jobs that neither one nor the other can be done. And and where there are these small places—let us take a look at how it happened—it was the small places, unemployment, where they had the state agricultural farms, it was those places, without thinking about how it happened, that laid the blame at our door, but it is the commies that are to blame, it is Kwasniewski and company that are to blame, all these things that happened there, all this poverty that happened there. It is just that we did not make it there on time and explain it to the people and they, well, simply, took the easy way.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct]

[Walesa] I do not know. I approached these debates fairly logically. But, well, something did not work out. I think the voters had already been cultivated and not much could be done there. Well, things could have been done a bit differently. But what could have happened if—that is not a good question.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct], Polish Radio, "Signals of the Day." Mr. President, what are your reflections after the result of these elections? And were you certain right to the end that you would win? Did you not at all assume that you could lose...

[Walesa, interrupting] Of course, of course I did not at all assume losing. Here I indeed got a slap in the face from a few people, one I did not deserve. That is why all the more so I must in accordance with the Old Testament give one back so that their jaw drops. [Laughter, applause.]

I pay back and I am going to pay this back. This Kwasniewski won in a bad style, through fraud, through swindle...

[Correspondent, interrupting] (?So why has he become president)?

[Walesa] Because he has blamed us and me for all these wrongdoings that have hit these people—that is, these dissolved state agricultural farms, housing—lack of—so he blamed us for these five years, but we were correcting communism and his solution and those of that ideology. But we did not have the time to prove to the people that these are bills of Kwasniewski and that web, but the people have ascribed these to me and to us. And that is the whole of our tragedy, that we did not have the time to explain this.

[Correspondent] Do you intend to cooperate with this government?

[Walesa] No, no, no. This is not, this is a government, I mean, this is a government, well—[responding to indistinct voice]—no, not that extreme. Well, the heritage for which the accounts have not been settled, an old conception of these people, the trash and others, these are not people with whom you can do anything. And of course I tried very hard, in the West, after all, I explained, because I wanted agreement in Poland. But they did otherwise. Wherever they had access, they talked nonsense about the president. And because of that, now we are going to do as they behaved toward us. [passage omitted]

[Pninska] Maria Pninska, Voice of America. Mr. President, do you believe there is a chance of early parliamentary elections, and with whom exactly would you like to build this bloc?

[Walesa] You know, if I wanted to play with feelings, I could bring that about very quickly, but I do not want to. This is a question of Poland developing, so that the people can see who was right, we have to show all these accounts, we have to show who led this, who guided this, so we need some time. And, and all this has to be in the new style, the democratic style, the calm style, but a style of winning arguments and not feelings. If I wanted to bring feelings into play, then really in a very short time there would be an unambiguous change. But we cannot do that, we cannot play with Poland, we cannot play with people's feelings in Poland, we have to play with arguments.

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[Pninska] One more thing. Are you going to stand in five years' time in the presidential elections?

[Walesa] Well, I do not know. I think there will be an earlier opportunity for that [laughter, applause], but I am more likely to be working for others. I have already been president. I can indeed do more from the side than directly. So for that reason probably not, although I am going to be promoting a president, probably, or helping a president.

[Pninska] Mr. President, the insignia of power preserved throughout the years of communism, preserved in London, which were handed over to you by President [in exile] Kaczorowski, are you now going to hand these over to President Kwasniewski?

[Walesa] No. Because of his dishonest conduct and because of his playing on dishonest instincts. For this reason we will not talk or pass them on. Because these are not the methods to get to this top office, that is what I think. [applause]

[Correspondent] Polish Radio, First Program. Mr. President, in spite of the fact that you have lost the election, is not the fact that you got the votes of the young people and the intelligentsia a bird of good omen?

[Walesa] I say again who did not vote. Those did not vote who were persuaded by Kwasniewski and this group that it was our fault that today they are unemployed or have not home. And perhaps that is how this should be interpreted and that is how this should be asked, Mr. Jelenski, and not the way you asked.

[Moderator] Go ahead, please.

[Lipko] Lipko, Radio Zet, Mr. President, I wanted to ask whether you would like to go for parliament at the head of a proreform group in the next elections?

[Walesa] No, I am going to serve Poland in a different way. I think that from the side, not being directly involved, not struggling for some office or other is more convenient. I served Poland, and here my service was impeded because I had to play additional roles that drew me away from real work. And that is why I am going to do a lot more and I will be a lot more effective if there is no direct involvement in something as far as I myself am concerned.

[Moderator] Two more questions, I think.

[Walesa] No, let them all, let them all.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, are you again ready to leap over some fence?

[Walesa] If the fatherland is in danger, if there is such a need, at any time of day or night, irrespective of the height of the fence and irrespective of my weight today. [applause.]

[Uljasz] Radio Jozef, Ula Uljasz. Will you not hesitate to cooperate with Freedom Union or with other blocs, with Mr. Olszewski, with Ms. Gronkiewicz-Waltz?

[Walesa] All those who noticed where our defeat lies have to draw conclusions. I warned, I asked, I begged, and I said who had the best chance, but ambitions and power split us up. At the same time, they also taught us that we have to act differently, and I think we will act differently.

[Uljasz] But you have more than once been disappointed by these people. Would you like to cooperate with them again?

[Walesa] Not necessarily disappointed. We were just learning. Let us treat it like that. We were learning. And this learning has costs.

[Uljasz] Mr. President, using the contacts and acquaintances you made as the head of state, will you still be a spokesman for Polish membership of NATO and the European Union?

[Walesa] Of course, yes, always. It is just that I know that with this composition and this president we have very little chance as far as joining these formations is concerned. If I were on that side I would always closely watch my wallet.

[Uljasz] But irrespective of the fact that that is the president we are going to have, will you be a spokesman for Poland's quickest entry into NATO and the union?

[Walesa] You know, Poland, our fatherland, is a different thing, and here we must not do anything so that it suffers the least loss, irrespective of who is leading us. So this is a different thing. Here let us mind the shop. To the outside we are one country, and here we can lay into each other and we should lay into each other. But outside things are different. And that is why I am going to do everything not to disrupt the direction of the reforms and maximally to assist these directions, and that is what I am going to do. But I am also going to say: Look out who we are dealing with. So far I have indeed been helping a great deal. I traveled, I took along such people as Kolodko and others. I demonstrated unity. But they did exactly the opposite. Wherever it was possible, they everywhere washed our internal dirty linen. Today I already have a lot of information on these subjects, and now I too am going to pay them back.

[Moderator] You, yes, you had a question.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, what did you mean when you said that there would be an opportunity for a change in the presidential post within three years?

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[Walesa] It is because our people are fairly impatient. Well, they are going to demand these jobs, they are going to demand these homes soon, probably as early as the spring. And, and we will see what Kwasniewski does.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, you speak about the communists' mistakes, but they won the elections. Could you publicly say here what were your mistakes?

[Walesa] Ladies and gentlemen, of course everyone makes mistakes, I suspect even me. But my greatest mistake was that I did not explain to the people, I did not explain in Kolobrzeg, in Elblag, and in other places that, listen, the fact that today you are worse off, that today you have no jobs, these are achievements of Kwasniewski and that orientation. Because they had built the wrong factories, subordinated us to the Soviets so strongly that when the Soviet Union dissolved itself we completely lost the possibilities of jobs. And that is their fault, it is their stupid policies that have made it so that today you have no jobs.

But they, but they said otherwise, that is was Solidarity, that the five years brought about what it brought about. Communism, I want to repeat this publicly again, was completely finished not because Walesa or Solidarity wanted so, but because it could not stand up to the competition, it could not stand up to television connections with the whole world, it could not stand up to telephone connections, because when people contacted directly and the borders opened, we saw how far behind we were, how senseless our work was, how factories were built in the wrong place.

And because of that I and Solidarity had the problem of how we should get away from this mistaken system of Mr. Kwasniewski. We have tried to save every drop of blood and got away peacefully, but that also costs.

Whereas if those people have not drawn conclusions but are blaming us, that is tragic and we cannot allow them to do that.

[Correspondent] Are you, Mr. President, likely to want to be again the head of Solidarity, the union?

[Walesa] No, because today Solidarity is more union, less political, and there are already groups of people there who have prepared to fulfill a different role in Solidarity, so I would have to start sort of feeling my way around again. That is probably no longer for me. That road is closed to me. [passage omitted]

[Kasprzycka] Elzbieta Kasprzycka, LOS ANGELES TIMES. Mr. President, I would like to ask you the following: President Kwasniewski is not going to disappear from the political stage. He is most likely going to remain there for five years. Should one fight for five years, or is Poland perhaps expecting some kind of reconciliation?

[Walesa] Of course, Poland wants reconciliation and we should strive for reconciliation, and I am going to strive for reconciliation, but on certain principles. On the principles of, well, truth, honesty, and not unrealistic little slogans. And if that is how Kwasniewski approaches these issues, reconciliation is possible. But I find it hard to believe that he can follow this road and these principles about which I have just...

[Kasprzycka] And one more thing. You said you would not meet Mr. Kwasniewski. Does that mean there will be no official handing over of power, that you are not going to meet?

[Walesa] Of course there will be a handover, but not by me. I personally have nothing to say to Mr. Kwasniewski because our visions of Poland have passed each other by, and, in connection with that, we have nothing to say to each other.

[Chairman] Thank you very much. Are there any other questions?

[Correspondent] You said, Mr. President, that there was deceit. What does this deceit amount to?

[Walesa] Well, to promising, above all, housing and jobs.

[Correspondent] But you, Mr. President, also made promises when you started your campaign several years ago.

[Walesa] No, no. Not like that. I spoke about market economy, I said I would travel around the world and organize money. It has not been spent right to this day. Even President Bush said in Warsaw that he was giving additional money for construction. I do not know if this was used up. I was doing things, apart from saying that I would be acting or doing. So I acted and I organized.

[Correspondent] But you know very well, Mr. President, that we had other governments, apart from Jozef Oleksy's government, the previous governments, while you were president.

[Walesa] But we are not talking about governments, we are talking about, about...

[Correspondent] We are talking about your presidency.

[Walesa] I am sorry?

[Correspondent] We are talking about your presidency.

[Walesa] No, no, no. You are talking about housing and about deceit.

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[Correspondent] No, that is not what I am talking about.

[Moderators] Could we have questions rather than a debate?

[Correspondent] Yes, but I do not quite understand what you are talking about.

[Correspondent] I wanted to find out from you, Mr. President, what, according to you, was you fault?

[Walesa] My fault?

[Correspondent] Why do you think you lost these elections?

[Walesa] Because this time I did not promise anything. I spoke about the realities and about how I would want to exercise power, and I spoke about the difficulties. And Kwasniewski spoke about abstract things, and that was what got accepted.

[Moderator] Thank you. Are there any more questions?

[Correspondent] Yes. Mr. President, what do you think about the demand that the heirs of the communist rule should present detailed accounts about what they spent on the billions of dollars of the Polish debts they made?

[Walesa] Also on this subject, I would like to work quietly when I have more time. As you know, ladies and gentlemen, I could not, I had to organize, to help, to look for customers for cooperation, and because of that I had little time. Now I have a lot more time. I will deal with all of it and accounts will be clearly visible and we will have these white papers everywhere and we will destroy the web so hard that it will not have paid them to give me so much slack.

[Correspondent] But do you not fear that the people will never listen to you again?

[Walesa] But hang on a minute, hang on a minute, what is this about? I do not want them to listen to me because I am not going to be a candidate again. I am not going to run for deputy or senator. So I am not going to be doing this for my purposes. I will be doing it for honesty and for explanation, so that is a different field of work.

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] you are retiring, Mr. President?

[Walesa] No, not at all, I am going to do a hard job. But a job that I like better. Here I had compulsory work because I had to fulfill roles and duties, of which the president has many. And now I am going to do what I like more.

[Moderator] I think we have raised every problem, so I assume your curiosity has been satisfied.

[Walesa] Just a word to the committees. Beginning today, we are creating single tickets, we are already playing for parliament, like I said, we are playing for accord and we all have to be together. So do not stop your work for a second. We have to do as much as possible for Poland.

[Moderator] Thank you very much, Mr. President. [passage omitted]

Walesa: No Cooperation With Kwasniewski Government

LD2011174895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1717 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Nov—During a meeting with journalists at his election staff's office today, President Lech Walesa announced that he is going to gather the right people around himself and go around Poland and that he is not going to cooperate with the present government.

"We have nothing to talk about," replied the president, when asked if he will meet Aleksander Kwasniewski and accept his proposal of possible cooperation. Walesa said that he does not want to play on people's feelings, but after a week's rest in Gdansk he intends to prove to people that what the left has to offer is wrong.

Walesa Refuses To Hand Insignia to Kwasniewski

LD2011183995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa has announced that he will not talk to Aleksander Kwasniewski and will not pass on to him the presidential insignia that he received from the last Polish president in exile [Ryszard Kaczorowski, president of the government in exile based in London].

[Begin Walesa recording] Because of his dishonest conduct and his playing on dishonest instincts. For this reason, we will not talk or pass them on [the insignia]. These are not the methods to get this top office. [end recording]

President Walesa said that he intended to carry on his fight with the use of political pressure and not street riots. Next week he intends to take a rest in Gdansk to recover from the election campaign.

Foreign Minister Bartoszewski Resigns

LD2111123695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Foreign Affairs Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski offered his resignation to

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Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy today. The foreign minister, like the interior minister, who offered his resignation yesterday, wants to leave his post on 20 December—that is, two days before the end of President Lech Walesa's term in office.

[Correspondent Krystyna Koziol] Minister Bartoszewski read to journalists the contents of the letter he handed to the prime minister this morning, offering his resignation. He said he does not want to answer any questions from journalists.

The letter contains the notice of my resignation and a request for it to be passed to the president, who is the person authorized to dismiss ministers. Bartoszewski said that his decision is final and that he will remain in office until 20 December. He revealed to journalists that Prime Minister Oleksy accepted his resignation with displeasure, regret, and sadness. The prime minister tried to persuade me to change my mind in the interest of the country, Bartoszewski added.

The foreign minister said that he understands the prime minister's arguments, but Polish society made the choice of a certain political option in democratic elections. Now, Bartoszewski added, the entire power is in the hands of one political camp, which must take responsibility for its decisions. Bartoszewski said that it is his duty to accept the will of the public, although he does not agree with it. He added that, in the present situation, there is no place [in the government] for a nonparty minister. [passage omitted]

Oleksy on Bartoszewski, Okonski Resignations

LD2111094795 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0700 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, speaking on Polish radio today, said that cooperation with the ministers in charge of the so-called presidential ministries had been good. He admitted that he will be talking with Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski and Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski later today. According to the prime minister, there were no reasons for their resignation requests other than the outcome of the presidential elections and that the departure of the three ministers [Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has resigned] will not cause any problems within the Cabinet.

[Begin Oleksy recording] This is not a government crisis. There are no other reasons, apart from the change in the post of president, for their resigning. Cooperation was going well, and, with regard to these people, everything was arranged on the platform of state and service to the state. These are very personal decisions. [end recording]

Jozef Oleksy declined to answer a question on his possibly replacing Aleksander Kwasniewski in the post of leader of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. He did not rule out that the SdRP Supreme Council would soon call a party congress or convention in order to resolve the issue of appointments to various posts.

Army Chief Has No Intention of Resigning

LD2011153395 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1500 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the Polish Army's General Staff, does not intend to resign in connection with Kwasniewski's victory and Defense Minister Okonski's announced resignation. Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, chief's of staff spokesman:

[Begin Czekierda recording] General Tadeusz Wilecki is acting in accordance with his plans for this and subsequent weeks. That is, the General Staff and the whole of the Armed Forces are implementing their planned activities, and the chief of staff, in accordance with the plans, is leaving tomorrow for a three-day NATO leadership conference in Brussels.

We are familiar with Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski's declaration, also as regards his attitude toward the Armed Forces, toward his being the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. We believe that here Poland's interests are the supreme objective, which is going to influence the actions of the newly appointed president. [end recording]

KRRiTV Head Will Not Submit Resignation

LD2011150695 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1400 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Presenter] Marek Jurek, chairman of the National Radio and Television Council [KRRiTV], does not intend to resign from the council. Let me remind you that Jurek was appointed by President Walesa. A few days ago Aleksander Kwasniewski said that, if he won the elections, KRRiTV members who were appointed by his predecessor should submit their resignations. Over to Marek Jurek:

[Begin recording] [Jurek] If the president, the president in office, asked me to do this, it would be a very important incentive for me to consider the matter. I believe that the KRRiTV, as the constitutional body responsible for guaranteeing freedom of speech in the audio-visual media and for looking after the interests of the viewers and listeners of these media, as well as the interests of people who represent a different way of thinking from that of the president-elect, is very

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important. It guarantees fulfillment of constitutional objectives.

[Correspondent Monika Olejnik] I understand that, unless the president asks you to, you will not submit your resignation.

[Jurek] I shall certainly try to meet with President Walesa soon. Of course, his opinion is very important to me for moral reasons. [end recording]

SLD-PSL Coalition Continues To Function

LD2111124295 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych said that the government coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will continue to function. Speaker Zych made this declaration at the first meeting of the government coalition after the presidential elections. The PSL representatives present at the meeting said that appointments to the presidential ministries and posts in the Presidential Chancellery have not been discussed yet.

Andrzej Drawicz, the prime minister's adviser [and former head of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Council], who also attended the meeting, denied the reports that he is to take over the post of minister of foreign affairs. He thought that Andrzej Olechowski, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and Bronislaw Geremek [leader of the opposition Freedom Union parliamentary floor group] are good candidates for the post.

Geremek told journalists yesterday that he does not want to slam the door on the proposal but that he is waiting for Aleksander Kwasniewski's decision.

Spokeswoman on Cooperation With New President

LD2011152195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1406 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Nov (PAP)—Government press spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska, asked today what the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] candidate's victory in the presidential elections means for the government, recalled that the prime minister declared "when no one yet knew how everything would turn out" his complete willingness to cooperate with any new president who came into office as a result of democratic elections.

Jakubowska thinks that, in the "characterological context," the prime minister will find it easier to cooperate with Aleksander Kwasniewski. But, she added, "the problems remain the same and will have to be resolved." "Perhaps because Aleksander Kwasniewski has become president it will be possible to speed up some of the fairly controversial issues," she added. She noted that good cooperation between the three elements—president, government, and parliament—will be especially important in the case of acts connected with the reform of the system of social insurance because, she added, "this is an issue that will certainly cause social tensions, and good cooperation here will perhaps cause these to be less intensive."

Sejm Speaker Hopes Warsaw Continues Reforms

LD2011154295 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1300 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych has expressed the hope that Poland will continue its reforms and will not change its foreign policy.

[Begin Zych recording] I would like to express the conviction that we shall be able to stand up to this extremely difficult problem and that the changes, which became very clear, particularly in the second round, as well as the attempts to divide society, will be leveled down. So, regardless of who finally becomes the president of the Polish Republic, we should act with the interest of this country in mind and in the awareness that one must resolve very difficult problems. Although considerable progress has already been achieved, a state budget must be adopted to ensure the activity of the state and public welfare. We should also act in awareness of what has already been achieved in the international arena—our progression toward the European Union, NATO, and cooperation with our neighbors. [end recording]

Investigation Into Kwasniewski's Affairs Suspended

LD2011144995 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1400 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Justice Ministry spokesman Andrzej Cubala gave an assurance that cases connected with the election campaign will continue to be pursued. According to Cubala, the cases against Aleksander Kwasniewski will be suspended for the period during which his parliamentary immunity is in force and, subsequently, for the duration of his presidential term in office.

[Begin Cubala recording] Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia will explain the procedure at a news conference, particularly how the work on these cases will be completed. There are a dozen or so of these cases. The nature of them is varied, starting with the notorious case of Mr. Bubel [leader of the Polish Beer Lovers Party and the Front for Combating Unemployment], who violated the

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law on several occasions in various circumstances—these cases are at the stage of being submitted to court—and finishing with the case of Mr. Kwasniewski, now probably president, connected with his financial statement and the statement concerning his education.

These cases are still being pursued by the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office. However, the proceedings cannot be started against this particular person because he enjoys parliamentary immunity. If he is elected president, the position of such standing does not allow proceedings to be conducted. In other words, these cases will be suspended. [end recording]

Poles Cautious About New President

MS2111120595 London THE TIMES in English 21 Nov 95 p 18

[Article by Roger Boyes: "A New Truce With Old Communists"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Poles were yesterday behaving as if they had been struck by a natural disaster. If Red Cross workers had patrolled the streets with collection boxes marked "Save Walesa", they would have gathered enough to provide blankets and hot soup for every unemployed man between the Oder and the Bug. It seemed almost churlish to point out that the sacking of Lech Walesa and his replacement by a former Communist was not an act of God but a democratic choice.

I fielded two phone calls yesterday from Poles who thought they would never again be given a passport to travel abroad; scare stories abound.

There is admittedly a problem with electing a relatively unknown former Communist. How much of a Communist is he? How former? The signs are that Aleksander Kwasniewski, the smooth, 41-year-old, sunbed-tanned winner of the election, believes in nothing at all. He was a reformed Communist when that was fashionable in the late 1980s; in the confused 1990s he can be all things to all men—which for a president with little constitutionally guaranteed power, is not such a bad thing.

Even so, the question "How Communist?" is one that will have to be asked again and again as Central and Eastern Europe rediscover the Left. There is no longer a monolithic Left waiting in the wings to bring order to the secret police archives, jail dissidents and close down churches. There are shades and nuances which have to be monitored carefully. Honourable social democratic traditions have to be taken into account, as do the new democratic constraints on politicians.

Former Communists are not by definition wolves in sheepskin coats. Georgia's Eduard Shevardnadze and Hungary's Gyula Horn may have their troubles at home, but they deserve respect rather than suspicion. The rise of the Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov needs, however, to be considered more cautiously.

He was quick yesterday to praise Kwasniewski's victory over Walesa. "There is nothing surprising in this, because across Europe there is a movement to the left and this is taking place here in Russia as well." Zyuganov naturally hopes that he will be able to ride to power in the Duma elections on December 17 on the back of a popular revolt against market reform. But Zyuganov does not earn many stars in the Red Guide to Good Communists. There is a nationalist tinge to his socialism, Lenin still lurks in the background and the main source of his support—the industrial elite—has a real chance of rolling back capitalism if he wins.

Both Horn of Hungary and Kwasniewski of Poland are less dangerous than Zyuganov. Reform in both countries has developed its own momentum, and is now largely beyond the meddling of politicians. Despite the political chaos of the past few years, the Polish economy grew 6.5 per cent in the first half of this year, and industrial output rose 13 per cent; around 60 per cent of production is already in private hands. It is not the Polish President who defines the level of subsidies to state industry, and he has limited power to break up monopolies.

But the Polish head of state does have a duty to complete the Solidarity revolution. That this task should fall on a former Communist is a strange twist of history. Since 1989, parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe have developed an exaggerated role in political life. They were, of course, freely elected, but the parties represented in these debating chambers are for the most part puny creatures, little more than clubs of dissidents who have rented offices in the major cities.

In Polish elections in 1991, 120 parties took part and 29 parties won seats in Parliament. A 5 per cent hurdle introduced before the 1993 elections had the effect of excluding most right-wing parties. The result is a Parliament dominated by the former Communists, the only party with a genuine national structure and reliable source of funding.

So the true nature of the problem in Central Europe is not the apparent rise of the Left, but the absence of a political Centre. Party organisations have to be developed, intelligently advised, allowed to grow and become serious rivals to the former Communists. Moreover, local government has to be encouraged and democratic institutions have to be protected. The battle for control of state television has become a permanent feature of political life in Poland and in the rest of the region;

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neither Kwasniewski nor Walesa offered to turn Polish television into a public service like the BBC.

A good Polish president, claiming to represent all Poles and not just the 51 per cent who voted for him, will address these problems even if it means arguing with his old party chums. Mr Kwasniewski may well be up to the challenge. Much depends on whether he has the courage to make enemies out of his political allies.

Lech Walesa certainly had that quality (and ended up with no friends at all), but he had no real sense of institutional power. He had the chance to be a Nelson Mandela or a Vaclav Havel, but he lacks the imagination, vision or patience to make a good leader in this odd era of European transition. As President, Kwasniewski could make it his first gesture to encourage Walesa to stay in politics and start his own opposition party. Together, in their different ways, they might be able to complete Poland's unfinished revolution.

NATO Reply on Troop Deployment to Bosnia Awaited

WS2111094595 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 20 Nov 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Andrzej Walentek: "The Government Is Awaiting a Reply From NATO; Will Poles Go to Bosnia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In a conversation with a POLSKA ZBROJNA reporter, Pawel Dobrowolski, deputy director of the foreign affairs minister's cabinet, denounced a SZTANDAR report claiming that Poland will withdraw its support for the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The possibility of sending our troops to that region remains viable. The Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not yet calculated the costs of sending our troops to Bosnia.*

In early November, our government sent a letter of intent to NATO headquarters stating our readiness to lend military support to the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The letter declares the possibility of deploying one of three of our units—an air assault battalion, a field hospital, or a logistics division. Neither NATO headquarters nor the UN Secretariat has so far answered the Polish officials' letter. Nevertheless, preparations are already under way for the deployment of our troops, which may very probably take place as early as January.

One of the basic aspects of participation of the Polish troops in the peacemaking mission in Bosnia is financing. A statement issued by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry in Brussels a few days ago indicates that the parties involved are to finance the costs of their participation. Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, Defense Ministry spokesman, told POLSKA ZBROJNA that, at present, it is difficult to estimate the costs of sending Poles to Bosnia. That will depend on, among other things, which of our military units NATO chooses.

One of the units that might be sent to Bosnia is the 16th Air Assault Battalion. Unlike the logistics and medical units, this battalion is based on the cadres and enlisted men of an existing and well-coordinated tactical unit, and not one that was formed exclusively for the purpose of foreign deployment.

Preparations to include the battalion in the Partnership for Peace project and hand it over to the disposal of the UN secretary-general have already been launched—long before the final decisions on the forms of future participation of the Poles in peace missions. This was undoubtedly the result of the need to maintain the unit's combat readiness to operate within the UN joint international peacekeeping forces. In line with the entered-upon agreements, the battalion has to launch operations within 30 days. The unit is expected to attain combat readiness on 30 November.

The commander of the 16th Air Assault Battalion is Major Marek Zerdecki. Eventually the unit is to consist of 790 men—86 officers, 48 warrant officers, 43 professional noncommissioned officers, and 613 regular soldiers. All of the commanders and half of the officers speak fluent English.

The battalion is to be based on the cadres of the 16th Air Assault Battalion, which is part of the 6th Shock Brigade. Naturally, the projected targets and additional equipping will require calling on experts from other tactical units, such as the 3rd Mechanized Brigade from Lublin and the 21st Podhale Rifle Brigade from Rzeszow.

Apart from the staple "Red Beret" [colloquial name for commandos] munitions, the unit, in addition, will be supplied with the equipment necessary for the operations it is to perform. The unit will receive BWP armored personnel carriers and BRDM combat reconnaissance vehicles, carriers, rocket launchers, and special communications equipment. Soldiers will be furnished with bullet-proof jackets and composite helmets.

If the 16th Air Assault Battalion is sent to Bosnia, its objectives will include carrying out observations, patrolling the neutral zones, and protecting and defending allocated posts. The latter might practically imply "introducing peace by force" in areas inhabited by civilians. If the "Red Berets" do go to Bosnia, they will also convoy transports with humanitarian aid, control the traffic of vehicles and people, and organize and command, if

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need be, a perimeter defense of the UN and civilians. They might even be given the mandate to aid encircled forces and missions of peacekeeping organizations operating in Bosnia.

This means that the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia—the Poles possibly among them—will have far greater power than they had before.

General Views 1996 Defense Budget

WS1711155595 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 13 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Brigade General Krzysztof Pajewski, chief of the Economic and Finance Board of the Polish Army General Staff, by Antoni Witkowski; place and date not given: "The Consolation Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Witkowski] In an interview to our paper on 25 September 1995, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy described the defense issue as a priority in government's activities. Does the Defense Ministry's budget for the next year confirm this declaration?

[Pajewski] Indeed, this and other declarations voiced by politicians raised much optimism and hopes that the Army's economic condition would improve. One should note with satisfaction that some of our proposals have been taken into consideration. These are primarily issues concerning additional funds for events being undertaken as part of the Partnership for Peace program and preservation of the VAT [value-added tax] exemption regarding purchases of the domestically made arms and military equipment, uniforms, liquid fuel for military aircraft, and ships. In addition, the Defense Ministry was relieved of paying for the Government Strategic Programs. Funds for this purpose will come from the Scientific Research Committee budget. Additional financing has been approved to buy medicine for disabled individuals covered by military health care.

[Witkowski] You served in front-line and airborne assault units. Will the military be happy with the draft budget for the Defense Ministry?

[Pajewski] No. It is just a gesture of common will, but it is not yet a step forward. Truth be said, the above actions by the government halted a decade-long tendency of declining defense budget allocations. Next year, the Defense Ministry budget will amount to 7.9 billion, which is 2.3 percent of the GDP. Considering funds earmarked for adjustments of wages and pensions, this figure will represent 2.4 percent of the GDP, which is a far cry from our needs and expectations.

[Witkowski] People in uniform remember a Sejm resolution of 16 February 1995 envisioning that the Defense Ministry budget will stand at 3 percent of the GDP as soon as 1996.

[Pajewski] By its resolution, the Sejm expressed its understanding of the Army's needs and, even more so, to the need for technical modernization and increased intensiveness of combat training. Additional funds were to be allocated to achieve those goals. However, the planned 1996 budget appropriations for the Defense Ministry provide grounds to believe that implementation of the Sejm's resolution is in jeopardy. A condition for its smooth implementation is to set the budget at 2.6 percent of the GDP. In addition, for me, the official responsible for planning current expenditures for the General Staff operations and development, the government's approval of different projections regarding the dynamics of the defensive budget's growth in this and following years, was a "bucket of cold water." It so happened that there are discrepancies between the Sejm resolutions and the government's information about implementation of the bill submitted to the parliament. Instead of growing to 3 percent of the GDP, the defense budget expenditures will be steadily falling from 2.4 percent in 1995 to 2.31 percent in 2000, because the growth dynamics of the Defense Ministry budget will be considerably lower than that of economic growth. In this connection, statements about preferential attention to defense issues in the sphere of financial support remain very disputable.

[Witkowski] Does this mean suspension of restructuring activities in the military?

[Pajewski] Of course not. But they will be considerably slowed down. Implementation of the concept "the smaller but stronger Armed Forces" will be crippled because basic reserves have already been exhausted, while complete execution of the military development plan would call for at least doubling, from 10 percent to 20 percent, the share of so-called asset expenditures, primarily for buying arms and equipment, in the Defense Ministry budget. We, however, will not get stuck on restructuring plans.

[Witkowski] Then why has the ministry's budget not yet been restructured?

[Pajewski] Asking this question, you hit the core of the issue. It is also a regular topic discussed at the meetings held by the parliamentary commission for national defense. This issue deserves a broader explanation.

Next year, we can allocate only 11.6 percent of our budget for arms and investments, which are asset expenditures, while such expenses represented one-third of our budget 10 years ago. This would mean that we will allocate almost 90 percent of the budget for current

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expenses. Some even talk about "eating away" most of the money. The reason for this is that the present pace of declining defense allocations was more than 10 percent faster than the pace of reduction of the Army potential, particularly its personnel. Someone may suggest that we continue reducing the military personnel. Without going into a deep strategic analysis, I believe that, with the present technical level of equipment, no further reductions should be allowed, as they may jeopardize security of the state. Additional scale-downs of the Army must be compensated by purchases of modern and more efficient equipment and armaments.

Issues related to defense were treated on the same basis as other national issues. Since 1990, the Army assumed the burden of taxes, local payments, and other levies. Although those expenses were largely offset, they account for about 30 percent of the Defense Ministry budget and belong to the so-called "eat-away" part of it, undermining the overall budget structure. If those expenses were not taken into consideration when comparing the present condition with 1986 (abecausethey did not exist in the ministry's budget at that time), proportions between expenditures for the Army's technical modernization and for current operations would be much more favorable.

[Witkowski] To what extent will the budget ensure the implementation of tasks facing the Polish Army?

[Pajewski] We are seeking an optimal division of the meager budget. We do our best to ensure basic conditions for training and operation of units and subunits.

Unfortunately, I have to say that next year we are planning to conduct command and staff exercises with only a limited number of troops. The available funds will not be enough to have necessary repairs of the infrastructure. It is estimated that this will increase the area of unrepaired premises by several million cubic meters to a total of 45 million cubic meters. Housing conditions of the command personnel will not improve. Purchases of modern domestic and foreign equipment will continue to shrink.

To increase efficiency of the equipment, we decided to allocate some funds for repairs of equipment and arms.

Therefore, one should not expect radical changes for the better in the current activities of the Army.

[Witkowski] POLSKA ZBROJNA receives signals from its readers about stringent austerity actions taking place in military units.

[Pajewski] It is true that the "Program of Frugality" has been introduced this year. This happened because the Defense Ministry was given additional tasks, which cost Z64 million and should be financed from other sources, such as the Scientific Research Committee and the state reserves. It is a fact that the funds obtained as a result of saving measures were devoured by the higher-than-projected inflation, and only a portion of this money was funneled to form 25 DKP's [expansion unknown]. If it had not been for this money, the deficit in military units and arms of service would have been even bigger.

Given the unbalanced budget allocations, probably next year we will have to introduce more austerity measures.

They do not exclude continuation of work on the comprehensive resolution of the above issues.

[Witkowski] Do you think the planned budget will allow the Polish Armed Forces to introduce their strategic goal—integration into NATO structures?

[Pajewski] Of course, integration with NATO includes not only economic, but also political, organizational, and legislative issues. Nevertheless, adaptation to our potential allies' requirements will call for additional funds.

We hope that the budget problem is not yet closed for discussion because the Sejm will have a debate on 26 November, during which the deputies will hopefully display favorable attitudes to and understanding of the defense needs of the state. I believe that the deputies will be consistent in implementing their resolution and reach a "constructive" compromise regarding the government's proposal—something the entire Armed Forces are waiting for.

Chief of General Staff on Reforms in Army

WS2111122295 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 17-19 Nov 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Andrzej Wasiak: "Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces at the National Defense Academy: The Army of 2005"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In the Senate Hall of the National Defense Academy [AON], General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of General Staff of the Polish Army, met with the commander and professional staff of the Academy. General Edmund Bolociuch, the chief of staff's first deputy, and Brigadier-General Edward Pietrzyk, chief of the Strategic and Operation Division, accompanied Gen. Wilecki. Some of the AON students participated in the meeting.*

Gen. Wilecki discussed the present state of our armed forces and its future improvement. He begun the discussion by describing the geostrategic situation of Poland before and after 1989. This outline served as a basis on which he explained the issues connected with the

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defense doctrine already accepted by our country. The general spoke broadly about foundations of "Polish security policy," connecting the doctrine closely with this document.

Furthermore, the chief of General Staff presented his own evaluation of the advancement of the reforms' implementation in the Army. Speaking on this subject, he focused his attention on the transformation of NATO, formation of the Territorial Defense Army, and deployment of military units in the country. He also mentioned that the accepted structures of the Ministry of National Defense (MON) and the General Staff of the Polish Army were consulted with the highest state authorities. He touched upon the issue of Army transformation involving other state sectors. He stated that the reorganization of the Armed Forces cannot be a problem of the Army alone, but of the entire society and its authority.

The "2005" model of our Army has been composed. The model considers, among other things, future guarantees for Army logistics, deployment of units, and their equipment. Under consideration was also training, which is always essential, regardless of the condition of combat technology. Speaking on the future shape of the Army, the chief of the General Staff quoted a rule "to know, to anticipate, not to be caught by surprise." If this rule is properly obeyed, the country will be safe.

The state of the reforms' implementation in the Army was the next topic of discussion. The general emphasized the formation of an integrated reconnaissance system. The infrastructure of the Army will be fully exploited, with the intention of increasing the professional Army. Unfortunately, the implementation of the latter depends on financial resources. Professionals cost a lot more.

The general noted that in recent years significant cuts in Armed Forces personnel had taken place, which lowered the cost of maintaining the Army. The reorganization of ground forces should be completed within a year and a half, but in the other forces will continue a little longer. He pointed out the role of territorial forces (OT), which are supposed to supplement the operational forces.

The general also discussed the final goals of military education. The reduction of the existing base by 30-40 percent had been planned simultaneously with an increased efficiency of training. He stated that an officer with a diploma from the Academy should truly be the "backbone of the Army."

The General Staff recently provided many documents pertaining to the improvement and modernization of the Army. This included a document on the integration of the our forces with NATO. The General Staff also discussed international exercises, communication systems compatibility, and participation in PFP [Partnership for Peace] exercises.

A separate issue discussed by the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army was the technical means of Army command. He devoted considerable attention to cooperation with the domestic arms industry. The Army, as well as industry enterprises, are vitally interested in such cooperation. Gen. Wilecki also discussed discipline and morale in the Armed Forces, legal issues, and budget matters. The latter are the most controversial—causing many important, ambitions plans to fall through. Unfortunately, the Army can only be as good as society can afford. In the discussion that took place after the general presentation of the Army's current and future problems, the issue of the exchange between operational units and the AON came up. In essence, the issue is about exchange of experiences: The operational officers could share their experiences with students, and the AON cadre could see how theoretical thought applies in practice. To create such a model would contribute to increasing the quality of the education offered by this military academy.

Tribunal Rules Against Walesa Appeal on Pensions

LD2011173395 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 20 Nov 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitutional Tribunal has ruled that the amendment to the law on the index-linking of pensions and annuities next year does not breach the constitution. Only two judges were of a different opinion.

The motion against the amendment, which changes the index-linking principles in 1996, was filed with the tribunal by President Lech Walesa after the Sejm, by the votes of the coalition, had rejected his veto. Now the president has to sign the law.

[Unidentified correspondent] The amendment to the law changes the method of indexing from pay-based to price-based next year. In accordance with this amendment, next year the pensions and annuities will be revalued only once—in September. They will increase by at least 2.5 percent above inflation. Their amount will depend on prices and not on pay. Previously, pensions were increased each time the average quarterly pay increased by at least 10 percent.

The president's representatives maintained before the Constitutional Tribunal that the amendment will limit any increases in pensions. According to the government, the amendment will be beneficial to pensioners because

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it guarantees a 2.5-percent increase in benefits. This year they increased 0.1 percent in real terms.

Episcopate Rejects Changes to Concordat Declaration

LD2111105295 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 21 Nov 90 5

[FBIS Translated Text] The Conference of the Episcopate of Poland has rejected the government's amendments to the joint declaration of the government and the episcopate on the issue of the Concordat. According to the bishops, the declaration in the version being proposed by the government breaches the contents of the Concordat. This reply was passed on to the government by Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek.

The bishop said that the Episcopate of Poland did not feel authorized to conduct further talks on the declaration because its new draft passed on to the episcopate by the government violated the substance of the Concordat. According to the bishops, the government's proposals were designed to bring about the renegotiation of the Concordat between the Polish Government and the Vatican.

British Corruption Alleged in Printing of Money

LD1911200895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1828 GMT 19 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 19 Nov—Senator Leszek Lackorzynski maintains that the agreement between the NBP [Polish National Bank] and the British to print the new Polish bank notes does not guarantee for the Polish side the right to their continued issue. He has asked Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia to clarify the provisions of the agreement. Speaking to a PAP journalist (on the 19th of this month), Lackorzynski said: "Major corruption is involved here."

Lackorzynski added that, for some time now, he, a senator and prosecutor with many years' experience, has been receiving reports about alleged bribes offered by the British at the time the agreement was made. These were to ensure for them a monopoly in printing the bank notes introduced in Poland after the revaluation of currency and eliminate from the market the national Securities Manufacturers [Wytwornia Papierow Wartosciowych]. "At first I dismissed them, thinking they were a result of NBP President Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz's growing involvement in the presidential campaign," Lackorzynski said. He told the PAP journalists that what persuaded him to look into the case were statements from "important people."

According to the senator, the agreement guarantees for the British the right to issue the Polish currency in perpetuity and takes work away from the Securities Manufacturers that exists for that purpose. "It is an odd case and an unprecedented one in the history of criminal science in the world," Lackorzynski emphasized.

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Iliescu 'Concerned' by 'Monetary Developments'

AU2011141695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian President Ion Iliescu is concerned about the fall of the leu and the recent monetary developments, it was said today at a news conference by the presidency's spokesman, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, who confirmed that, at the end of last week, the head of state held consultations with the Romanian prime minister and the minister of finance, however, without disclosing the results of the talks.

Regarding the process of Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation, Traian Chebeleu said that, in this process, it is not the positions of the parties that matter, but the position of the institutions on which the Constitution confers duties in foreign policy, such as the Presidency, the government, and Parliament.

Answering a question, Traian Chebeleu said that the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] has supported and continues to officially support the reconciliation initiative.

At the same time, the spokesman denied that Valer Suian would have allegedly been supported by the presidency for his election to the position of PUNR president, our correspondent, Sorin Aman, informed us.

CDR Also Expresses 'Concern'

AU1711164695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Executive Committee of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] met today in Bucharest and examined the dramatic drop in the leu's exchange rate in the last few days. It expressed profound concern over the consequences of this situation for the people's living standard—a fax received from the CDR reads. At the same time, the fax reads, the initiatives taken by the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD], at the request of the Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania [CSDR], to solve the just claims of the education trade union federations enjoy the CDR's backing.

The Executive Committee also examined the scale of values to be used for selecting the CDR candidates in the next elections, which will be submitted to the approval of the CDR Council.

At its first session after the passing away of the CDR's founder and first president, Corneliu Coposu, the Executive Committee adopted a solemn statement. Among other things, the document points out that, at its first meeting after the death of Corneliu Coposu, the CDR is piously and gratefully bowing to his memory, with the firm determination to implement the ideas and political program to which he has devoted all his life. The CDR is convinced that the PNTCD will remain a basic pillar of the organization's unity and strength and welcomes the confirmation of Mr. Ion Diaconescu, the life-long friend and associate of the great departed leader, to the position of PNTCD president. The CDR will strictly implement Coposu's electoral strategy on participation in the elections on joint lists and on backing a sole presidential candidate in the next elections. The CDR reiterates its support for Professor Emil Constantinescu as CDR president and sole candidate for Romania's presidency.

The Executive Committee expresses the conviction that the CDR, the true alternative to the current power, is capable of winning the 1996 elections and of taking the country out of the crisis and the people out of poverty.

UDMR Meeting Assesses Slovak Language Law

LD1811194895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 18 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The settlement of minority issues is a condition of the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation. This was said at a meeting of the leading body of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] in Tirgu Mures [Marosvasarhley]. Peter Marvanyi reports:

[Marvanyi] All platforms agreed with Chairman Bela Marko's recent letter in which he strongly rejects criticism levelled against Honorary Chairman Laszlo Tokes by Traian Chebeleu, spokesman for the Romanian president. However, he proposes again that Romanian-Hungarian roundtable discussions should be held. Delegates agreed that the union should take a stand in its documents over the matter of the Slovak language law, because the UDMR cannot be indifferent to the affairs of other minorities and other ethnic Hungarian communities beyond the border.

One delegate said that the Slovak language law forces European institutions to thoroughly examine similar conflicts, and to punish countries which do not adhere to European standards with expulsion. Resolutions are expected to be adopted tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Army Reports Compliance With Paris Arms Treaty

AU1811153495 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 17 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was signed in Paris in 1990, became effective today.

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A communique released by the National Defense Ministry points out that Romania, which ratified the treaty in 1992, managed to conform, correctly and on time, with the extremely difficult pledge it assumed by signing the arms reduction treaty.

As stipulated by the treaty, this reduction was carried out in three stages, and it comprised tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, and combat aircraft. The costs for the entire process of setting up destruction sites, the transportation of the equipment to be scrapped, as well as the scrapping operations themselves have been paid for from the financial resources allotted from the state budget to the national defense ministry.

Composition of Arms Production Commission Defined

AU1811171995 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 13 Nov 95 p 12

[Article by George Radian: "The Commission in Charge of Coordinating Arms Production Will Take Over Control of All Factories of Military Technology and Will Approve the Adoption of Foreign Technology"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Commission Includes Secretaries of State in the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Interior, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Central State Office for Special Problems, and Others

Romania's Government adopted a decision regarding the composition and duties of the commission in charge of coordinating defense production. The composition of the commission is as follows:

President: Secretary of state and head of the department in charge of Army outfitting and logistics;

Members: Secretary of state in the Ministry of Interior; secretary of state in the Ministry of Industries; secretary of state in the Ministry of Research and Technology; secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance; secretary of state in the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection; secretary of state and head of the Central State Office for Special Problems; general executive director at the State Property Fund; deputy director of the Romanian Intelligence Service; state counselor in the prime minister's office.

Secretary: Head of the Programs and Resources Directorate in the Army Outfitting and Logistics Department.

The Personnel and the Assets in the Defense Production Sector Benefits From Special Protection

In accordance with the provisions of Law No. 78/1995 regarding the protection of personnel and assets in the defense production sector, the council in charge of coordinating defense production has the following duties:

—Examines and approves the draft research-development programs of military technology products and correlates them with the resources that can be ensured and with the needs of all components of the national defense system, in view of preparing it for approval by the country's Supreme Defense Council;

—Examines the possibilities of completing the programs of developing new military technology products or to modernize the ones currently existing in the Army's supply, recommends the extent of involvement of internal research units, and approves the participation of foreign firms in completing and unfolding these programs;

—Approves the cooperation programs of economic factors in the defense production sector with foreign partners aimed at manufacturing military technology products;

—Once every quarter examines the stage of fulfillment of programs on research and development of military technology products, the possibilities of marketing at home and exporting abroad the technology manufactured in the defense production sector, the execution of orders for repair of arms, for ammunition, combat technology, and for acquisition of spare parts and other materials of a military nature, necessary to the forces of the national defense system, as well as the stage of implementing the quality ensuring systems; forwards reports to the country's Supreme Defense Council about these domains together with recommendations and proposals to the executive bodies, aimed at solving difficulties and shortfalls noticed in the work of completing the defense production; every quarter requests, through the authorized ministries, and receives reports from economic factors on the stage of fulfillment of research-development-production programs for military technology that is in their sphere of activity.

—Oversees and periodically reports to the country's Supreme Defense Council and the government the stage of fulfilling the programs of restructuring the defense production sector;

—Approves—from the viewpoint of research, design, and production—the strategy for outfitting the components of the national defense system, with a view to presenting it for approval to the country's Supreme Defense Council.

The mail, documents, and archives of the commission are handled and preserved at the Army Outfitting and Logistics Department's Program and Resources

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Directorate, while the data and data processing output is taken over, worked out, and stored by the Data Processing Office of the Army Outfitting and Logistics Department.

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Foreign Ministry Urges Non-Recognition of FRY

LD1711162995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1512 GMT 17 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, Nov 17 (TANJUG)—The Slovenian Foreign Ministry has called Contact Group, European and other countries not to recognize the F.R.Y. (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) as the heir to the former S.F.R.Y. (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) from which Slovenia was first to secede thus ushering in the country's bloody collapse.

As was made public in Ljubljana on Friday, Slovenia seeks the 'issue of the heritage of the S.F.R.Y. to be resolved separately from the current talks in Dayton' and warns that it will 'in no way agree to allowing Serbia's and Montenegro's access to the former S.F.R.Y.'s property and foreign currency reserves abroad once the sanctions against the F.R.Y. are lifted.'

Slovenia forcibly seceded from the S.F.R.Y. late June 1991, and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the suit, while the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia alone broke away peacefully. Serbia and Montenegro, which had opposed the breakup of the former S.F.R.Y. proclaimed the F.R.Y. in April 1992, emphasizing that thus they were ensuring the continuity of the S.F.R.Y.

Talks on Bosnia, opened in Dayton on November 1, are being held by Serbian and Croatian Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman and leader of part of the Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegovic. A success of these talks would result, as was announced, in the suspension of the United Nations sanctions against the F.R.Y.

In attempting to internationalize its years-long anti-Yugoslav campaign, renewed now at the time the Dayton talks are in their final stage, the Slovenian Government also stressed it was categorically against the F.R.Y.'s succeeding the former Yugoslavia in the United Nations.

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Federal

Belgrade: 'Too Much' Invested for Talks To Fail

AU2111101095 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 21 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks continued in Dayton overnight, however, nobody was able to say whether this peace marathon that started on 1 November would end today or not.

The only thing that State Department Spokesman David Levi told the reporters just before midnight on Monday was that the next meeting with the press would be held at 0700 local time on Tuesday morning, which is 1300 Yugoslav time [1200 GMT]. Levi confirmed that the negotiations are continuing in Dayton and that intensive concluding consultations were being held. In the course of the night, we worked in circles, whereby the mediators would carry controversial documents from one delegation to another, trying to reach a compromise solution. It is also known here that the maps are the most important and, at the moment, the only remaining controversial issue. Whether the Muslim delegation headed by Alija Izetbegovic is resisting these maps because it is dissatisfied with the territorial solution or because it got scared of the peace that only partially acknowledges their insistence in a unified Bosnia is quite another matter.

The State Department spokesman, who is obliged to inform reporters about the proceedings in the talks, strictly observed the media blockade that is accompanying the negotiations at the Wright-Patterson base last night. However, it is nevertheless expected here that the peace process will not fail this morning. The international community, the mediators, the negotiators, and especially the United States have invested too much in the current stage of the peace talks to let it all fall through casually at the moment when peace is within their grasp. It is expected that the announced ceremony of the conclusion of the peace talks will be held in the course of the day, naturally, with the adoption of a peace agreement that has practically been completed. In this case, U.S. President Clinton would be the one to announce that peace has been reached in Ohio. However, nothing of this can be taken for granted until it is announced officially that the talks have ended and that the issue of peace has been solved.

Foreign Minister, Canadian Diplomat Hold Talks

LD2011210895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2100 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov 20 (TANJUG)—Deputy Yugoslav Foreign Minister Dr Radoslav Bulajic held a talk on Monday with Jean-Pierre Juneau, assistant for Europe in the Canadian Foreign Ministry, about the situation in the territory of former Yugoslavia and about the peace talks in Dayton.

Juneau expressed Canada's expectations regarding a successful ending of the Dayton talks and advised Bulajic of Canada's planned participation in a program of economic reconstruction of the areas of former Yugoslavia once the crisis was resolved by agreement.

It was noted by both sides that the lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) would enable a quick recovery of traditionally friendly relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Canada in all domains.

Juneau also had a talk with Assistant Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic about efforts towards a political and just settlement of the crisis in areas of former Yugoslavia and about the relevant roles of the F.R.Y. and Canada.

The two sides assessed that the successful end to the peace process would enable the full normalization of the two countries' relations, expansion of political dialogues, and the development of traditionally friendly relations between the F.R.Y. and Canada.

Also featured at the talks were the prospects for the renewal and development of economic cooperation between the two countries, for which, as the two sides ascertained, broad possibilities and mutual interests existed.

The Yugoslav side displayed interest in transfers of up-to-date Canadian technology and in capital investments from that country.

Bearing in view a large number of emigrants of Yugoslav origin in Canada, it was particularly pointed to the necessity to renew as soon as possible the work of the F.R.Y. consulate general in Toronto and to reestablish regular air traffic between the two countries.

Serbia

Information Minister, Romanian TV Director Meet

LD2011204395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2023 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 20 (TANJUG)—Serbia's Information Minister Ratomir Vico [name as received] received Monday Romanian Radio-Television Director Dimitri Popa.

Vico said Romanian TV had been one of those which had correctly covered the developments in the former Yugoslavia.

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Serbia's information minister told Popa that a correct coverage of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the Serbian people was increasingly present in the world.

He said he hoped that the agreement which was expected to be reached in Dayton, Ohio, would mark a turning point in the coverage of the developments in the former Yugoslavia in the sense that it would be turned more to positive topics—development and cooperation.

Romanian guest Popa, in Belgrade at the invitation of Radio-TV Serbia, said Romanian National Radio-TV had tried to cover as objectively and professionally as possible the developments in the former Yugoslavia.

Probe To Disprove Srebrenica Accusations Urged

AU2111105295 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Nov 95 p 2

[Commentary by Nebojsa Curcic: "The Trap of the 'Srebrenica Case'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Friday, the HERALD TRIBUNE on its front page carried a WASHINGTON POST report about alleged crimes committed by Serbs against the Muslims in Srebrenica in early July of this year.

The author claims that the "Srebrenica" file, which is in the possession of the tribunal in The Hague, contains statements of survivors who described the summer's events in the until recently unknown town in eastern Bosnia as "scenes from hell that will remain engraved on the darkest pages of history."

(Fuad Riyad), one of the judges at The Hague, told the THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent that the crimes committed there were unimaginable: Civilians were tortured and killed, and subsequently thrown into mass graves; in some places, the victims were buried alive; women, children, and old people were beaten, tortured, and then slaughtered; one old man was forced to eat the liver of his killed grandson.... All these monstrosities, claims THE WASHINGTON POST, were carried out by the Serbs.

If one has the stomach to read the text through to the end, and if he is a Serb, wherever he may be, he has a choice between two things:

The first is that what THE WASHINGTON POST has written and the HERALD TRIBUNE reported is a lie.

The testimonies of former UN commanders and officers stationed in Bosnia, the findings of expert teams from various countries (Britain and Russia), and finally, Lord David Owen's recently published book prove that, in this war, which should be coming to an end, the Muslim side employed the dirtiest of methods to achieve its goals. One of the goals was to show the Serbs as criminals and pathological killers who rape, shell, and slaughter civilians. This is the image of Serbs created by the media, and it has been circulated for three years. If we are certain that the story about the bloody orgy around Srebrenica was invented for the sake of media pressure on the negotiations in Dayton, the political and military authorities of the Serb Republic will probably come up with evidence that this is yet another propaganda trick. Pale or Banja Luka, regardless, will conduct an investigation in the presence of investigators from The Hague of from somewhere else, they will dig around the spots considered to be mass graves, and they will clear the Serb people in Bosnia of the monstrous accusations that they are genocidal and bloodthirsty, and that "their place is on the darkest pages of history."

The other possibility is that the testimonies are perhaps partly true.

In that case, the authorities of the Serbs in Bosnia must launch an investigation that will be a hundredfold more rigorous. It can be established in detail exactly who was doing what during those 10 days in July and who is responsible for what. Without waiting for The Hague or any other court, the killers and criminals should be traced and tried by Serb jurors without any mercy or explanations to the effect that there were "higher interests" at stake. If anyone has slaughtered a child or shot an exhausted man in the back of the head, the fact that his birth certificate says that he is a Serb cannot be a mitigating circumstance for the Serb people on either side of the Drina River. He is a killer, such as exist in every nation, and only a killer. Such a person was not given license by any Serb in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, the United States.... to kill and massacre in the name of the national cause. He cannot hide behind the story that he was doing it in our name because we cannot ever agree to this. This is the only way to clear the names of tens of thousands of brave Serb soldiers in Bosnia who bravely fought for their country in this war. This is not only about defending the honor of a uniform or a flag. It is a condition so that tomorrow, children will not be ashamed of their fathers, their names, and the nation they belong to.

Some will say: "The Croats and Muslims have committed crimes more monstrous than this fabrication." True. However, the fact that there were worse killers on the other sides does not mean that we can forgive killers (if there were any) who shrouded themselves in this or that Serbian flag. If we grant clemency to ours, we shall grant clemency to theirs. If we shut our eyes before Srebrenica, we shall give them the right to shut their eyes before Medacki Djep, western Slavonia, Knin, Pakrac,

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Zagreb, Sanski Most, Dvor, Sarajevo.... We do not have a mandate for such forgiveness.

New Democracy Wants Sanctions Lifted, Refugee Aid

AU1611182595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 95

[Report on a news conference by New Democracy, in Belgrade on 16 November, by Marina Stojadinovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is expected that a compromise solution will be reached in Dayton and that peace will be agreed upon soon. The New Democracy hails the agreement on the Srem-Baranja district and believes that the Serbian delegation acted courageously and responsibly, said Radivoje Lazarevic, president of the New Democracy executive committee.

He emphasized that parallel to the Dayton talks, the following measures should also be implemented, namely, complete lifting of sanctions against our country and more effective help from the international community for the Serbian Krajina refugees. The proposal by several European Union countries for the formation of a fund to help the refugees has almost been forgotten. For that reason, the New Democracy asks that this fund start to operate.

New members of the New Democracy Zivadin Andrejevic and Nenad Jankovic, who used to be members of the Serbian Radical Party of Smederevska Palanka, were also introduced to the reporters at the news conference. It was reported at the news conference that the entire executive committee of the Serbian Radical Party of Smederevska Palanka recently changed over to the New Democracy.

Weekly Explains 'Disputes' in POLITIKA

AU1711144795 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 13 Nov 95 pp 8-11

[Article by Ivan Radovanovic: "Derby in Politika"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The story about the distribution of power in Serbia took a more dramatic turn at about 0500 on Sunday, 5 October. Two inspectors from the Belgrade Secretariat of Internal Affairs took Zivorad Minovic [former director of the Politika Company] from his office, pushed him in a "fica" [a small Fiat car] and took him for a "brief conversation." Some 15 hours later, when he was eventually released, Zivorad Minovic no longer held any position. The observers were left to conclude that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had broken even the last link connecting him to his own image of a few years ago, the image that he is now persistently trying to remove.

It was for that very reason that Milorad Vucelic, number one man in the Serbian television at one time, had to go before Minovic. The list of those yet to be "eliminated" includes Radovan Pankov, Mihalj Kertes, Mihajlo Markovic, Borisav Jovic, and many other Socialist leaders of whom no one wonders whether they will go, but when they will go. By changing his policies, Milosevic has also changed the men who would carry out these policies and bequeathed power to a completely new team rallied around the Yugoslav United Left and Mirjana Markovic. The fact that the whole "coup" was conducted in a fairly ugly way is a special story....

Scenario

The Serbian leadership had used the well-known "hot-cold" tactics against Minovic, a dangerous man who knew much. Some were trying to convince him that everything would be alright and that there was nothing to worry about, while others were at the same time "clobbering" him. Sources close to the former chairman of the [Politika] company claim that he held talks with Milosevic on several occasions in the past few months, and that the Serbian president each time assured him that disputes in POLITIKA would be stopped. According to the same sources, the last meeting occurred about a month before Minovic was ousted. As we have learned, during the four and a half-hour talks, Minovic himself proposed to leave Politika, but asked to be allowed to leave without losing face, with a reception, farewell speeches, and everything that goes with such occasions. Milosevic rejected this suggestion, saying that he still needed Politika's number one man.

According to his associates, Minovic had the last meeting with the authorities a week before he was arrested. Dragan Tomic, chairman of the Serbian Assembly, who, following Milosevic's orders, had tried even before that to "reconcile" the warring parties in Politika, had talked with Minovic, asking him that all disputes in Politika be frozen while Milosevic is in Dayton. Minovic, whose friends praised him for being able to "see things two years ahead," this time simply did not manage to see what would happen to him in only one week's time.

In addition to having the wrong first-hand information, which is unfortunate, and which only confirms the existence of someone's bad intentions, Minovic has been unlucky throughout this affair. He did not have a protector. People like Pankov, Borisav Jovic, Kertes...were already on the same list as Minovic, and therefore the chairman of the Politika company found himself in an extremely unenviable position. His opponents, people

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from the Hadzi Dragan Antic's camp, the man who after all became Minovic's executor, even boasted about how they managed to "surround Zivorad" completely. "Whoever he tried to telephone in the last few days, it turned out that he was too late, they had already been contacted that day by someone else."

In other words, Minovic's fate had been sealed some time before Milosevic left for Dayton. And then came the blow.

Chronology

Had he not been previously confused, Minovic's alarm system would probably have gone off the moment he went to see Milosevic off to Dayton. At the airport, shoulder to shoulder were standing Mirjana Markovic, who is known not to like Minovic; Hadzi Dragan Antic, who had been trying to replace him for some time; Dragan Tomic, who was allegedly trying to reconcile him and Antic and Mirjana Markovic; Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic, who had a bad report in one of Minovic's papers; and Information Minister Ratomir Vico, who will soon assume the role of Minovic's prosecutor....

Minovic realized what the game was only when Politika's striking vendors came to his office, accusing him that he wanted to sell off Politika's newsstands. Caught in the trap, Minovic then publicly stated that he would repeat what happened in 1992, the year in which he tried and succeeded in resisting Milosevic's attempts to put Politika under state control by organizing a big strike.

He himself started to prepare workers for a "counterattack." He decided to try to eliminate the main obstacle in the company itself, Hadzi Dragan Antic, director of POLITIKA. Here is how those who witnessed the last showdown described the event:

"On Saturday, POLITIKA again attacks Minovic, reproaching him for a critical article about Mirko Marjanovic in DEM, and calls for his resignation. Minovic tries to smooth the whole thing out with the 'big boss' and asks for his telephone number in Dayton. His sources say that there is only one 'hot line' for contacting Milosevic and that this line is installed in Mirko Marjanovic's office. Despite the fact that he knows the extent to which Marjanovic dislikes him, Minovic tries to get in touch with him, but to no avail. As Minovic's associates says, he was told that Marjanovic had gone hunting."

What is interesting is that on the same day the other two people who matter in this affair were not in Belgrade either. Dragan Tomic, who, apart from trying to solve the disputes in Politika, is now, according to the Constitution, standing in for Milosevic, was in London. Ljubisa Igic, head of Beobanka and chairman of the [Politika] Managing Board, was in Milocer. Faced with these facts, Minovic, it appears, decides to gamble everything.

He convenes a meeting of the Managing Board (using his role as Igic's deputy, and claiming that Igic had resigned as chairman of the Managing Board a few days earlier), at which he suspends Hadzi Dragan Antic and calls for a referendum in the company at which the workers would decide on the reunification of Politika into one single company. At the same time he appears on Politika Television. The television carries a report about the workers in the printing works who support the idea about a referendum.

Everything is indeed beginning to look like 1992 and the authorities are trying to prevent it. Late that evening (the first POLITIKA Sunday issue has already appeared in the streets), Hadzi Dragan Antic's camp is preparing a statement by POLITIKA's "Collegium," in which Minovic is accused of wanting the continuation of the war, an unstable dinar, hyperinflation, Serbia isolated by the international community, the roar of tanks in Srem, the smoke of burned houses over Sumadija....Information Minister Ratomir Vico goes into action at the same time and demands that the law be respected in Politika, and calls on the public prosecutor to react.

Both the "Collegium's" and Vico's statements are being prepared for the press, which Minovic tries to prevent. He demands that the Collegium's statement be taken out of POLITIKA's Sunday edition. About 0100, the police arrive at Politika.

After a two-hour discussion with them, Minovic agrees to the printing of the contentious statement. He is then taken to the police.

Transfer

On the scene comes Sava Andjelkovic, Minovic's lawyer and the lawyer of the Politika Company at that time. Andjelkovic demands that the minutes from the Managing Board's session, with which Hadzi Dragan Antic was suspended the day before, be signed (Antic accused Minovic of falsifying the statement from the session, claiming that Mile Kordic, director of POLITIKA EKSPRES, did not attend the session. Andjelkovic has managed to obtain Kordic's signature). After that, Andjelkovic calls Dusan Mitevic, former director of RTV [Radio and Television] of Serbia, a close friend of the Milosevic family, who says that he cannot believe that Minovic has been arrested. He also calls Public Prosecutor Miodrag Tmusic, who also expresses his disbelief. He then calls the police, who first tell him

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that they do not know where Minovic is and then that he cannot see his client since he will be released very soon anyhow. Minovic was taken to the department dealing with corporate crime. Head of this department is Miodrag Rsumovic. Andjelkovic fails to find him.

Reacting to the news that Minovic had been arrested, one of the leaders from the opposition calls a friend in the police and asks him "why Minovic was arrested." The answer is: "Because Minovic is colluding with Karadzic and wants to bring him here to Serbia."

So, this is what all this is about. Just as in the case of Vucelic. Milosevic is first persuaded to believe the story about "warmongering clan," "the turncoats close to Karadzic," and then everything was easy. Minovic, who would not even dare think about opposing Milosevic, let alone about ousting him from power, went to prison accused precisely of having done that.

"We have thrown the garbage out of Politika," said one of Milosevic's opponents with satisfaction after the arrest [sentence as published]. Hadzi Dragan Antic went to the Hyatt for breakfast with Aleksandar Tijanic, director of BK [Braca Karic] Television, who was replaced by Minovic as head of RTV Politika and kicked out of the Politika Company about a year and a half ago.

Then, on Sunday afternoon, Ljubisa Igic returns to Belgrade from Milocevo. He convenes a new session of the company's Management Board and the same evening, at about 1900, the board discusses Minovic's replacement.

Two people who had already voted in Minovic's Management Board for Antic's suspension, also vote in favor of that proposal. Sava Andjelkovic claims that he was present when one of them (Mile Kordic, director of POLITIKA EKSPRES) was called for a talk on Sunday morning to the office of Milomir Minic, secretary general of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS].

In any case, Minovic is replaced and Tomica Raicevic, minister without portfolio in the federal government, takes his position. As we have learned, the two met later in the Federation Palace to discuss the transfer of duties. It is not known when this will happen. Since his replacement, Minovic has been in his apartment. He is refusing to talk to journalists, saying that he is waiting for Milosevic to return from Dayton.

Who Is Who

One of Minovic's associates says that Minovic does not want to say anything because "whatever he says will not be good." Minovic is restricted by the fact that he had been the regime's man. Under his leadership Politika had been instrumental in bringing Milosevic to power in Serbia in the late 1980's, just as Vucelic's television was later instrumental in presenting Milosevic's war story.

According to his associates, of all the people in power, Minovic only trusted Milosevic and maintained frequent contacts only with him. He was avoiding other SPS members because he thought, among other things, that they were not equal to him in terms of influence.

He maintained links with the opposition and was particularly close to Dragoljub Micunovic and later to Dragica Draskovic. In the opposition camp, they associate him with those Socialists called the "Backa Palanka group," which includes, among others, Vucelic, Kertes, and Jovica Stanisic, head of Serbian state security.

His opponents, if one does not count Milosevic, were Mirjana Markovic, Mirko Marjanovic, Tomica Raicevic, Dragan Tomic, and lately Milomir Minic, as well as Ratomir Vico and possible millionaires such as Bogoljub Karic, chairman of the Brothers Karic Company, which is very close to the Milosevic family, then Ljubomir Mihajlovic, head of the Commercial Bank—whose list of clients includes the Politika Company, the Red Star soccer club, the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Army of Yugoslavia....On this list are also Hadzi Dragan Antic and Aleksandar Tijanic, who for their own reasons, wanted to see the back of Minovic as soon as possible.

All of them, as well as Belgrade Mayor Nebojsa Covic and Zoran Todorovic, one of the leading members of the Yugoslav United Left, were on the list of people whose files DEM, the newspaper that attacked Mirko Marjanovic, was about to open.

"The clique," as the aforementioned are referred to in Minovic's camp, was this time faster. Everything that he had probably been intending to do to them had he had sufficient time and strength, they had done to him. They convinced Milosevic that it was in fact they who should be allowed access to the big pie of power and to nibble it now together. As Zika Minovic said, the only important thing in doing so is "how long it will last."

Jovic's Diary Fails To Appear in Stores

AU1311212695 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Nov 95 p 4

[Report by "U.R.": "Controversial Cover or Content?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Borisav Jovic's book, "The Last Days of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]—Excerpts From a Diary," published by the Politika Company, which, as the author claims, "reveals the events that happened behind the scenes" during

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the crucial period in the Yugoslav crisis (1989-1992), has not appeared in the shops even 10 days after its promotion. The book is not available in book shops or at newsstands. Politika's shops claim that the book has been "sold out" and that the new edition will appear soon, either today or tomorrow. A shop assistant told us last night that she has "handed over" [predati] the books, but quickly corrected herself saying she has "sold out" [prodati] the books.

It is still unclear as to what has happened with the diary of the former president of the SFRY Presidency. As we have learned from Academician Mihajlo Markovic, Jovic was initially unhappy with the book's cover and demanded that the design be changed. However, owing to the public's great interest, he changed his mind and authorized the sale of the book with its present cover. At the book's promotion in the International Press Center, Borisav Jovic said that there were no longer any reasons to delay the book as "the public has the right to know the authentic facts that have determined our fate."

"The disappearance" of the book on its way to the readers has caused speculation that there is yet another showdown in the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS].

According to some newspapers, the printing of Jovic's book is connected directly with the replacement of Zivorad Minovic [former chairman of Politika Company]. It is further claimed that, by publishing the book, the former chairman of the Politika Company has made a disastrous mistake as the book "contains parts that Slobodan Milosevic took out during friendly authorization." Jovic himself claims, however, that this is "rubbish," adding that "there were no differences" between him and Milosevic.

The proponents of the "conspiracy theory" are backing their claims with the chronology of events. Only POLITIKA EKSPRES apparently paid some attention to the promotion of the book, and this was done only a day before Minovic's replacement. This explanation is consistent with the earlier claims about the existence of a plan to purge the SPS of its "hawks." In addition to Jovic, Vucelic, Minovic, Kertes, Markovic, Pankov... are regularly mentioned as "hawks." The real reason for "freezing" the diary notes of the former top official of the Yugoslav federation remains, however, unknown to the public. A similar thing happened a few months ago to a RTS [Radio and Television of Serbia] documentary series called "Camera Remembers," about the 9 March demonstrations, which was taken off the program. In both cases the presentation of the not-so-distant past to the public at large was skipped without excessive explanation.

[Box, p 4]

Book Without Sufficient "Historical Distance"

At the promotion of Borisav Jovic's book, Academician Mihajlo Markovic said, among other things, that the book can be read as the most exciting drama and that it "contains precious historical material necessary to understand and explain the crucial period of 1989 to 1992." In a statement for NASA BORBA, Markovic declined to comment on the political background to the book's failure to appear, but said that the attention that the book drew was natural since "such things cannot be published in many countries for several decades."

Official Presents Industrial Production Statistics

AU1611181095 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Industrial production in FRY the first 10 months of this year increased by 5.8 percent in comparison to the same period last year, Mirjana Rankovic, assistant director of the Federal Statistics Institute, stated at the regular news conference today. Here is a report by Dusan Vojnovic:

[Begin recording] Production in October increased by 14.1 percent over the previous month. Comparing the first 10 months of the previous year and this year, we noted an increase in production in nearly all sectors, except for the textile, leather, and rubber industries. Excluding all seasonal influences, production has again been on the increase in October in comparison to the average monthly production last year and it amounted to 2.5 percent. However, looking only at October this year and last, production has declined by 3.9 percent.

A considerable growth in production in Serbia and its decline in Montenegro continues to be a characteristic of the industrial production trends in the FRY. While production in Serbia in the first 10 months of this year increased by almost 7 percent, it declined in Montenegro by a little more than 9 percent. Due to the Serbian economy's considerably greater industrial potential, however, the decline in Montenegro did not influence the overall dynamics of production in the FRY considerably. [end recording]

Montenegro

Prime Minister to Meet With UK Foreign Secretary

LD2011162295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1235 GMT 20 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—The Montenegrin Government today adopted a platform for Montenegrin Prime Minister

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Milo Djukanovic's visit to Great Britain 21-22 November.

During his stay in London Djukanovic will meet with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, Minister of State in the Foreign Office Nicholas Bonsor, and Minister of State for the Armed Forces Nicholas Soames.

The government said that the visit represents the continuity of high-level political dialogue with the British side and its purpose is an exchange of opinions on the current political situation in the region.

The possibilities for stepping up and promoting Montenegrin-British cooperation within the framework of overall Yugoslav-British relations will also be discussed.

The Montenegrin Government also adopted a report on the visit of a Montenegrin delegation to the United States between 5-13 November and assessed it as successful, useful, and completely in accordance with Montenegro's interests and efforts in normalizing relations with the United States.

According to a statement issued after the Montenegrin Government's session, it was said that the overall goals of the visit were achieved, particularly regarding the improvement of Montenegrin-American relations and making the American public aware of specific Montenegrin efforts in developing democracy, respect for human rights, multiethnic tolerance, its promotion of the process of privatization, and preparedness for a speedy reintegration into international financial organizations and current integrational processes.

Kosovo

Rugova Urges Political Parties to Cooperate

AU2011190095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 18 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a meeting of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] Presidency in which the party branch chairmen participated, President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova reiterated the position of the Albanian political parties and institutions on resolving the issue of Kosova on the basis of a referendum. Here is a telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Prishtina:

[Haziri] President Rugova briefed the local LDK officials on the position on the Kosova issue in the international agenda. Within this framework, Rugova said that visits by U.S. diplomats and the visits to the United States by Kosova representatives show U.S. interest in Kosova.

Commenting on the latest developments in the regional and international political scene, President Rugova said that the Kosova leadership's positions on resolving the issue of Albanians in this area are similar to those expressed in the referendum on Kosova independence.

Dr. Rugova further spoke about the current situation in Kosova. He emphasized the importance of cooperation among the political parties and state institutions with the aim of being better organized and of further institutionalizing life in Kosova. Within this framework, Rugova praised the work of LDK activists and local officials.

President Rugova briefed those present on the preparations made for a tour in several European countries and the United States, which will be held in the framework of regular relations that Kosova has with these countries.

In a press statement, the Kosova Information Center reports that the situation in the information field in Kosova was also discussed at the meeting with LDK branch chairmen. LDK Presidency members Mehmet Harizi and Adil Pireva discussed the issue at length. During the debate on the matter, it was said that greater professionalism was required and it was stressed that information activity should be expanded within the LDK framework.

Newspapers Reportedly Publish 'Plan K'

AU1711214595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 17 Nov 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Albanian-language papers in Kosovo today published the basic principles of the so-called Plan K for Kosovo. This plan has been prepared for quite some time by the Contact Group as a part of the overall solution for the former Yugoslavia. The starting point of this plan is the restoration of the autonomy of the Kosovo Albanians and a one-year transitional period under international supervision. Here is a report by our Belgrade correspondent, Matej Surc:

[Begin recording] After several months of speculation on what was in store for Kosovo, the first tangible plan or proposal of a plan for this southern Yugoslav province has leaked out to the public. Plan K, as it was named, was allegedly handed over to the Albanians by one of the representatives of the five-member Contact Group. The plan is supposed to be discussed at the first conference on the former Yugoslavia, following the Dayton talks.

It is probably no coincidence that the plan was published following a Serbian-Croatian agreement on the gradual and supervised reintegration of eastern Slavonia into Croatia. Namely, had Belgrade succeeded in annexing a

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portion of the occupied territories in Croatia and Bosnia, the Kosovo Albanians would have insisted on Kosovo's unconditional secession from Yugoslavia.

Plan K envisages the gradual restoration of the autonomy in Kosovo. During the initial transitional period, which is supposed to last one year, the work of the institutions in the province should be reanimated and all laws that discriminate against the Albanians annulled. The Serbs would have to end the repression, withdraw the police troops and the army, and prepare the conditions for democratic local elections. Until then, the province would be administered by a mixed administrative commission, consisting of the representatives of the Serbs, the Albanians, and the international organizations, which would also supervise the process of normalization. Upon the expiry of one year, an international conference on Kosovo would be organized.

The plan will definitely become a subject of numerous debates and various interpretations. Namely, the Serbian side has already voiced opposition to the decision of the Kosovo Albanians that Ibrahim Rugova will be their representative in the transitional government. [passage omitted]

Serb Anti-Albanian Violence in October Reported

AU1811162995 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 16 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Prishtina-based [Pristina] Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) has released its newest monthly report on the Serbian regime's campaign of repression and violation of human rights in Kosova. The CDHRF says plundering of the Albanian population has become the most conspicuous practice of the Serbian regime's human rights record in Kosova besides the now protracted campaign of cracking down on the Albanians allegedly in connection with arms collection. "Arrests, raids, convictions, physical torture, and police interrogation of Albanians has become an everyday Kosovar reality," the Prishtina human rights organization notes.

During October 1995, as many as 727 Albanians were affected by Serbian state-sponsored repression and violence, the CDHRD says, noting that 188 persons were arbitrarily arrested and/or detained; 123 Albanian households were raided on and had their homes searched by the Serbian police; 123 persons were subjected to physical torture, 22 of whom were incurred body injuries on the occasion; 276 persons were maltreated in connection with arms searches campaign; 26 Albanians were summoned so-called "informative conversations;" 144 people were summoned to police, whereas the police itself was after 17 more. The CDHRF says 23 women, 11 children, and 16 elderly people were among those targeted by the Serbian police in October. In diverse forms, five journalists, 67 political activists, 48 teachers and educational activists, sports activists, etc., were harassed and maltreated by the Serbian regime, according to the CDHRF. During October 13 persons were convicted to prison terms, one person was kidnapped by the police, 22 had their passports seized. There were 22 cases of police intimidation of Albanians, while due to Serbian police torture and threats four Albanian families had to flee the country, the CDHRF says. It further notes that four Albanian families were evicted from their apartments and Serb families were housed there instead during the month. The Prishtina human rights organization points out in its report that the practice of forceful induction of Albanian youths in the Serbian military has continued. Touching on the Serbian regime's campaign of plundering of Albanian-owned businesses and individual citizens, the CDHRF says October saw at least 138 cases of Albanian citizens and businesses being targeted by the campaign, large sums of goods and foreign currency being arbitrarily seized by the Serbian regime.

Former Policemen Criticize Serb 'Persecution'

AU1811162795 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 16 Nov 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Independent Trade Unions of Former Police Force of Kosova (ITUPFK) has forwarded an appeal to similar international associations urging solidarity and protection of its membership, ruthlessly oppressed by the Serbian regime in Kosova. The ITUPFK recalls that following the Serbian crackdown on Kosova in 1990, over 3,500 Albanian policemen and other employees with the former Kosova police force were arbitrarily dismissed from their jobs, to be later victims of an unprecedented persecution by the Serbian regime. Albanian former policemen have been persecuted, the sole reason being the fact that they have established their independent trade unions so as to protect their social, economic, and civic rights. Since its foundation, the ITUPFK has been subjected to an outrageous campaign of the Serbian mass media and the Serbian regime itself. Over the past years, more than 850 former police employees have undergone various forms of the Serbian regime and police, including beatings, harassment, threats and long-term prison terms. By the end of the last year, as many as 198 former Kosova police employees were arrested and brutally tortured amidst Serbian regime's efforts to allegedly track down the "parallel police force in Kosova" operating alongside the heavy Serbian police build-up. Around 150 were held in detention, to face earlier this year Serbian regime charges for having allegedly been involved in "hostile

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activity" undermining the territorial integrity of the self-styled Yugoslavia.

In several kangaroo trials staged this year in Prishtina [Pristina], Peje [Pec], Gjilan [Gnjilane], and Prizren, 155 Albanian former policemen were sentenced to a total of 417 years of imprisonment. The Serbian court authorities failed to produce any corroborative evidence whatsoever in support of the indictment against them. All the defendants have denied involvement in any "parallel police force in Kosova." They have revealed testimonies of outrageous torture they had been subjected to by the Serbian police and state security, and of having been forced to sign self-incriminating statements concocted on their behalf by the Serbian state security. The very statements/confession were to be used later in the trials as the sole evidence in support of the Serbian regime's indictment.

The trade unions of former policemen of Kosova appeal to the international public opinion and analogous trade unions associations worldwide to add to their voice against the persecution they have been subjected to by the Serbian regime. The Kosova former policemen also call for solidarity and material support, for they have suffered under the Serbian occupying regime in Kosova.

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